BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP, LTD. 810 KIEWIT PLAZA OMAHA 31, NEBRASKA
Our Performance in 1964
1964年我们的投资表现
Although we had an overall gain of $4,846,312.37 in 1964, it was not one of our better years as judged by our fundamental yardstick, the Dow-Jones Industrial Average (hereinafter called the "Dow"). The overall result for BPL was plus 27.8% compared to an overall plus 18.7% for the Dow. The overall result for limited partners was plus 22.3%. Both the advantage of 9.1 percentage points on a partnership basis and 3.6 points by the limited partners were the poorest since 1959, which was a year of roughly comparable gains for the Dow.
尽管我们在1964年总体收益为484万6312.37美元，但是和我们一直以来的标杆道琼斯指数相比，成绩并没有那么亮眼。合伙企业总体收益为27.8%，同时期道指的收益为18.7%。有限合伙人的总体收益为22.3%。以合伙企业总体来计算相对道指的9.1%正收益和合伙人收益来计算的3.6%的相对正收益都是自1959年来最低。今年的确是道指收获颇丰的一年。
Nevertheless, I am not depressed. It was a strong year for the general market, and it is always tougher for us to outshine the Dow in such a year. We are certain to have years when the Dow gives us a drubbing and, in some respects, I feel rather fortunate that 1964 wasn't the year. Because of the problems that galloping markets pose for us, a Dow repeat in 1965 of 1964 results would make it most difficult for us to match its performance, let alone surpass it by a decent margin.
但我并不沮丧。今年股票市场红红火火，对于我们来说要超过道指就更加困难了。毫无疑问道琼斯指数会在某些年远远超过我们，不过很幸运1964年没有。如果今年市场还像1964年那样上涨，我们1965年的结果将很难和它的表现相媲美，更别说大幅超越了。
To bring the record up to date, the following summarizes the year-by-year performance of the Dow, the performance of the Partnership before allocation to the general partner, and the limited partner's results:
下表是最新的year by year 和道指的收益对比，包括合伙企业总体收益（在分配之前），以及有限合伙人的收益：
Based on yearly changes in the value of the Dow plus dividends that would have been received through ownership of the Dow during that year.
收益计算基于每年的股价变化并考虑对应的股利发放；For 1957-61 consists of combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout the entire year after all expenses but before distributions to partners or allocations to the general partner.
1957-1961年的数据包含了所有有限合伙人在扣除必要费用后的收益率，但未算入分发给合伙人的资金或者给一般合伙人的分红；For 1957-61 computed on the basis of the preceding column of partnership results allowing for allocation to the general partner based upon the present partnership agreement, but before monthly withdrawals by limited partners.
基于前表的数据且根据当前合伙人协议扣除给一般合伙人配额的部分，但并不计算合伙人每个月从账户中的提款。
On a cumulative or compounded basis, the results are:
累积收益率如下：
Investment Companies
其他投资公司
We regularly compare our results with the two largest open-end investment companies (mutual funds) that follow a policy of being typically 95-100% invested in common stock, and the two largest diversified closed- end investment companies. These four companies, Massachusetts Investors Trust, Investors Stock Fund, Tri- Continental Corporation, and Lehman Corporation, manage about 30 billion investment company industry. My opinion is that their results roughly parallel those of the overwhelming majority of other investment advisory organizations which handle, in aggregate, vastly greater sums.
通常我们将自己的投资收益和两家最大的开放式基金（其资产95%-100%都在股票市场中），和两家最大的封闭式投资公司相比较。这四家公司，Massachusetts Investors Trust, Investors Stock Fund, Tri- Continental Corp., and Lehman Corp., 总共管理了超过了45亿美金的资产，投资者达到55万人，可以认为是当前300亿美金投资行业的典型代表。我的观点是除了总体规模差别外，这四家公司应该与绝大多数其他投资咨询机构的表现大致相当。
The purpose of this tabulation, which is shown below, is to illustrate that the Dow is no pushover as an index of investment achievement. The advisory talent managing just the four companies shown commands annual fees of over $8 million and this represents a very small fraction of the professional investment management industry. The public batting average of this highly-paid and widely respected talent indicates performance a shade below that of the Dow, an unmanaged index.
罗列这些资讯是为了证明超越道指并非易事。仅仅这四家公司才华横溢的基金经理收的管理费每年就将近800万美元，而这只是专业投资管理行业的冰山一角。这些高薪广受尊敬的基金人才忙活出来的收益率还没有一个被动指数好。
The repetition of these tables has caused partners to ask: "Why in the world does this happen to managements working with (1) bright, energetic staff people, (2) virtually unlimited resources, (3) the most extensive business contacts, and (4) literally centuries of aggregate investment experience?" (The latter qualification brings to mind the fellow who applied for a job and stated he had twenty years of experience - which was corrected by the former employer to read “one year's experience -twenty times.”)
这些重复的表格让各位股东不禁提问，这些投资管理机构到底怎么了，雇员都是聪明绝顶精力旺盛的人，基本上无穷无尽的资源，最广泛的业务联系，和快百年的投资积累经验。（其实这些经验让我想起申请工作并称他有20年经验的人--前雇主将其更正为将一年的经验重复了20次）
This question is of enormous importance, and you would expect it to be the subject of considerable study by investment managers and substantial investors. After all, each percentage point on 300 million per year. Curiously enough, there is practically nothing in the literature of Wall Street attracting this problem, and discussion of it is virtually absent at security analyst society meetings, conventions, seminars, etc. My opinion is that the first job of any investment management organization is to analyze its own techniques and results before pronouncing judgment on the managerial abilities and performance of the major corporate entities of the United States.
这个问题十分重要，你会觉得这个问题很值得投资经理和大量投资者去研究。毕竟，300 亿美元的每个百分点就是每年 3 亿美元。不过奇怪的是，对于这个问题的在华尔街任何文献中都没有提及，并且在证券分析师协会会议，研讨会等也无人提及。我的观点是首先是各个投资管理公司自己分析他们自己的投资方法和收益结果，然后再对美国各个实业家的管理能力吹毛求疵。
In the great majority of cases the lack of performance exceeding or even matching an unmanaged index in no way reflects lack of either intellectual capacity or integrity. I think it is much more the product of: (1) group decisions - my perhaps jaundiced view is that it is close to impossible for outstanding investment management to come from a group of any size with all parties really participating in decisions; (2) a desire to conform to the policies and (to an extent) the portfolios of other large well-regarded organizations; (3) an institutional framework whereby average is "safe" and the personal rewards for independent action are in no way commensurate with the general risk attached to such action; (4) an adherence to certain diversification practices which are irrational; and finally and importantly, (5) inertia.
大多数情况下，投资收益无法超越甚至和被动指数持平并非智力不足或者缺乏诚信。我认为这更多是由于（1）集体决策--我个人有可能带有偏见的观点是，优秀的投资管理几乎不可能是来自于任何规模的团体，并且团体中各方都参与到了决策中；（2）期望和其他大型投资管理公司投资组合一致的冲动；（3）在一种提倡平均至上的组织结构中，特立独行的奖励和承受的风险不相称；（4）对于分散投资行为的不合理的执念；最后也是最重要的，（5）懒。
Perhaps the above comments are unjust. Perhaps even our statistical comparisons are unjust. Both our portfolio and method of operation differ substantially from the investment companies in the table. However, I believe both our partners and their stockholders feel their managements are seeking the same goal - the maximum long- term average return on capital obtainable with the minimum risk of permanent loss consistent with a program of continuous investment in equities. Since we should have common goals, and most partners, as an alternative to their interest in BPL, would probably have their funds invested in media producing results comparable with these investment companies, I feel their performance record is meaningful in judging our own results.
也许上述的评论是不公平的，甚至我们统计对比的数据也是不公平的。我们投资组合以及运作方法和上表中的投资公司完全不同。但是，我相信我们的合伙人和股东都是为了同一个目标，寻求长期平均收益的最大化，和最小化永久损失的风险。既然我们目标一样，而且大多数人在投资BPL之外也会将他们的资金投入到和这些投资公司收益相似的标的中。因此把业绩拿来对比一下也很有意义。
There is no question that an important service is provided to investors by investment companies, investment advisors, trust departments, etc. This service revolves around the attainment of adequate diversification, the preservation of a long-term outlook, the ease of handling investment decisions and mechanics, and most importantly, the avoidance of the patently inferior investment techniques which seem to entice some individuals. All but a few of the organizations do not specifically promise to deliver superior investment performance although it is perhaps not unreasonable for the public to draw such an inference from their advertised emphasis on professional management.
投资管理公司，投资经理人，信托公司等等，他们提供的服务都很重要。这些服务围绕充分多样化，保持长期投资观点，简化投资决策和方法，并且最重要的是防止个人滥用某些似乎吸引人但是其实拙劣的投资技术。除了少数几个组织外，所有组织都没有特别承诺提供卓越的投资业绩，尽管公众从他们宣传的对专业管理的强调中得出这样的推论也许并非不合理。
One thing I pledge to you as partners - just as I consider the previously stated performance comparison to be meaningful now, so will I in future years, no, matter what tale unfolds. Correspondingly, I ask that you, if you do not feel such a standard to be relevant, register such disagreement now and suggest other standards which can be applied prospectively rather than retrospectively.
作为合伙人，我向各位承诺一件事，我对投资收益对比有重大意义这个观点现在和未来都不会改变，无论以后发生什么。相应地，如果各位觉得这种对比毫不相关，请立即投票反对并且提供一个可以具有前瞻性的对比方法，而非后视镜的方法。
One additional thought - I have not included a column in my table for the most widely-used investment advisor in the world - Bell management. People who watch their weight, golf scores, and fuel bills seem to shun quantitative evaluation of their investment management skills although it involves the most important client in the world - themselves. While it may be of academic interest to evaluate the management accomplishments of Massachusetts Investors Trust or Lehman Corporation, it is of enormous dollars-and-cents importance to evaluate objectively the accomplishments of the fellow who is actually handling your money - even if it’s you.
还有一个想法，我的对比表中没有包含当前使用最广泛的投资顾问--Bell management。人们关注体重，高尔夫成绩和燃油费用，却似乎回避了对他们投资管理技能的量化评估，尽管这关系到世界上最重要的客户，他们自己。虽然评估马萨诸塞州投资者信托基金或雷曼公司的管理成就可能具有学术意义，但客观地评估实际处理您资金的人的成绩（即使是您本人）非常重要。
The Question of Conservatism
关于保守的问题
In looking at the table of investment company performance, the question might be asked: “Yes, but aren't those companies run more conservatively than the Partnership?" If you asked that question of the investment company managements, they, in absolute honesty, would say they were more conservative. If you asked the first hundred security analysts you met, I am sure that a very large majority of them also would answer for the investment companies. I would disagree. I have over 90% of my net worth in BPL, and most of my family have percentages in that area, but of course, that only demonstrates the sincerity of my view - not the validity of it.
当看到投资管理公司的表现之后，很自然会有人问：”没错，但是这难道不是因为投资公司的运营比合伙企业更加保守吗？“ 如果你拿这个问题问管理公司，毫无疑问保守是唯一的答案。如果相同的问题去问任何一百个股票分析师，我也相信绝大多数人也会为投资管理公司说话。不过我不同意，我的净资产90%在BPL，而且我家人大多数都在合伙企业中有股份。不过这只能证明我的话是真诚的，并不一定是对的。
It is unquestionably true that the investment companies have their money more conventionally invested than we do. To many people conventionality is indistinguishable from conservatism. In my view, this represents erroneous thinking. Neither a conventional nor an unconventional approach, per se, is conservative.
毫无疑问，投资公司投资资金的方式比我们更传统。 对许多人来说，传统与保守没有区别。 在我看来，这代表了错误的想法。 无论是传统的还是非常规的方法本身，都不是保守的。
Truly conservative actions arise from intelligent hypotheses, correct facts and sound reasoning. These qualities may lead to conventional acts, but there have been many times when they have led to unorthodoxy. In some corner of the world they are probably still holding regular meetings of the Flat Earth Society.
真正保守的行动源于明智的假设、正确的事实和合理的推理。 这些品质可能会导致传统行为，但也有很多时候它们会导致非正统的行为。 在世界的某个角落，可能还有某个“地球是平的”团体在举行定期集会。
We derive no comfort because important people, vocal people, or great numbers of people agree with us. Nor do we derive comfort if they don't. A public opinion poll is no substitute for thought. When we really sit back with a smile on our face is when we run into a situation we can understand, where the facts are ascertainable and clear, and the course of action obvious. In that case - whether other conventional or unconventional - whether others agree or disagree - we feel - we are progressing in a conservative manner.
我们不应懈怠，因为有很多人选择相信我们。反过来，如果没人相信则更应该努力。民意测验并不能代替独立思考。除非我们处于一个能够完全理解的环境之中，各个事实是清楚确定的，事物行动的过程是显而易见的情况下，才能真正的放松。在那种情况下，不管是否墨守成规，或者其他人是否同意，都会觉得我们是在保守地进行运作。
The above may seem highly subjective. It is. You should prefer an objective approach to the question. I do. My suggestion as to one rational way to evaluate the conservativeness of past policies is to study performance in declining markets. We have only three years of declining markets in our table and unfortunately (for purposes of this test only) they were all moderate declines. In all three of these years we achieved appreciably better investment results than any of the more conventional portfolios.
上面的描述看起来很主观。的确如此。各位应该选择一个客观公正的方法。对于如何判断投资方法是否保守，我的建议是研究这个方法在下跌市场中的收益如何。在下表中只有三年是是下跌市场，而且很不幸都是轻微下跌。在这三年的对比中，我们的投资收益明显要好于任何传统的投资方法。
Specifically, if those three years had occurred in sequence, the cumulative results would have been:
特别要指出，如果这三年是连续发生的，累积收益将会是：
We don’t think this comparison is all important, but we do think it has some relevance. We certainly think it makes more sense than saying “We own (regardless of price) A.T. &T., General Electric, IBM and General Motors and are therefore conservative.” In any event, evaluation of the conservatism of any investment program or management (including self-management) should be based upon rational objective standards, and I suggest performance in declining markets to be at least one meaningful test.
虽然这种对比不是决定性的，但是这其中确实能说明一些规律。总比那些说着“我们（无论成本）有AT&T ， 通用，IBM股票，所以我们是传统的投资方法“ 要来着合理。在任何情况下，判断投资方法或者投资管理的保守程度应该基于一个相对客观的标准。我建议把在下跌市场中投资组合表现纳入对比是一个很有意义的测试方法。
The Joys of Compounding
复利的魔力
Readers of our early annual letters registered discontent at a mere recital of contemporary investment experience, but instead hungered for the intellectual stimulation that only could be provided by a depth study of investment strategy spanning the centuries. Hence, this section.
早期年度信的读者对仅仅展示当代的投资经验已经不满，而是希望在深挖跨越数个世纪的投资策略上获得知识上的激励。因此，我为大家带来这个章节。
Our last two excursions into the mythology of financial expertise have revealed that purportedly shrewd investments by Isabella (backing the voyage of Columbus) and Francis I (original purchase of Mona Lisa) bordered on fiscal lunacy. Apologists for these parties have presented an array of sentimental trivia. Through it all, our compounding tables have not been dented by attack.
我们最近两次对金融专业神话的探索表明，据称伊莎贝拉（支持哥伦布的航行）和弗朗西斯一世（最初购买蒙娜丽莎）的近乎疯狂的投资。他们支持者们却罗列了许多无关痛痒的琐事为其辩护。但是即便如此，还是无法改变复利表的结果。
Nevertheless, one criticism has stung a bit. The charge has been made that this column has acquired a negative tone with only the financial incompetents of history receiving comment. We have been challenged to record on these pages a story of financial perspicacity which will be a bench mark of brilliance down through the ages.
然而，有一条评论值得注意。有人指责我们只评论历史上财务无能的人。读者要求罗列一些富有财务洞察力的故事，这些故事可以成为历史上财务辉煌的标杆。
One story stands out. This, of course, is the saga of trading acumen etched into history by the Manhattan Indians when they unloaded their island to that notorious spendthrift, Peter Minuit in 1626. My understanding is that they received 24 net. For this, Minuit received 22.3 square miles which works out to about 621,688,320 square feet. While on the basis of comparable sales, it is difficult to arrive at a precise appraisal, a 20 per square foot estimate seems reasonable giving a current land value for the island of 12,433,766,400 (12 1/2 billion). To the novice, perhaps this sounds like a decent deal. However, the Indians have only had to achieve a 6 1/2% return (The tribal mutual fund representative would have promised them this.) to obtain the last laugh on Minuit. At 6 1/2%, 24 becomes 42,105,772,800 (42 billion) in 338 years, and if they just managed to squeeze out an extra half point to get to 7%, the present value becomes $205 billion.
一个故事值得一说。 当然，这铭记史册的智慧传奇交易是曼哈顿印第安人在 1626 年将他们的岛屿交给臭名昭著的挥霍无度的彼得·米努伊特（Peter Minuit）。我的理解是，他们收到了 24 美元的净收入。 为此，Minuit 获得了 22.3 平方英里的面积，约合 621,688,320 平方英尺。 虽然仅仅依据现有的交易信息，很难得出精确的评估，但我们可以合理估计地价为每平方英尺 20 美元，那么该岛目前的土地价值为 12,433,766,400 美元（12.5 亿美元）。 对新手来说，这听起来像是一笔不错的交易。 然而，印第安人只需要获得 6.5% 的回报（部落共同基金代表会向他们承诺这一点。）就可以在 Minuit 上笑到最后。 在 收益率为6.5% 时，24 美元在 338 年内变成了 42,105,772,800 美元（420 亿美元），如果他们只是设法挤出一个额外的半个点达到 7%，现值将变为 2050 亿美元。
This table indicates the financial advantages of:
这个表展示了如何获得投资上的优势
- A long life (in the erudite vocabulary of the financial sophisticate this is referred to as the Methusalah Technique)
活得够久 - A high compound rate
收益率够高 - A combination of both (especially recommended by this author)
以上两者结合
Our Goal
我们的目标
You will note that there are no columns in the preceding table for the 27.7% average of the Partnership during its eight-year lifespan or the 22.3% average of the limited partners. Such figures are nonsensical for the long term for several reasons: (Don't worry about me "holding back" to substantiate this prophecy.)
各位会发现上图中并未将合伙企业27.7% 的年化收益和22.3%的有限合伙人收益率加入对比。从长远来看，这些数字是荒谬的，原因如下：（不要担心我会“回避”来证实这个预言。）
Any significant sums compounded at such rates take on national debt proportions at alarming speed.
任何以这样的复利增长的大笔款项都将以惊人的速度占有国家债务。During our eight-year history a general revaluation of securities has produced average annual rates of overall gain from the whole common stock field which I believe unattainable in future decades. Over a span of 20 or 30 years, I would expect something more like 6% - 7% overall annual gain from the Dow instead of the 11.1% during our brief history. This factor alone would tend to knock 4 points or so off of our annual compounding rate. It would only take a minus 20.5% year in 1965 for the Dow to bring it down to a 7% average figure for the nine years. Such years (or worse) should definitely be expected from time to time by those holding equity investments. If a 20% or 30% drop in the market value of your equity holdings (such as BPL) is going to produce emotional or financial distress, you should simply avoid common stock type investments. In the words of the poet - Harry Truman – “If you can’t stand the heat, stay out of the kitchen. It is preferable, of course, to consider the problem before you enter the “kitchen.”
在我们合伙企业的这八年，股票市场的价值重估导致提高了股市的平均收益率，这个现象我相信未来几十年不会持续下去。以20-30年的时间跨度来看，我估计道指的年化收益将在6%-7%而非这几年的11.1%。仅仅这一项就将收益率降低了4个百分点。道指在 1965 年只需要负收益 20.5% 就会将其 9 年的平均收益降到 7%。作为投资者，我们绝对应该准备这种（甚至更糟）情况的随时发生。如果您持有的股票（例如 BPL）的市值下跌 20% 或 30% 会对您产生情绪或财务困境，您应该避免普通股类型的投资。用诗人哈里·杜鲁门的话来说——“如果你受不了高温，就不要去厨房。当然，最好在进入“厨房”之前考虑好。We do not consider it possible on an extended basis to maintain the 16.6 percentage point advantage over the Dow of the Partnership or the 11.2 percentage point edge enjoyed by the limited partners. We have had eight consecutive years in which our pool of money has out-performed the Dow, although the profit allocation arrangement left the limited partners short of Dow results in one of those years. We are certain to have years (note the plural) when the Partnership results fall short of the Dow despite considerable gnashing of teeth by the general partner (I hope not too much by the limited partners). When that happens our average margin of superiority will drop sharply. I might say that I also think we will continue to have some years of very decent margins in our favor. However, to date we have benefited by the fact that we have not had a really mediocre (or worse) year included in our average, and this obviously cannot be expected to be a permanent experience.
我们认为不可能长期保持对合伙企业道琼斯指数 16.6 个百分点的优势或有限合伙人享有的 11.2 个百分点的优势。 我们连续八年的资金池表现优于道琼斯指数，尽管利润分配安排使有限合伙人在其中一年未能达到道琼斯指数的业绩。 尽管普通合伙人（我希望有限合伙人不要太多）咬牙切齿，但我们肯定会有几年（注意复数）合伙企业的结果低于道琼斯指数。 当这种情况发生时，我们的平均优势幅度将急剧下降。 我可能会说，我也认为我们将继续拥有对我们有利的几年非常可观的利润。 然而，这都是因为迄今为止我们受益于这样一个事实，即我们从未经历过收益水平真正平平无奇（或更糟），显然不可能永远这样。
So what can we expect to achieve? Of course, anything I might say is largely guesswork, and my own investment philosophy has developed around the theory that prophecy reveals far more of the frailties of the prophet than it reveals of the future.
那么我们可以期望实现什么？ 当然，我可能说的任何事情在很大程度上都是猜测，而我自己的投资哲学是围绕这样一种理论发展起来的，即预言揭示的先知的弱点远比它揭示的未来要多。
Nevertheless, you, as partners, are entitled to know my expectations, tenuous as they may be. I am hopeful that our longer term experience will unfold along the following basis:
尽管如此，作为合作伙伴，你们有权了解我的期望，尽管它们可能很微不足道。 我希望我们的长期经验将在以下基础上展开：
An overall gain from the Dow (including dividends, of course) averaging in the area of 7% per annum, exhibiting customarily wide amplitudes in achieving this average -- say, on the order or minus 40% to plus 50% at the extremes with the majority of years in the minus 10% to plus 20% range;
道琼斯指数的整体收益（当然包括股息）平均在每年增长 7% 的范围内，在达到这个平均水平时表现出惯常的震荡——比如说，大约大多数年份处于负 10% 至正 20% 范围内并伴有负 40% 到正 50% 之间的极端情况；An average advantage of ten percentage points per annum for BPL before allocation to the general partner - again with large amplitudes in the margin from perhaps 10 percentage points worse than the Dow in a bad year to 25 percentage points better when everything clicks;
在分配给普通合伙人之前，BPL 平均每年有 10 个百分点的优势——同样，利润率震荡的幅度也很大，从糟糕的一年可能比道琼斯指数差 10 个百分点，当一切顺利时，比道琼斯指数好 25 个百分点；The product of these two assumptions gives an average of 17% to BPL or about 14% to limited partners. This figure would vary enormously from year to year; the final amplitudes, of course, depending, on the interplay of the extremes hypothesized in (1) and (2).
这两个假设的乘积平均给 BPL 17% 或给有限合伙人约 14%。 这个数字每年都会有很大的不同； 当然，最终幅度取决于（1）和（2）中假设的极值的相互作用。
I would like to emphasize that the above is conjecture, perhaps heavily influenced by self-interest, ego, etc. Anyone with a sense of financial history knows this sort of guesswork is subject to enormous error. It might better be left out of this letter, but it is a question frequently and legitimately asked by partners. Long-range expectable return is the primary consideration of all of us belonging to BPL, and it is reasonable that I should be put on record, foolish as that may later make me appear. My rather puritanical view is that any investment manager, whether operating as broker, investment counselor, trust department, Investment Company, etc., should be willing to state unequivocally what he is going to attempt to accomplish and how he proposes to measure the extent to which he gets the job done.
我要强调的是，以上是猜想，可能受自身利益、自我等因素的影响很大。任何对金融历史有了解的人都知道，这种猜测的误差很大。 在这封信中最好不要提及它，但这个问题合作伙伴经常提及，并且他们有权知道我的答案。远期预期收益是我们所有属于BPL的人的首要考虑，这应该被记录在案，因为难免我以后会做什么蠢事。我清教徒似的观点是，任何投资经理，无论是作为经纪人、投资顾问、信托部门、投资公司等，都应该愿意明确说明他将试图完成什么以及建议如何衡量他完成了这些。
Our Method of Operation
我们的运营方法
In past annual letters I have always utilized three categories to describe investment operations we conduct. I now feel that a four-category division is more appropriate. Partially, the addition of a new section - "Generals Relatively Undervalued" - reflects my further consideration of essential differences that have always existed to a small extent with our "Generals" group. Partially, it reflects the growing importance of what once was a very small sub-category but is now a much more significant part of our total portfolio. This increasing importance has been accompanied by excellent results to date justifying significant time and effort devoted to finding additional opportunities in this area. Finally, it partially reflects the development and implementation of a new and somewhat unique investment technique designed to improve the expectancy and consistency of operations in this category. Therefore, our four present categories are:
在过去的年度信件中，我总是使用三个类别来描述我们进行的投资业务。 我现在觉得四类划分比较合适。 增加了一个新的分类——“相对被低估的股票”——反映了我对与股票分类中一直存在的本质差异的进一步考虑。 在某种程度上，它反映了曾经是一个非常小的子类别但现在已成为我们总投资组合中更重要的一部分并且其重要性日益增加。
这种日益增长的重要性伴随着迄今为止的出色收益，使得投入大量时间和精力在该领域寻找更多机会是非常合理的。 最后，它部分反映了一种新的、有些独特的投资技术的开发，旨在提高该类别业务的预期和一致性。 因此，我们目前的四个类别是：
“Generals -Private Owner Basis” - a category of generally undervalued stocks, determined by quantitative standards, but with considerable attention also paid to the qualitative factor. There is often little or nothing to indicate immediate market improvement. The issues lack glamour or market sponsorship. Their main qualification is a bargain price; that is, an overall valuation of the enterprise substantially below what careful analysis indicates its value to a private owner to be. Again, let me emphasize that while the quantitative comes first and is essential, the qualitative is important. We like good management - we like a decent industry - we like a certain amount of “ferment” in a previously dormant management or stockholder group. But, we demand value.
"股票 - 基于私有的目的" - 一类通常意义上的低估股票，通过一些定量的方法筛选而出，不过仍然要经过定性分析。这类股票通常短期内很难有股价提升。问题在于这些股票缺乏魅力或市场赞助。 他们的主要优点是便宜的价格； 也就是说，企业的总体估值大大低于仔细分析表明其对私人所有者的价值。 让我再次强调，虽然定量是第一位的并且是必不可少的，但定性是重要的。 我们喜欢良好的管理——我们喜欢一个体面的行业——我们喜欢在以前休眠的管理层或股东群体中进行一定程度的“发酵”。 但是，我们要求价值。
Many times in this category we have the desirable "two strings to our bow" situation where we should either achieve appreciation of market prices from external factors or from the acquisition of a controlling position in a business at a bargain price. While the former happens in the overwhelming majority of cases, the latter represents an insurance policy most investment operations don't have. We have continued to enlarge the positions in the three companies described in our 1964 midyear report where we are the largest stockholder. All three companies are increasing their fundamental value at a very satisfactory rate, and we are completely passive in two situations and active only on a very minor scale in the third. It is unlikely that we will ever take a really active part in policy-making in any of these three companies, but we stand ready if needed.
很多时候，在这个类别中，我们有理想的互为补充的方案，要么通过外部因素实现市场价格的升值，要么通过以低廉的价格获得企业的控制权。 虽然前者发生在绝大多数情况下，但后者代表了大多数投资业务所没有的保险策略。 我们继续扩大我们在 1964 年年中报告中描述的三家公司的头寸，成为最大的股东。 这三个公司都在以非常令人满意的速度增加它们的基本价值，我们在两种情况下完全被动，在第三家公司只有稍微参与管理。 我们不太可能真正积极参与这三家公司中的任何一家的政策制定，但如果需要，我们随时准备就绪。"Generals -Relatively Undervalued" - this category consists of securities selling at prices relatively cheap compared to securities of the same general quality. We demand substantial discrepancies from current valuation standards, but (usually because of large size) do not feel value to a private owner to be a meaningful concept. It is important in this category, of course, that apples be compared to apples - and not to oranges, and we work hard at achieving that end. In the great majority of cases we simply do not know enough about the industry or company to come to sensible judgments -in that situation we pass.
“股票 - 相对低估” - 此类别是一些股价要相对低于同类别的股票。我们要求这类股票的估值和标准有巨大的利差，但是（通常是因为公司规模）将这家公司私有化却不是一个合理的选择。在这个类别中，这点很重要。因为我们努力希望能在相同类别中进行对比。而在绝大多数情况下，我们对行业或者公司的了解不足从而无法作出明确的判断 --- 这种情况下，我们就略过这家公司。
As mentioned earlier, this new category has been growing and has produced very satisfactory results. We have recently begun to implement a technique, which gives promise of very substantially reducing the risk from an overall change in valuation standards; e.g. I we buy something at 12 times earnings when comparable or poorer quality companies sell at 20 times earnings, but then a major revaluation takes place so the latter only sell at 10 times.
如前所述，这项新的类别资金总量正在增长，而且产生了很好的收益。我们最近开始实施一项技术，该技术有望大大降低估值标准整体变化带来的风险；例如当某个可对比的业绩较差的公司股价为20倍市盈率时，我们以此为参考在PE为12的时候购买了另一家公司，但是由于市场发生重大的重估，对标公司的市盈率为10了，那么我们就“买贵了”。
This risk has always bothered us enormously because of the helpless position in which we could be left compared to the "Generals -Private Owner" or "Workouts" types. With this risk diminished, we think this category has a promising future.
这种风险一直困扰着我们，因为与“股票-私有化”或“套利”类型相比，我们可能处于被动的境地。 但随着这种风险的降低，我们认为这个类别有一个充满希望的未来。"Workouts" - these are the securities with a timetable. They arise from corporate activity - sell-outs, mergers, reorganizations, spin-offs, etc. In this category we are not talking about rumors or "inside information" pertaining to such developments, but to publicly announced activities of this sort. We wait until we can read it in the paper. The risk pertains not primarily to general market behavior (although that is sometimes tied in to a degree), but instead to something upsetting the applecart so that the expected development does not materialize. Such killjoys could include anti-trust or other negative government action, stockholder disapproval, withholding of tax rulings, etc. The gross profits in many workouts appear quite small. It's a little like looking for parking meters with some time left on them. However, the predictability coupled with a short holding period produces quite decent average annual rates of return after allowance for the occasional substantial loss. This category produces more steady absolute profits from year to year than generals do. In years of market decline it should usually pile up a big edge for us; during bull markets it will probably be a drag on performance. On a long-term basis, I expect the workouts to achieve the same sort of margin over the Dow attained by generals.
”套利“ - 这些是有时间操作表的股票。它们来自公司活动——出售、合并、重组、分拆等。在这一类别中，我们不是在谈论与此类发展有关的谣言或“内幕消息”，而是公开宣布的活动。我们等到可以在报纸上看到消息后再行动。风险并不主要来自于一般市场（尽管有时在一定程度上与此相关），而是有些行为让政府不满意，从而让该商业活动无法实现。这样的扫兴的缘由可能包括反垄断或者其他政府反对的行为，股东不赞成，或者税务问题等等。大多数的套利纯利润很少。这有点像找那种还剩一点时间的停车计时器。然而，由于这种套利的收益可以预测并且周转时间短，在将偶尔的重大损失计算入内后，其平均年回报率仍然不错。而且他要比股票的收益更加稳定。从长远来看，我希望套利类别可以达到和股票投资一样高于道指的收益。
- "Controls" - these are rarities, but when they occur they are likely to be of significant size. Unless we start off with the purchase of a sizable block of stock, controls develop from the general - private owner category. They result from situations where a cheap security does nothing pricewise for such an extended period of time that we are able to buy a significant percentage of the company's stock. At that point we are probably in a position to assume a degree of or perhaps complete control of the company's activities. Whether we become active or remain relatively passive at this point depends upon our assessment of the company's future and the managements capabilities.
“控股公司” - 这类非常罕见，但是发生时，资金规模都很大。除非我们一开始就大量购入股票，否则控股公司都是从股票-私有化的类别衍生出来的。他们是由以下情况产生的：在相当长的一段时间低廉的股价毫无起色从而导致我们持续购入了公司相当大比例的股份。到那时，我们可能在处于可以一定程度或者完全控制公司活动的地位。至于我们是主动参与还是做个默不作声的股东，取决于我们对公司未来和管理层能力的评估。
We do not want to get active merely for the sake of being active. Everything else being equal, I would much rather let others do the work. However, when an active role is necessary to optimize the employment of capital, you can be sure we will not be standing in the wings.
我们不想仅仅为了活跃而活跃。 在其他条件相同的情况下，我宁愿让其他人做这项工作。 但是，当需要发挥积极作用来优化资本使用时，您可以肯定我们不会袖手旁观。
Active or passive, in a control situation there should be a built-in profit. The sine qua non of this operation is an attractive purchase price. Once control is achieved, the value of our investment is determined by the value of the enterprise, not the oftentimes irrationalities of the market place.
主动还是被动，这是处于控股股东地位的一个潜在优势。此操作的必要条件是具有吸引力的购买价格。 一旦实现控制，我们投资的价值就取决于企业的价值，而不是市场的不合理性。
Any of the three situations where we are now the largest stockholders mentioned under Generals - Private Owner could, by virtue of the two-way stretch they possess, turn into controls. That would suit us fine, but it also suits us if they advance in the market to a price more in line with intrinsic value enabling us to sell them, thereby completing a successful generals - private owner operation.
在股权-私有化类别中提到三家公司的任意一家都可以双向延伸。有可能转变成控股公司的类别，这非常适合我们。但如果它们在市场上推进到更符合内在价值的价格，使我们能够出售它们，从而完成一个成功的股权-私有化类别的运作也不错。
Investment results in the control category have to be measured on the basis of at least several years. Proper buying takes time. If needed, strengthening management, redirecting the utilization of capital, perhaps effecting a satisfactory sale or merger, etc., are also all factors that make this a business to be measured in years rather than months. For this reason, in controls, we are looking for wide margins of profit -if it appears at all close, we quitclaim.
最终会发展成控股类别的投资都必须至少几年的时间。合理的价格购入需要时间。如果需要，加强管理、调整资金使用方向、可能还会涉及多方满意的出售或合并等，也是使这项业务以年而不是月来衡量的所有因素。因此我们在此类的操作需要巨大的利润空间，如果这不满足，我们会放弃。
Controls in the buying stage move largely in sympathy with the Dow. In the later stages their behavior is geared more to that of workouts.
在买入阶段其和道指的行为相似。不过在后期的行为更像是套利。
You might be interested to know that the buyers of our former control situation, Dempster Mill Manufacturing, seem to be doing very well with it. This fulfills our expectation and is a source of satisfaction. An investment operation that depends on the ultimate buyer making a bum deal (in Wall Street they call this the "Bigger Fool Theory") is tenuous indeed. How much more satisfactory it is to buy at really bargain prices so that only an average disposition brings pleasant results.
各位也许会对我们之前的控股公司的买家感兴趣。Dempster Mill Manufacturing似乎做的很好。这很符合我们的期望。任意的一项投资都是依赖于最终买家做冤大头实在是不靠谱（华尔街那帮人叫做博傻游戏）。以真正便宜的价格购买然后在合理的价格卖出才是稳健而且令人愉快的。
As I have mentioned in the past, the division of our portfolio among categories is largely determined by the accident of availability. Therefore, in any given year the mix between generals, workouts, or controls is largely a matter of chance, and this fickle factor will have a great deal to do with our performance relative to the Dow. This is one of many reasons why single year's performance is of minor importance and good or bad, should never be taken too seriously.
正如我之前提到的，我们投资组合中各个类别的分配很大程度取决于市场上有多少合适的标的。因此，在任意年份，股票，套利或者控股公司的分配是随机的，而他们的分布对于我们和道指收益的对比又紧密相关。这也就说明了为什么不用太在意一年的收益率。
To give an example of just how important the accident of division between these categories is, let me cite the example of the past three years. Using an entirely different method of calculation than that used to measure the performance of BPL in entirety, whereby the average monthly investment at market value by category is utilized, borrowed money and office operating expenses excluded, etc., (this gives the most accurate basis for intergroup comparisons but does not reflect overall BPL results) the generals (both present categories combined), workouts, and the Dow, shape up as follows:
为了佐证各个类别分类的随机性，我把过去三年的收益率给大家列举一下。这里我们使用了一个完全不同的统计方式，即使用按类别计算平均每月投资标的的市场价值，不包括借入资金和办公室运营费用等。（这可以最准确地表现公司内部各个类别的投资收益，但不代表BPL总体收益）股票，套利和道指的收益对比如下：
Obviously the workouts (along with controls) saved the day in 1962, and if we had been light in this category that year, our final result would have been much poorer, although still quite respectable considering market conditions during the year. We could just as well have had a much smaller percentage of our portfolio in workouts that year; availability decided it, not any notion on my part as to what the market was going to do. Therefore, it is important to realize that in 1962 we were just plain lucky regarding mix of categories.
很明显套利（包括控股投资）在1962年拯救了我们，如果该类别在那一年占比很小我们的总体收益将会很难看，虽然要比当年总体市场的表现要好很多。那一年我们投资组合中套利的比例本可以少很多，但是这取决于是否有合适的标的而非我去预测市场。因此，重要的是要认识到，在 1962 年，我们有合适的投资类别组合完全是靠运气。
In 1963 we had one sensational workout which greatly influenced results, and generals gave a good account of themselves, resulting in a banner year. If workouts had been normal, (say, more like 1962) we would have looked much poorer compared to the Dow. Here it wasn't our mix that did much for us, but rather excellent situations.
在1963年我们完成了一笔极成功的套利运作，极大地提升了收益，而股票投资也表现不俗。如果套利收益表现平平（像1962年那样），我们的评价收益率相较于道指来说就差强人意了。这一年并不是说多样性投资类别对我们有多大帮助，仅仅是碰上一笔好的交易了。
Finally, in 1964 workouts were a big drag on performance. This would be normal in any event during a big plus year for the Dow such as 1964, but they were even a greater drag than expected because of mediocre experience. In retrospect it would have been pleasant to have been entirely in generals, but we don’t play the game in retrospect.
最后，1964年套利的收益大大地拖累了总体收益。在道指大涨的1964年什么事情发生都有可能，但是由于经验不足，整体收益逊于预期。回想起来如果我们全压在股票市场的收益将会非常可观，但是我们不会生活在如果里。
I hope the preceding table drives home the point that results in a given year are subject to many variables - some regarding which we have little control or insight. We consider all categories to be good businesses and we are very happy we have several to rely on rather than just one. It makes for more discrimination within each category and reduces the chance we will be put completely out of operation by the elimination of opportunities in a single category.
我希望前面的表格能说明这一点，即给定年份的收益受许多变量的影响——其中一些我们几乎无法控制或洞察。 我们认为所有类别都是好的业务，很高兴我们多个可以依赖的收益来源，而不仅仅是一个。 各个类别互相补充这样就不会因为某种类别的失败导致我们整体收益堪忧。
Taxes
税务
We have had a chorus of groans this year regarding partners' tax liabilities. Of course, we also might have had a few if the tax sheet had gone out blank.
今年我们收到了合作伙伴纳税义务的齐声抱怨。当然，我么的确应该有一些税要交。
More investment sins are probably committed by otherwise quite intelligent people because of "tax considerations" than from any other cause.
往往一些非常聪明的人都会出于税收考虑而做出很多投资失误。
What is one really trying to do in the investment world? Not pay the least taxes, although that may be a factor to be considered in achieving the end. Means and end should not be confused, however, and the end is to come away with the largest after-tax rate of compound. Quite obviously if two courses of action promise equal rates of pre-tax compound and one involves incurring taxes and the other doesn't the latter course is superior. However, we find this is rarely the case.
我们做投资真正想做的是什么？ 不是缴纳最少的税款，尽管这可能是实现目标时要考虑的一个因素。 然而，手段和目的不应该混淆，目的是要得到最大的税后复合率。 很明显，如果两种行动方案承诺税前复合率相等，一种涉及产生税款，另一种则不，后一种方案更优越。 然而，我们发现这种情况很少见。
It is extremely improbable that 20 stocks selected from, say, 3000 choices are going to prove to be the optimum portfolio both now and a year from now at the entirely different prices (both for the selections and the alternatives) prevailing at that later date. If our objective is to produce the maximum after-tax compound rate, we simply have to own the most attractive securities obtainable at current prices, And, with 3,000 rather rapidly shifting variables, this must mean change (hopefully “tax-generating” change).
在总共3000支股票市场中选择20只股票，并且希望他们在当年以及未来几年在不同价格上面保持超额回报是不可能的。我们的目的是产生最大的税后复合收益，因此我们需要当前价格最具吸引力的证券。而且另外3000只股票是随时浮动的变量，这也意味着我们也要跟着变化。
It is obvious that the performance of a stock last year or last month is no reason, per se, to either own it or to not own it now. It is obvious that an inability to "get even" in a security that has declined is of no importance. It is obvious that the inner warm glow that results from having held a winner last year is of no importance in making a decision as to whether it belongs in an optimum portfolio this year.
很明显，我们不会根据股票去年或者上个月的表现来决定是否持有。下跌的股票带来的心理不平毫不重要，而看着去年盈利的股票所带来的满足感也不是继续持有的理由。
If gains are involved, changing portfolios involves paying taxes. Except in very unusual cases (I will readily admit there are some cases), the amount of the tax is of minor importance if the difference in expectable performance is significant. I have never been able to understand why the tax comes as such a body blow to many people since the rate on long-term capital gain is lower than on most lines of endeavor (tax policy indicates digging ditches is regarded as socially less desirable than shuffling stock certificates).
如果有盈利，那么换股就要交税。除非有极特殊的情况（我会欣然承认有一些情况），如果预期业绩的差异很大，那么税收金额就无关紧要了。我一直无法理解为什么税收对许多人来说是一个如此沉重的打击，因为长期资本收益的比率低于大多数收益来源（根据税收政策表明买卖股票仅仅比挖沟更受欢迎一点）。
I have a large percentage of pragmatists in the audience so I had better get off that idealistic kick. There are only three ways to avoid ultimately paying the tax: (1) die with the asset - and that's a little too ultimate for me even the zealots would have to view this "cure" with mixed emotions; (2) give the asset away - you certainly don't pay any taxes this way, but of course you don't pay for any groceries, rent, etc., either; and (3) lose back the gain if your mouth waters at this tax-saver, I have to admire you -you certainly have the courage of your convictions.
我的听众中有很大比例的实用主义者，所以我最好摆脱那种理想主义的幻想。只有三种方法可以避免最终缴纳税款：（1）与资产一起死 - 这对我来说有点过于极端，即使是狂热分子也不得不以复杂的情绪看待这种“解药”； (2) 放弃资产——你当然不用这种方式缴纳任何税款，当然你也不用支付任何杂货、租金等； （3）如果你只想着节税的话，就放弃收益，不过我不得不佩服你——你实在太忠于自己的信念了。
So it is going to continue to be the policy of BPL to try to maximize investment gains, not minimize taxes. We will do our level best to create the maximum revenue for the Treasury -at the lowest rates the rules will allow.
因此，BPL 的政策将继续是试图最大化投资收益，而不是最小化税收。 我们将尽最大努力为财富创造最大收益——以规则允许的最低利率。
An interesting sidelight on this whole business of taxes, vis-à-vis investment management, has appeared in the last few years. This has arisen through the creation of so-called "swap funds" which are investment companies created by the exchange of the investment company's shares for general market securities held by potential investors. The dominant sales argument has been the deferment (deferment, when pronounced by an enthusiastic salesman, sometimes comes very close phonetically to elimination) of capital gains taxes while trading a single security for a diversified portfolio. The tax will only finally be paid when the swap fund's shares are redeemed. For the lucky ones, it will be avoided entirely when any of those delightful alternatives mentioned two paragraphs earlier eventuates.
过去几年出现了关于整个税收业务相对于投资管理的一个有趣的现象。 这是通过创建所谓的“交换基金”而产生的，这些基金是通过将投资公司的股票交换为潜在投资者持有的一般市场证券而创建的投资公司。 主要的销售论点是资本利得税的延期（延期，这个字眼销售员在提及时，激动的都失声了），同时交易单一证券同时实现了多元化的投资组合。 只有当互换基金的股份被赎回时，才会最终支付税款。如果够幸运，之前提到的那几个完全免税的选项他有可能会碰上一个。
The reasoning implicit in the swapee's action is rather interesting. He obviously doesn't really want to hold what he is holding or he wouldn't jump at the chance to swap it (and pay a fairly healthy commission - usually up to $100,000) for a grab-bag of similar hot potatoes held by other tax-numbed investors. In all fairness, I should point out that after all offerees have submitted their securities for exchange and had a chance to review the proposed portfolio they have a chance to back out but I understand a relatively small proportion do so.
产生这种交换的初衷实在有趣。显然股票持有者不愿意继续持有或者他不愿放弃和别人交换类似股票的机会（特别是还要收取很大一笔最高达10万刀手续费）。但说句公道话，每个交易的参与方都有机会审核交易中涉及的股票并及时推出，虽然几乎没人这么做。
There have been twelve such funds (that I know of) established since origination of the idea in 1960, and several more are currently in the works. The idea is not without appeal since sales totaled well over 250,000 to $700,000 per year), but because of the low tax basis inherited from the contributors of securities, virtually his every move creates capital gains tax liabilities. And, of course, he knows that if he incurs such liabilities, he is doing so for people who are probably quite sensitive to taxes or they wouldn't own shares in the swap fund in the first place.
自 1960 年提出这一想法以来，（据我所知）已经建立了 12 个这样的基金，目前还有几个正在筹建中。 这个想法并非没有吸引力，因为销售额总计超过 6 亿美元。 所有基金都保留了一名投资经理，他们通常向其支付资产价值的 0.5% 作为报酬。而这些基金经理却面临一个有趣的问题，报酬是为了让其好好的管理基金（在五个最大的基金中，这个费用目前每年从 250,000 美元到 700,000 美元不等），但是由于从基金认购人那里继承的低税基，他的每一次操作都会产生资本利得税。而且他还知道，这些资本利得税的对象是那些本来就对税务敏感的客户，或者他们一开始就不该认购这种交换基金。
I am putting all of this a bit strongly, and I am sure there are some cases where a swap fund may be the best answer to an individual's combined tax and investment problems. Nevertheless, I feel they offer a very interesting test-tube to measure the ability of some of the most respected investment advisors when they are trying to manage money without paying (significant) taxes.
虽然以上的看法有点偏激，但我相信在某些情况下，互换基金可能是解决个人税收和投资问题的最佳答案。 尽管如此，我觉得他们提供了一个非常有趣的实验环境来衡量一些最受尊敬的投资顾问在不缴纳（大量）税款的情况下管理资金的能力。
The three largest swap funds were all organized in 1961, and combined have assets now of about $300 million. One of these, Diversification Fund, reports on a fiscal year basis which makes extraction of relevant data quite difficult for calendar year comparisons. The other two, Federal Street Fund and Westminster Fund (respectively first and third largest in the group) are managed by investment advisors who oversee at least 2 billion of institutional money.
三个最大的互换基金都是在 1961 年成立的，现在总资产约为 3 亿美元。 其中之一，多元化基金，以财政年度为基础进行报告，这使得提取相关数据以进行日历年比较非常困难。 另外两个，联邦街基金和威斯敏斯特基金（分别是该集团的第一和第三大基金）由手下至少 20 亿美元机构资金的投资顾问管理。
Here's how they shape up for all full years of existence:
以下是他们成立以来年化收益：
This is strictly the management record. No allowance has been made for the commission in entering and any taxes paid by the fund on behalf of the shareholders have been added back to performance.
这是个严谨的管理记录，没有算入任何津贴或者基金代表股东支付的税款的费用。
Anyone for taxes?
对于税收还有问题吗？
Miscellaneous
杂项
In the December 21st issue of AUTOMOTIVE NEWS it was reported that Ford Motor Co. plans to spend $700 million in 1965 to add 6,742,000 square feet to its facilities throughout the world. Buffett Partnership, Ltd., never far behind, plans to add 227 1/4 square feet to its facilities in the spring of 1965.
在 12 月 21 日的《汽车新闻》中报道说，福特汽车公司计划在 1965 年斥资 7 亿美元在全球范围内增加 6,742,000 平方英尺的设施。巴菲特合伙有限公司，也不甘落后，计划在 1965 年春天为其设施增加 227 1/4 平方英尺。
Our growth in net assets from 100) on May 5, 1956 when the first predecessor limited partnership.(Buffett Associates, Ltd. ) was organized, to $26,074,000 on 1/1/65 creates the need for an occasional reorganization in internal routine. Therefore, roughly contemporaneously with the bold move from 682 to 909 1⁄4 square feet, a highly capable is going to join our organization with responsibility for the administrative (and certain other) functions. This move will particularly serve to free up more of Bill Scott's time for security analysis which is his forte. I’ll have more to report on this in the midyear letter.
我们的净资产从 1956 年 5 月 5 日第一个前身有限合伙公司（Buffett Associates, Ltd.）成立时的 105,100 美元（猜猜谁投入的100 美元）增长到 65 年 1 月 1 日的 26,074,000 美元，因此我们需要对内部程序进行偶尔的重组。因此，在进行 682 到 909 1⁄4 平方英尺的大胆扩建的同时，一个有能力的人将加入我们的组织，负责行政（和某些其他）职能。这一举措将特别有助于腾出比尔斯科特更多的时间进行安全分析，这是他的专长。我将在年中信中对此进行更多报告。
Bill (who continues to do a terrific job) and his wife have an investment in the Partnership of 298,749, a very large majority of their net worth. Our new associate (his name is being withheld until his present employer has replaced him), along with his wife and children, has made an important investment in the Partnership. Susie and I presently have an interest of 3,406,700 in BPL which represents virtually our entire net worth, with the exception of our continued holding of Mid-Continent Tab Card Co., a local company into which I bought in 1960 when it had less than 10 stockholders. Additionally, my relatives, consisting of three children, mother , two sisters, two brothers-in-law, father-in-Law, four aunts, four cousins and six nieces and nephews, have interests in BPL, directly or indirectly, totaling $1,942,592. So we all continue to eat home cooking.
比尔（总是能出色的完成使命）和他的妻子在合伙企业中投资了 298,749 美元，占他们净资产的很大一部分。我们的新合伙人（他的名字不便透露直到在他现雇主真正找到替代者），连同他的妻子和孩子，对合伙企业进行了重要的投资。 Susie 和我目前在 BPL 中拥有 3,406,700 美元的权益，这几乎代表了我们的全部净资产，除了我们继续持有 Mid-Continent Tab Card Co.，这是我在 1960 年购买的当地公司，当时它只有不到 10个股东。此外，我的亲戚，包括三个孩子、母亲、两个姐妹、两个姐夫、岳父、四个阿姨、四个堂兄弟和六个侄女和侄子，直接或间接在 BPL 拥有权益，总计 1,942,592 美元。
Finally -and most sincerely -let me thank you partners who cooperate magnificently in getting things to us promptly and properly and thereby maximize the time we can spend working where we should be -by the cash register. I am extremely fortunate in being able to spend the great majority of my time thinking about where our money should be invested, rather than getting bogged down in the minutiae that seems to overwhelm so many business entities. We have an organizational structure which makes this efficiency a possibility, and more importantly, we have a group of partners that make it a reality. For this, I am most appreciative and we are all wealthier.
最后 - 也是最诚挚的 - 让我感谢合作伙伴，他们在及时、妥善地为我们提供帮助方面进行了出色的合作，从而最大限度地利用宝贵的时间放在工作上。 我非常幸运能够将大部分时间都花在思考我们的钱应该投资在哪里，而不是陷入似乎压倒这么多商业实体的细枝末节。 我们的组织结构使这种效率成为可能，更重要的是，我们有一群合作伙伴使之成为现实。 对于这一点，我最感激，我们都将更富有。
Cordially, Warren E. Buffett
