Dilution 稀释
Dilution refers to the phenomenon of a shareholder’s ownership percentage in a company decreasing because of an increase in the number of outstanding shares, leaving the shareholder with a smaller piece of the corporate pie. The total number of outstanding shares can increase for any number of reasons, such as the issuance of new shares to raise equity capital or the exercise of stock options or warrants.
稀释指公司股东持股比例下降的现象，是由于流通股数量的增加导致股东持有公司更少的份额。流通股总数量可由于任何原因增加，例如发行新股增加股本或行使股票期权或权证。
However, not all dilutive issuances are harmful to the existing shareholders. If the company issues shares but receives sufficient cash in exchange for the shares, the shareholders’ ownership percentages may be reduced but the value of the company has increased enough to offset the lower ownership percentage. On the other hand, if the cash received is insufficient, the increase in the value of the company will not be enough to offset the reduction in ownership percentages.
然而，并非所有的稀释性发行都对现有股东利益造成损失。若公司发行股票但因股票交易获得足够的现金，股东的所有权比例可能下降但公司的价值增加以至于抵销较低的所有权比例。另一方面，若公司获得的现金不足，公司价值的增加就不足以抵销股东所有权比例的下降。
In venture capital deals, the transaction documents typically include negotiated provisions designed to deal with a dilutive issuance that would otherwise reduce the value of the preferred investors’ shares (relative to the price the preferred investors paid for their shares). These provisions are referred to as “anti-dilution provisions.”
在风险投资交易中，交易文件通常包括旨在处理稀释性发行的协商条款，否则会降低优先股投资者股票的价值（相比较于优先股投资者为他们股票所支付的价格而言）。这些条款统称为“反稀释条款”。
Anti-dilution 反稀释
In venture capital terms, dilution becomes a concern for preferred stockholders when confronted with a “down round” — a later issuance of stock at a price that is lower than the preferred issue price. Anti-dilution provisions protect against a down round by adjusting the price at which the preferred stock converts into common stock. We previously discussed the concept of the preferred stock being convertible into common here, noting that many of the preferences of the preferred stock are based on the number of shares of common into which the preferred converts (e.g., voting rights, dividend rights, liquidation).
在风险投资交易中，稀释成为优先股股东面临“下跌”时的一个担忧－之后股票的发行价格低于优先发行的价格。反稀释条款通过调整优先股转换为普通股的价格从而防止下跌。我们之前讨论过可转换为普通股的优先股的概念，指出优先股的许多优先选择权是基于优先股转换的普通股的数量（例如表决权、股息分配权，清算等）。
There are three common alternatives for anti-dilution provisions described in the NVCA’s model term sheet: full ratchet, weighted average, and no price-based anti-dilution protection.
美国风险投资协会条款说明模版中描述的反稀释规定主要有三种常见的选择：棘轮条款、加权平均值、无价格基础的反稀释保护。
Full Ratchet棘轮条款
A “full ratchet” provision is the simplest type of anti-dilution provision but it is the most burdensome on the common stockholders and it can have significant negative effects on later stock issuances. Full ratchet works by simply reducing the conversion price of the existing preferred to the price at which new shares are issued in a later round. So if the preferred investor bought in at $1.00 per share and a down round later occurs in which stock is issued at $0.50 per share, the preferred investor’s conversion price will convert to $0.50 per share. This means each preferred share now converts into 2 common shares.
棘轮条款是最简单的反稀释条款但是对普通股股东而言是最难以负担的，并且会对之后的股票发行产生重大负面影响。棘轮条款通过简单地降低现存优先股的转换价格为后一轮发行新股的价格。所有若优先股投资者以1美元每股价格买入股票在之后轮的融资中股票下跌为每股0.5美元。这意味着每个优先股现在转换成两个普通股。
Full ratchet is easy and it’s the most advantageous way to handle dilution from the preferred investor’s standpoint but it is the most risky for the holders of any common stock. With this approach, the common stockholders bear all of the downside risk while both common and preferred share in the upside.
棘轮条款容易，最有利的优势是站在优先股投资者的角度来处理稀释问题，但是对普通股股东风险最大。通过这种方法，普通股股东承担所有价格下跌的风险，而普通股与优先股同时处于上涨空间。
Full ratchet can also make later rounds more difficult. If the company needs to issue a Series B round and the stock price has decreased, it may be difficult to get the Series A investors to participate because they are getting a full conversion price adjustment. In essence, the Series A investors are getting more shares without putting more cash in the Series B round. In addition, the full ratchet provision will reduce the amount the Series B investors will be willing to pay in a down round (simply because full ratchet results in more shares outstanding on an “as converted” basis).
棘轮条款也可能会使得后面的轮次更加困难。若公司需要发行B轮且股价已经下跌，A轮投资者很难参与，因为他们获得全面的转化价格调整。本质上，A轮投资者无需在B轮投入更多的现金就能获得更多的股票。此外，棘轮条款将减少B轮投资者在下一轮降价融资中的出资（仅仅由于棘轮条款导致更多流通股处于“转换”的基础上）。
Weighted Average加权平均值
A second and more gentle method for handling dilution is referred to as the “weighted average” method. [1] Following is the calculation for a typical weighted average anti-dilution provision presented by the NVCA’s term sheet (it looks a little intimidating at first glance but it’s actually pretty simple):
第二种更温和的处理稀释的方式称为“加权平均值”方法。［1］以下是美国风险投资协会条款清单所显示的典型的加权平均值反稀释条款的计算（第一眼看上去有些吓人，但实际上相当简单）：
CP2 = CP1 * (A+B) / (A+C)
CP2 = Conversion price immediately after new issue
CP2 = 新发行后的转化价格
CP1 = Conversion price immediately before new issue
CP1 = 新发行前的转化价格
A = Number of shares of common stock deemed outstanding immediately before new issue [2]
A = 新发行前视为已发行普通股的数量［2］
B = Total consideration received by company with respect to new issue divided by CP1
B = CP1除以公司新发行获得的总对价
C = Number of new shares of stock issued
C = 已发行股份的数量
Let’s suppose a company has 1,000,000 common shares outstanding and then issues 1,000,000 shares of preferred stock in a Series A offering at a purchase price of $1.00 per share. The Series A stock is initially convertible into common stock at a 1:1 ratio for a conversion price of $1.00.
假设一家公司已发行100万普通股，之后在A轮中发行价格为每股1美元的100万优先股。A轮股票最初可以1:1比例转换为普通股，转化价格为1美元。
Next, the company conducts a Series B offering for an additional 1,000,000 new shares of stock at $0.50 per share. The new conversion price for the Series A shares will be calculated as follows:
接下来，公司在B轮中以每股0.5美元增加发行100万新股。A轮股票的新的转化价格计算如下：
CP2 = $1.00 x (2,000,000 + $500,000) / (2,000,000 + 1,000,000) = $0.8333.
This means that each of the Series A investor’s Series A shares now converts into 1.2 shares of common (Series A original issue price/conversion ratio = $1.0 /$0.8333 = 1.2).
这意味着每个A轮投资者的A系列股票现在转换为1.2普通股（A轮原始发行价格／转换比例＝1美元／0.8333美元＝1.2）.
Under the discussion of full ratchet above, we noted that the preferred shares became convertible into 2 common shares post-issuance. Under weighted average, the preferred shares became convertible into 1.2 shares. This simple example illustrates that the weighted average approach is much less beneficial for the preferred investor but much less onerous for the common stockholders.
基于上述对棘轮条款的讨论，我们注意到优先股在发行后转换为2个普通股。根据加权平均值，优先股转换为1.2个普通股。这个简单的例子说明加权平均值对优先股投资者的受益并不多，但让普通股股东减轻了负担。
However, to provide a little more context, let’s assume our hypothetical company is sold and liquidated for $10,000,000 after the Series B round. We’ll also assume, for simplicity, that there was no dividend preference for the preferred shares and that we’re using a non-participating structure. Here’s how the cash gets distributed with full ratchet and weighted average, respectively:
然而，为提供一些更多的背景，假设我们设想的公司在B轮融资后被出售并以1000万美元清算。为简单其间，我们还假设对优先股没有股息优先权，我们使用非参与结构。下表是现金如何通过棘轮条款和加权平均值各自实现分配：
棘轮条款
1000万美元
实际
普通
完全稀释
清算
股票
转换
比例
收入
普通
100万
100万
25%
250万
A轮
100万
200万
50%
500万
B轮
100万
100万
25%
250万
总计
300万
400万
100%
1000万
加权平均值
1000万美元
实际
普通
完全稀释
清算
股票
转换
比例
收入
普通
100万
100万
31%
312.5万
A轮
100万
120万
38%
375万
B轮
100万
100万
31%
312.5万
总计
300万
320万
100%
1000万
Note how much more the Series A investors get with full ratchet and how much this reduces the amounts distributable to Series B investors and common stockholders.
请注意A系列投资者通过棘轮条款得到多少，这会减少可分配给B系列投资者和普通股东的金额。
No Price-Based Anti-dilution Protection 无价格基础的反稀释保护
The third alternative for anti-dilution in the NVCA’s term sheet is no price-based anti-dilution protection. In this scenario, the preferred investor bears the risk of a down round along with the common stockholders. This is the fairest from the standpoint of the common stockholders but many preferred investors will not agree to take the down round risk without any anti-dilution protection.
在美国风险投资协会条款清单中第三个反稀释的方法是无价格基础的反稀释保护。在这种情况下，优先股股东与普通股股东共同承担下跌的风险。从普通股股东角度而言这是最公平的方式但是许多优先股投资者在没有任何反稀释保护的条件下不会同意承担下跌的风险。
