英文早读第82篇，选自巴菲特年度信，友才翻译。

(1) Any significant sums compounded at such rates take on national debt proportions at alarming speed.
（1）任何大额资金以这样的复合率增长都会以令人惊恐的比例承担国债。

(2) During our eight-year history a general revaluation of securities has produced average annual rates of overall gain from the whole common stock field which I believe unattainable in future decades. Over a span of 20 or 30 years, I would expect something more like 6%-7% overall annual gain from the Dow instead of the 11.1% during our brief history. This factor alone would tend to knock 4 points or so off of our annual compounding rate. It would only take a minus 20.5% year in 1965 for the Dow to bring it down to a 7% average figure for the nine years. Such years (or worse) should definitely be expected from time to time by those holding equity investments. If a 20% or 30% drop in the market value of your equity holdings (such as BPL) is going to produce emotional or financial distress, you should simply avoid common stock type investments. In the words of the poet - Harry Truman - "If you can't stand the heat, stay out of the kitchen." It is preferable, of course, to consider the problem before you enter the "kitchen".
（2）在我们8年历史中，一个常规的股票重新估值产生的平均年度盈利率来自于整体股票市场的变化，我认为在未来几十年是不可获得的。超过20到30年跨度，我相信来自于道琼斯指数差不多大约6%-7%整体年度盈利代替在我们主要历史上的11.1%。单独这个因素将会是我们年度复合率击掉4个百分点。仅仅如果在1965年道琼斯指数取得-20.5%亏损就会把这9年的复合率下降至平均7%。这样的年份（或许更糟糕）无意会时不时的被那些持有资产投资的人预期。如果一个资产持有（例如巴菲特合伙基金）市场价值20%或30%的下跌将会产生精神或财务窘迫，你应该避免股票类型投资。在哈利徒曼的诗中的话，“如果你不能站在炉子旁，就站在厨房外面”。这当然是更好的去考虑这个问题在你进入“厨房”前。

(3) We do not consider it possible on an extended basis to maintain the 16.6 percentage point advantage over the Dow of the Partnership or the 11.2 percentage point edge enjoyed by the limited partners. We have had eight consecutive years in which our pool of money has out-performed the Dow, although the profit allocation arrangement left the limited partners short of Dow results in one of those years. We are certain to have years (note the plural) when the Partnership results fall short of the Dow despite considerable gnashing of teeth by the general partner (I hope not too much by the limited partners). When that happens our average margin of superiority will drop sharply. I might say that I also think we will continue to have some years of very decent margins in our favor. However, to date we have benefited by the fact that we have not had a really mediocre (or worse) year included in our average, and this obviously cannot be expected to be a permanent experience.
（3）我们不认为这是可能的：一个扩大的基础获得比道琼斯指数按合伙基金计算多16.6个百分点领先或者按LP享有的11.2个百分点计算。我们有8年连续的资金比道琼斯指数更优异的表现，尽管这些年有一年盈利分配留给LP的少于道琼斯结果。我们当然会有一些年份（注意这个复数）当合伙基金结果落后于道琼斯尽管GP们（我希望不是LP们）已经相当咬牙切齿。当这些发生时我们的平均领先幅度将会显著下降。我或许会说我也认为我们会继续有些年份是对我们有利的令人满意的领先。然而，到目前我们确信这个事实我们没有一个真正平平（或者更糟糕）的年份在我们的平均表现中，这显然不能被期望是一个永久的经历。

So what can we expect to achieve? Of course, anything I might say is largely guesswork, and my own investment philosophy has developed around the theory that prophecy reveals far more of frailties of the prophet than it reveals of the future.
因此我们可以期望获得什么呢？当然，任何我说的事或许很大程度是猜测，并且我自己的投资哲学已经发展为围绕这个理论：预言揭露的预言家的脆弱比揭露未来多得多。

Nevertheless, you, as partners, are entitled to know my expectations, tenuous as they may be. I am hopeful that our longer term experience will unford along the following basis:
然而，你作为合伙人应当知道我的期望，或许他们是脆弱的。

(1) An overall gain from the Dow (including dividends, of course) averaging in the area of 7% per annum, exhibiting customarily wide amplitudes in achieving this average -- say, on the order of minus 40% to plus 50% at the extremes with the majority of years in the minus 10% to plus 20% range;
（1）道琼斯指数（当然包括股息）整体盈利平均在每年7%的范围，展示通常的较宽振幅在实现平均的时候——也就是说，有这样的顺序从亏损40%到盈利50%在极端情况同时大部分年份在亏损10%到盈利20%范围；

(2) An average advantage of ten percentage points per annum for BPL before allocation to the general partner - again with large amplitudes in the margin from perhaps 10 percentage points worse than the Dow in a bad year to 25 percentage points better when everything clicks; and
（2）巴菲特合伙基金平均每年10个百分点领先在分配给GP前——再一次伴随大的振幅在领先幅度上从或许在坏的年份落后道琼斯10个百分点到当一切都击中时领先25个百分点；并且

(3) The product of these two assumptions gives an average of 17% to BPL or about 14% to limited partners. This figure would vary enormously from year to year; the final amplitudes, of course, depending, on the interplay of the extremes hypothesized in (1) and (2).
（3）这两个假设的结果给了巴菲特合伙基金平均17%收益或者给LP大约14%收益。这个数字将在每年差别很大；最后的振幅，当然，取决于在（1）和（2）中假设的极端情况的相互作用。

I would like to emphasize that the above is conjecture, perhaps heavily influenced by self-interest, ego, etc. Anyone with a sense of financial history knows this sort of guesswork is subject to enormous error. It might better be left out of this letter, but it is a question frequently and legitimately asked by partners. Long-range expectable return is the primary consideration of all of us belonging to BPL, and it is reasonable that I should be put on record, foolish as that may later make me appear. My rather puritanical view is that any investment manager, whether operating as broker, investment counselor, trust department, Investment Company, etc., should be willing to state unequivocally what he is going to attempt to accompish and how he proposes to measure the extent to which he gets the job done.
我想强调上面这些是猜想，或许严重受个人兴趣、自我等等影响。任何人有财务历史感的知道这类猜想是巨大的错误。他或许最好不在这封信中，但是这个问题经常并合情合理的被合伙人问到。长期预期回报率是我们所有属于BPL的人首要考虑的点，所以这也是合理的我把它记录在案，尽管之后会让我似乎是愚蠢的。我进一步更严格的观点是任何投资经历，不论工作为经纪人、投资顾问、信托机构、投资公司等等，都应该愿意毫不含糊地陈述他将试图实现什么以及他如何期望去衡量他工作实现的内容。

90.alarming：引起恐慌的；令人惊慌的；使人惊恐的
91.distress：窘迫，痛苦；遇难，遇险；悲伤；贫困；忧虑；困苦
92.reveal：揭示；显示；透露；展示；露出；显出
93.frailties：弱点；懦弱；软弱；衰弱
94.tenuous：脆弱的；纤细的；微弱的；飘渺的；薄的；易断的
95.customarily：习惯的；习惯上；通常
96.amplitude：振幅
97.assumption：假设；假定；担任；承担；获得
98.interplay：相互作用；相互影响
99.hypothesis：假设；（有少量事实但未被证实的）假说；（凭空的）猜想；猜测
100.conjecture：猜想；推测；猜测；臆测；揣测
101.be left out：被排除在外；脱漏
102.legitimate：合法的；法定的；合情合理的；正当合理的；法律认可的
103.put on record：记录在案
104.puritanical：道德极严格的；清教徒式的
105.unequivocal：毫不含糊地；斩钉截铁的；表达明确的