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弗朗索瓦·菲永简介，1954年3月生于法国西部城市勒芒，是执政的人民运动联盟成员，具有公共法学和政治学博士学位。

1981年，他首次当选国民议会议员，是当时最年轻的国会议员。

1993年3月，弗朗索瓦·菲永首次进入法国政府，并在政府中担任高等教育和研究部长。

2002年5月，菲永进入拉法兰政府，担任社会事务、劳工和互助部长。他一上任，就着手法国养老金制度改革。由于改革力度较大，他所推行的改革被称为“菲永改革”。

2005年5月底，离开内阁后，菲永积极支持萨科齐备战总统大选，成为萨科齐竞选总统中的“首席高参”，对萨科齐的当选居功至伟。

《金融时报》说，在左翼阵营看来，萨科齐的右翼团队中，菲永是“最不讨厌”的一位，他也被视为萨科齐阵营的“鸽派”代表人物。

菲永以勇于改革和善于与社会各界对话著称。他喜欢文学，爱好登山活动，并对赛车情有独钟。其所著的《法兰西能够承受真相》一书，颇为畅销。

菲永在法国议会上称：“我们需要中国，世界也要靠中国走出经济衰退。”菲永还强调，西藏是中国领土的一部分。

-信息来自网络。侵删。

The FN’s first base was in the south, where Mr Le Pen built support among French settlers returning from independent Algeria in the 1970s. Its second was the rust-belt of the north and east, where it scooped up the disappointed vote that once went to socialists or communists. Maps by Hervé Le Bras, a demographer, show that the FN now has a third home in Mr Guilluy’s peripheral areas—beyond the outskirts of the cities, but not deeply rural. In a ring of communes between 40km and 50km from the centre of Paris, for example, the FN’s candidate in the 2015 regional elections, Wallerand de Saint-Just, won 32% of the vote. In places 80km out or more, he scored fully 41%

国民阵线的第一个根据地在南部，勒庞先生在20世纪70年代因阿尔及利亚独立返回法国的定居者中获得了支持。它的第二个根据地在北部和东部的‘’铁锈地带‘’，在那里曾经投给社会党或共产党的选票由于被辜负而被他们收入囊中。人口统计学家HervéLe Bras的地图显示，国民阵线现在找到了第三个安家落户的所在，即Guilluy先生所谓的周边地区-城市郊区以外，但又不是深入农村的地方。比如，在距离巴黎市中心40至50公里的公社圈里，国民阵线候选人Wallerand de Saint-Just在2015年的地区选举中赢得了32％的选票。而在80公里或更远的地方，他的得票率达到十足的41％。

Isolation boosts FN support. “The farther you live from a railway station”, says Mr Le Bras, “the more you are likely to vote FN.” France has high-quality public services,and its citizens have matching expectations for the fabric of their lives. When that fabric thins—when a local butcher closes, or a doctor leaves town—they feel neglect. A common factor behind the FN vote in such places, says Jérôme Fourquet, director of Ifop, is “a sense of abandonment, of being left behind by an elite that doesn’t care.”

与世隔绝的程度推动了国民阵线支持率的上升。Le Bras先生说 “你离火车站距离越远，就更有可能投票给国民阵线。”法国拥有高质量的公共服务，其公民将期望和生活中的织物等量齐观。当织物变薄时 -例如当一位当地的屠夫关张，或者一位医生离开小镇 - 他们会觉得被忽视。 Ifop的总监JérômeFourquet说，国民阵线在这些地方收获选票背后一个共同因素在起作用，那是一种“被放弃的感觉，被漠不关心的精英抛弃的感觉。“

Ms Le Pen exploits this sentiment with uncanny skill. Born into politics and raised in a mansion in a swish Parisian suburb, she somehow manages to speak for those she calls the country’s “forgotten” in a way they find credible. The reason this works is partly Ms Le Pen’s shrewd feel for simple language and anti-elite slogans. But it is also because France has been going through an unusually unsettled time that has left people looking beyond the established parties and given French populism distinctive features.

勒庞女士以不可思议的技巧借用了这种情绪。生于政治世家，长于时髦巴黎郊区的豪宅里的她，设法为她口中的国家“被遗忘者”代言，以他们认为可信的一种方式。这个做法有效的原因部分是由于勒庞女士对简单的语言和反精英口号精于世故的感觉。但也是因为法国一直在经历的一个异常的不稳定的时期，使得人们既定党派之外寻求解决方案，这给予了法国民粹主义不同凡响的特征。

One is a sense that a great country, the cradle of human rights and the Enlightenment, has somehow lost its way. This is particularly obvious in economic terms. Since the end of the trente glorieuses, the three decades of strong growth that followed the second world war, it has been debt, rather than growth, that has financed the high-speed trains, the blooming municipal flower beds and the generous provisions for child care, ill health, job loss and old age that are the hallmark of France’s splendid public sector. French public spending now accounts for a greater share of GDP than it does in Sweden. But no French government has balanced its budget since 1974.

那种伟大国家的感觉，人权摇篮和启蒙运动，已经有点不知所踪。这在经济方面尤其明显。从特伦特荣誉结束以来，（指二战之后三十年的强劲增长），是债务而不是增长，为高速列车，城市里盛开的花坛和慷慨的福利（如儿童保育，生病医疗，失业和老年福利）提供了资金，这是辉煌的法国公共部门的标志。法国公共开支占GDP的份额比瑞典的还要大。但自1974年以来，没有一届法国政府做到平衡预算。

Les Trente Glorieuses ("The Glorious Thirty") refers to the thirty years from 1945-1975 following the end of the Second World War in France. The name was first used by the French demographer Jean Fourastié.

以上来源于:Wikipedia

Over the past 15 years, there has been a particular décrochage, or decoupling, between the French economy and that of Germany, its closest ally. In 2002 the two countries enjoyed comparable GDP per head. Germany, under Gerhard Schröder, began to reform itself. France, under Jacques Chirac, didn’t. Today, Germans have 17% more purchasing power per person. Labour costs in France have risen faster than in Germany, deterring the creation of permanent jobs and undermining competitiveness. The country’s share of all goods exports between EU countries has dropped from 13.4% to 10.5%.

在过去的15年里，法国经济和它最亲密的盟友德国的经济之间发生了一个特别的解耦或分离的过程。在2002年，两国的人均GDP大体旗鼓相当。德国，在格哈特·施罗德治下（Gerhard Schröder）开始改革自身。法国在雅克·希拉克(Jacques Chirac)治下却没有做同一件事。今天，德国的人均购买力高了17％。法国的劳动力成本比德国增长更快，这阻碍了长期工作的产生，并削弱了竞争力。在欧盟国家之间所有商品出口中法国的份额从13.4％下降到了10.5％。

Most devastating is unemployment. In 2002, it was a tad higher in Germany. Today it has dropped to 4% on that side of the Rhine, but in France it remains stuck at 10%, and at 25% for the under-25s. Over 80% of new jobs are on short-term contracts, with “short-term” often meaning just a month. A generation of young French people has grown up outside the country’s famously protected job market. The votes for Mr Trump or Brexit were weakest among the under 25s; but the young French support the FN more than any other party. (Conversely, older voters have much less truck with Ms Le Pen than their Anglophone peers did with Brexit and Mr Trump; polls say they fear for their savings and pensions if France leaves the euro.)

最具破坏性的是失业问题。在2002年，德国比法国略高了一点。而今，莱茵河那里的失业率下降到了4％，但法国仍然保持在10％，25岁以下则是25％。超过80％的新工作是短期合同，“短期”往往意味着一个月。法国的年轻一代成长于国家有名的受保护的就业市场之外。特朗普或英国脱欧获得支持的选票在25岁以下是最少的; 但年轻的法国人更支持国民阵线而不是其他政党。 （相反地，更年长些的选民支持勒庞女士的数量，比那些以英文为母语的同龄人对脱欧或特朗普的支持要少得多; 民意调查显示，如果法国离开欧元区，他们担心自己的储蓄和养老金。

Shame isn’t a strong enough emotion

只是羞愧还不够

Economic self-doubt has been compounded by a sense of what Laurent Bouvet, a political scientist, calls “cultural insecurity”. Three big terrorist attacks within the space of 18 months, in 2015 and 2016, battered France’s confidence. The coming presidential election will be conducted under a state of emergency which has been renewed four times since November 2015. The French have had to learn to live with soldiers patrolling the streets and railway stations, a daily visual reminder of their vulnerability.

经济自我怀疑由于政治学家劳伦特·布维(Laurent Bouvet)宣称的“文化不安全”感而变得更加复杂。 在2015年和2016年，18个月时间内发生的三次大型恐怖袭击沉重打击了法国的自信心。即将到来的总统大选将在紧急状态下进行，自2015年11月以来已经延长了四次。法国人不得不学会忍受和街道上，火车站巡逻士兵共处的生活。这种日常的视觉冲击是对他们脆弱性的一种提醒。

Legitimate worries about terrorism have supplied fertile ground for insidious identity politics. As the home to one of Europe’s biggest Muslim minorities, France is more alert than, say, Italy or Spain to hints of religious extremism. Moreover, the country has a pre-existing and unforgiving framework for managing religious expression—known as laïcité—which recent governments, fearing a threat to secularism, have tightened up. When this provokes a row—over Muslim head-coverings, say—it plays straight into Ms Le Pen’s hands; she has little trouble persuading voters that their values are under threat. France, she tells her flag-waving rallies, faces nothing less than “submersion”.

对恐怖主义的合理担忧为阴险的身份政治提供了沃土。 作为欧洲最大的穆斯林少数民族之一的家园，法国比意大利或西班牙更加警惕宗教极端主义的迹象。 此外，该国有一个早已存在而且法不容情的宗教表达的管理框架 - 被称为政教分离（laïcité） - 最近，由于担心威胁到世俗主义，政府把它收得更紧了。 当这引起了争议，比如关于穆斯林头饰，它直接成为放入勒庞女士手中的武器; 她几乎不费吹灰之力就说服了选民，他们的价值观正在受到威胁。 她告诉挥舞旗帜这旗帜的集会人群，法国不啻于面临“淹没”的命运。

Ms Le Pen succeeds not because of the way her policies, which include a lower retirement age, more taxes on foreign workers and massive increases in spending on the armed forces, would tackle economic insecurity or the threat of terror (they wouldn’t). It is because of her talent for blending two strands of populism: anti-immigrant talk about values and churches, strong in the south, and anti-market discourse about jobs and the system, favoured in the north. On both counts, she can tap into French history.

勒庞女士成功的原因不是因为她的政策将解决经济不安全或恐怖威胁（无济于事），这些政策包括较低的退休年龄，对外国工人征更多税和大幅增加武装力量的开支。而是她融合两股民粹主义的天赋：反移民者谈论价值观和教会，他们在南方很强大；反对市场者讨论工作和制度，则在北方大受欢迎。在这两个方面，她都可以利用法国历史。

Ms Le Pen may have purged the FN of the overt anti-Semitism and neo-Nazi imagery of her father’s era. Yet her party remains originally rooted in a nostalgia for colonial Algeria and supporters of Marshal Pétain, who collaborated with the Nazis. Churches, flags and the homeland remain potent symbols in this world. Campaigning in Provence Ms Maréchal-Le Pen frequently recalls the country’s roots in Christendom. At her aunt’s political rallies, supporters can be heard chanting: “On est chez nous” (This is our home).

勒庞女士可能已经把她父亲时代的公开反犹主义和新纳粹图像从国民阵线中清除出去。然而，她的政党仍然或植根于对阿尔及利亚殖民的怀旧之情或来自于贝当元帅（曾与纳粹合作）的支持者。在这个世界里，教会，旗帜和家园仍然是有力的象征。在普罗旺斯的竞选活动中，勒庞女士经常回忆起这个国家的根在于基督教会。在她姑妈的政治集会上，支持者能听到颂歌：“On est chez nous”（这是我们的家园）。

At the same time, anti-establishment politics fits her compatriots’ self-image as a nation of revolutionaries, pitch forks in hand. When Mr Le Pen was first elected to the National Assembly, in 1956, it was on a list led by Pierre Poujade, who evoked this tradition when he spoke up for “the little people”: “The downtrodden, the trashed, the ripped off, the humiliated.” It is no coincidence that Ms Le Pen’s campaign slogan is “In the name of the people”.

与此同时，反体制政治家身份很符合她作为一个国家的革命者的，手持杖叉的她同胞的自画像。1956年，当勒庞先生第一次当选国民议会时，它在由皮埃尔·普贾德（Pierre Poujade）领导的名单上。，当他为“被压倒，被丢弃，受欺骗，受侮辱“的“小人物”代言时，他唤起了这个传统。勒庞女士选择”以人民的名义“为竞选口号不是巧合。

A final ingredient gives French populism a further twist: Euroscepticism. Invaded three times by Germany since 1870, and on its fifth republic, France has a long disrupted history, insecure even in peace. After the second world war it dealt with this by building Europe—a project by which it sought to bind in Germany and to amplify its own power. The French regarded the ceding of sovereignty as a means of reinforcing, not undermining, their nation state.

最后一种配料进一步扭曲了法国的民粹主义：欧洲怀疑论。自1870年以来到第五共和国，德国入侵法国三次，法国有长期中断的历史，甚至在和平时期也不安全。二战后，它通过建设欧洲的项目来解决这个难题 - 一个试图绑定德国和放大自己的力量的项目。法国可以把主权上的让步视为巩固其民族国家的手段而不是相反。

Europe remains an important part of French identity. But somewhere along the line the passion it once evoked cooled down, and the consensus supporting it faltered. Second thoughts spread long before the recent currency and refugee crises. In 1992, the French approved the launch of the union’s single currency by the slimmest of margins. In 2005 they rejected the draft EU constitution. The share of French people who see Europe favourably dropped from 69% in 2004 to 38% in 2016, according to Pew, a polling group; that makes the EU less popular in France than in Britain. This has given the FN a fresh electoral cause. Ms Le Pen speaks of Brexit as a model of emancipation from the shackles of what she calls the “European Soviet Union”.

欧洲仍然是法国身份的重要组成部分。但是在这条路线上前行的某个地方，它曾经激发的热情冷却下来，支持它的共识也变得步履蹒跚。改弦更张的想法在最近的货币和难民危机发生之前很久就蔓延开来了。1992年，法国仅以最微弱多数批准推出欧盟单一货币。2005年，他们拒绝了欧盟宪法草案。根据名义调查公司皮尤的数据，法国人口中视欧洲为友好的比例从2004年的69％下降到了2016年的38％。这使得欧盟在法国甚至比在英国更不受欢迎。这给了国民阵线新的竞选理由。勒庞女士谈到英国脱欧时说，这是挣脱她所谓的“欧洲苏维埃联盟”枷锁，得到解放的典范。

The feeling that France has lost its sense of purpose goes well beyond those tempted to vote for the FN. So does exasperation with the failures of both the left and the right to put the national interest first, and fix the country. At every national election for the past ten years, at all levels of government, the French have voted against the party in overall ower; fully 89% of the French told a recent poll they thought the country was heading in the wrong direction. It is this that has opened the way for a party refusenik such as Mr Macron—who,should he win, will have to get the people to break their unerring habit of resisting the change they have just voted for, a habit that accounts for much of their frustration.

认为法国已失去使命感的情绪远远超出了那些倾向于投票给国民阵线的心情。对于左，右两派失败的愤怒相比国家利益为先，治理国家也是如此。过去十年的每一届国家大选中，在政府的各个层面，法国人都开足马力投票反对各党派; 最近一次民意测验表明整整89％的法国人认为国家走错了方向。正是这个因素为拒绝党派的候选人，如马克龙先生打开了局面。如果当选，他必须让人民打破他们的但求无过，不愿变革的习惯，（变革正是他们投票希望获得的东西），这个习惯是选民们挫败感的重要原因。

In “Le Mal Français”, a book published in 1976, Alain Peyrefitte, a minister under Charles de Gaulle, lamented the fact that such a talented country had produced such a blocked system. Every now and then, it seems, France needs to go through convulsions of abrupt change in order to free itself from l’immobilisme (paralysis). History shows that such moments of upheaval can produce startling and creative forces for renewal. But they can also presage a slide into darkness. In Mr Macron’s cities, and Ms Le Pen’s peripheries, France is poised to go either way. The choice it makes could scarcely matter more.

在1976年出版的“Le MalFrançais”一书中，阿兰·佩耶菲特（Alain Peyrefitte），戴高乐的一位部长，哀叹这样一个有才华的国家产生了这样一个阻塞的体制。 时不时地，似乎，法国需要通过突然改变引起的惊厥，把自己从瘫痪中解脱出来。 历史表明，这种巨变时刻可以产生惊人的和有创造性的力量实现复兴； 但他们也可以预示着一跤滑入黑暗之中。 在马克龙的城市或勒庞女士的周边地区之间，法国处于选择道路的十字路口。 它做出的选择不能更重要了。