BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP, LTD. 810 KIEWIT PLAZA OMAHA 31, NEBRASKA
First Half Performance
上半年度投资表现
The whole family is leaving for California on June 23rd so I am fudging a bit on this report and writing it June 18th. However, for those of you who set your watches by the receipt of our letters. I will maintain our usual chronological symmetry in reporting, leaving a few blanks which Bill will fill in after the final June 30th figures are available.
全家要在6月23日出发去加州，所以这篇有点赶工并是在6月18日完成的。当然，为了照顾对时间较真的股东，我仍然维持了股东信之间时间对称，并在股东信末尾留了几个空行，Bill 会在6月30日之后补上最新的内容并寄给各位。
During the first half of 1964 the Dow-Jones Industrial Average (hereinafter called the “DOW”) advanced from 762.95 to 831.50. If one had owned the Dow during this period, dividends of approximately 14.40 would have been received, bringing the overall return from the Dow during the first half to plus 10.0%. As I write this on June 18th, it appears that our results will differ only insignificantly from those of the Dow. I would feel much better reporting to you that the Dow had broken even, and we had been plus 5%, or better still, that the Dow had been minus 10%, and we had broken even. I have always pointed out, however, that gaining an edge on the Dow is more difficult for us in advancing markets than in static or declining ones.
在1964年上半年，道琼斯工业平均指数（之后简称道指）从762.95点涨到了831.50点。如果在这段时间持有道指，那么再算上14.40的股息分红，总体的投资收益会超过10.0%。 在我6月18日写这篇股东信的时候，我们的总体收益看起来和道指的差距不大。但是如果结果是道指没有增长我们确有5%的收益，我会感觉好很多。或者道指跌了10%，我们收益为0，我会更加高兴。正如我一贯指出的，在牛市超越道指要比熊市或者温和的市场难得多。
To bring the record up to date, the following summarizes the performance of the Dow, the performance of the Partnership before allocation to the general partner and the limited partners' results:
更新一下数据，下面我们总结一下道琼斯指数，合伙企业在给一般合伙人分红前和有限合伙人的收益对比：
Footnotes to preceding table:
上表的脚注
(1) Based on yearly changes in the value of the Dow plus dividends that would have been received through ownership of the Dow during that year. The table includes all complete years of partnership activity.
- 道指的计算是将指数的变化和当年收到的股利相加。这个表包含了合伙企业所有年份的收益
(2) For 1957-61 consists of combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout the entire year after all expenses but before distributions to partners or allocations to the general partner. - 1957-1961年的数据包含了所有有限合伙人在扣除必要费用后的收益率，但未算入分发给合伙人的资金或者给一般合伙人的分红；
(3) For 1957-61 computed on the basis of the preceding column of partnership results allowing for allocation to the general partner based up on the present partnership agreement, but before monthly withdrawals by limited partners. - 基于前表的数据且根据当前合伙人协议扣除给一般合伙人配额的部分。
Buying activities during the first half were quite satisfactory. This is of particular satisfaction to me since I consider the buying end to be about 90% of this business. Our General category now includes three companies where B.P.L. is the largest single stockholder. These stocks have been bought and are continuing to be bought at prices considerably below their value to a private owner. We have been buying one of these situations for approximately eighteen months and both of the others for about a year. It would not surprise me if we continue to do nothing but patiently buy these securities week after week for at least another year, and perhaps even two years or more.
上半年买股票的感觉都很不错。对于我来说尤其如此，因为上半年买股票占了整体业务的90%。我们的股票池目前有三只股票，其中B.P.L 是占股最多的。这些流通股过去并将持续地在低于其内在价值的价格买入。我们已经持续18个月买入这只股票，并其他两只股票我们也快买了一年了。不出意外我们会耐心地每周买入这些股票，持续一年或者两年都有可能。
What we really like to see in situations like the three mentioned above is a condition where the company is making substantial progress in terms of improving earnings, increasing asset values, etc., but where the market price of the stock is doing very little while we continue to acquire it. This doesn't do much for our short-term performance, particularly relative to a rising market, but it is a comfortable and logical producer of longer-term profits. Such activity should usually result in either appreciation of market prices from external factors or the acquisition by us of a controlling position in a business at a bargain price. Either alternative suits me.
刚刚提到的三家公司正处于我们乐于见到的状态中：1，公司在增加营收，提高资产价值等方面成效卓著；2，而股票市场价格在我们购买的时候却没有升高。虽然这对于我们短期的收益似乎没有帮助，特别是在当前的牛市行情的背景下。但是它却会为我们带来稳定的长期的收益。这种投资行为往往最终会导致要么市场认识到其价值导致股价上涨要么我们在便宜的价格得到了公司控股股东的席位。无论哪种情况都很适合我。
It is important to realize, however, that most of our holdings in the General category continue to be securities which we believe to be considerably undervalued, but where there is not the slightest possibility that we could have a controlling position. We expect the market to justify our analyses of such situations in a reasonable period of time, but we do not have the two strings to our bow mentioned in the above paragraph working for us in these securities.
然而，重要的是认识到我们在股票投资类别中大多数都持仓都是我们认为低估的股票，但是绝大多数股票我们都很少有机会买到达到控股股东的份额。因此我们都是期望市场在合理的时间内认同我们的分析从而股价能匹配它的价值，所以对于这些公司的股票我们并没有上段提到的第二种选择。
Investment Companies
其他投资公司
We regularly compare our results with the two largest open-end investment companies (mutual funds) that follow a policy of being typically 95%-100% invested in common stocks, and the two largest diversified closed- end investment companies. These four companies, Massachusetts Investors Trust, Investors Stock Fund, Tri- Continental Corp., and Lehman Corp., manage over 28 billion investment company industry. Their results are shown below. My opinion is that this performance roughly parallels that of the overwhelming majority of other investment advisory organizations which handle, in aggregate, vastly greater sums.
通常我们将自己的投资收益和两家最大的开放式基金（其资产95%-100%都在股票市场中），和两家最大的封闭式投资公司相比较。这四家公司，Massachusetts Investors Trust, Investors Stock Fund, Tri- Continental Corp., and Lehman Corp., 总共管理了超过了40亿美金的资产，可以认为是当前280亿美金投资行业的典型代表。具体对比结果如下表所示。我的观点是除了总体规模差别外，这四家公司应该与绝大多数其他投资咨询机构的表现大致相当。
(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.
- 计算基于市值的变化并算入股利
(2) From 1964 Moody's Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-63. Estimated for first half 1964. - 资料来源于穆迪的投资手册和1964年上半年数字是估计值
These figures continue to show that the most highly paid and respected investment management has difficulty matching the performance of an unmanaged index of blue chip stocks. The results of these companies in some ways resemble the activity of a duck sitting on a pond. When the water (the market) rises, the duck rises; when it falls, back goes the duck. SPCA or no SPCA, I think the duck can only take the credit (or blame) for his own activities. The rise and fall of the lake is hardly something for him to quack about. The water level has been of great importance to B.P.L’s performance as the table on page one indicates. However, we have also occasionally flapped our wings.
这些数字持续表明即便是收费最高，最受尊重的投资管理公司收益也很难超越由蓝筹股组成的指数。这些投资公司的表现就像池塘里的鸭子一样，水涨鸭起，水落他们也一样落下来。收到什么样的对待处于什么位置我想完全取决于鸭子自己的行为，湖水的涨落本不该由鸭子们来质疑。正如第一页中的表格展示的那样，“水位”的高低曾经也是我们投资公司重要的影响因素，只不过我们偶尔会扇动一下翅膀（不跟着落下）。
I would like to emphasize that I am not saying that the Dow is the only way of measuring investment performance in common stocks. However, I do say that all investment managements (including self- management) should be subjected to objective tests, and that the standards should be selected a priori rather than conveniently chosen retrospectively.
我必须强调的是，并非道指是估计投资表现的唯一指标。但是我确信所有的投资管理公司都应该和它进行比较，对比的标准应该提前选好，而不是简单的回溯。
The management of money is big business. Investment managers place great stress on evaluating company managements in the auto industry, steel industry, chemical industry, etc. These evaluations take enormous amounts of work, are usually delivered with great solemnity, and are devoted to finding out which companies are well managed and which companies have management weaknesses. After devoting strenuous efforts to objectively measuring the managements of portfolio companies, it seems strange indeed that similar examination is not applied to the portfolio managers themselves. We feel it is essential that investors and investment managements establish standards of performance and, regularly and objectively, study their own results just as carefully as they study their investments.
管理资金是一个苦差事。投资经理十分幸苦地评估各行各业的公司管理层，包括汽车，钢铁，化工等等。这些评估需要大量的工作，通常十分庄严地选出哪些公司管理得当哪些公司管理有误。当这些投资公司如此幸苦地评估不同的上市公司时，确很奇怪不用相似的标准评估自己。我们觉得投资人和投资管理公司需要自己建立一个投资收益评估体系，定时客观地评估他们的投资表现，就像他们对待上市公司那样。
We will regularly follow this policy wherever it may lead. It is perhaps too obvious to say that our policy of measuring performance in no way guarantees good results--it merely guarantees objective evaluation. I want to stress the points mentioned in the "Ground Rules" regarding application of the standard--namely that it should be applied on at least a three-year basis because of the nature of our operation and also that during a speculative boom we may lag the field. However, one thing I can promise you. We started out with a 36-inch yardstick and we'll keep it that way. If we don't measure up, we won't change yardsticks. In my opinion, the entire field of investment management, involving hundreds of billions of dollars, would be more satisfactorily conducted if everyone had a good yardstick for measurement of ability and sensibly applied it. This is regularly done by most people in the conduct of their own business when evaluating markets, people, machines, methods, etc., and money management is the largest business in the world.
无论结果如何，我们都会定期的遵守该政策。这个衡量绩效的标准并不能保证我们会有个很好的表现，但它绝对客观。我想再次强调在“基本原则” 中提到的观点，总体绩效应该以3年的维度来评估，因为由于我们经营的方法，在投机盛行的期间我们可能会相对落后。但是我可以向各位保证一点。我们以高标准开始，就会持之以恒。我们绝不会因为达不到标准而降低它。在我看来，整个投资管理领域涉及数千亿美元，如果每个人都有一个衡量能力的好标准，并且明智地应用它，整个市场会更令人满意。 在评估市场、人员、机器、方法等时，大多数人在开展自己的业务时经常这样做，而资金管理是世界上最大的业务。
Cordially,
Warren E. Buffett
