本译文极其不严谨，不适宜用作任何学术参照，安思大人请阅

1.  Introduction

What Is Philosophy of Mind?

1.1 心灵哲学是啥？

Metaphysical Preliminaries

形而上学

Mind-Body Supervenience

身心问题——灵魂附体

Materialism and Physicalism

唯物主义和物理主义

Varieties of Mental Phenomena

心灵现象——心灵的各种表现

Is There a “Mark of the Mental”?

心灵是否有的独有的特征？

1.1 心灵哲学是啥？

为更好的应对纷繁复杂的世间万物，通常我们会对事物进行分类。

我们将他们分为岩石、树木、鱼、鸟、砖块、火、雨和其他无数种类，并根据它们的属性和特征（大小、高或短、红或黄、慢或快，死活等等）来描述它们。比如，我们将东西分为有生命的和无生命的(即便是一只死鸟，我们仍然知道它是有生命的，不像一块石头或一个青瓷花瓶压根儿就不会死的。)。虽然会有例外情况，但我们总是能轻易区分什么是有生命的还是没生命的。就像当我们认识一个人时，我们几乎总是能知道这个人是男是女。

生命和普通事物之间的最基本区别，在于生命有思想有心灵。我们对生命和普通事物的态度是完全不同的。生命有意识、能够体验到痛苦和快乐的感觉，石头和植物则没有。这种态度的差别，在关于素食主义和活体动物科学实验的争论中可以略见一斑。

我们往往认为自己在自然世界中占有特殊而独特的地位，因为我们特别高度发达的心智能力和功能，例如抽象思维、自我意识、艺术敏感性、复杂情感和理性思考和行动的能力。虽然我们欣赏植物和动物的生命奇迹，但我们并不认为每一个生物都有一个思想，或者我们需要一个心理学理论来理解榆树和桦树的生命周期，或者阿米巴原虫的行为和生殖模式。除了少数具有某些神秘倾向的人之外，我们不认为植物世界的成员具有心理上的天赋，而且我们也会将许多来自这个王国的成员排除在精神领域之外，我们不认为阿米巴原虫的精神生活适合于严肃的心理调查。

但对于一些高级动物，如猫、狗和黑猩猩，我们发现给予他们相当丰富的精神生活是完全自然的。他们像人一样经历痛苦、渴望和快乐;他们或多或少地感知周围的环境，并利用所获得的信息来指导他们的行为。他们也会做一些事情，比如储存和使用周围环境的信息，从经验中学习，而且他们显然有感觉，比如害怕、沮丧和焦虑。我们用我们平常用的人类同胞的情绪来描述他们的心理生活:加菲在宠物车里感到局促不安，所有的交通噪音都让她紧张。小可怜虫急切的想要被放出来。

但是，即使是更聪明的动物们，比如马和海豚，是否有更复杂的社会情感，比如尴尬和羞耻?他们是否有能力形成意图，进行思考和决策，或执行逻辑推理?当我们沿着动物的阶梯往下走，比如说，牡蛎、螃蟹和蚯蚓，我们会认为它们的精神生活与一种做得很好的猫相比，是相当贫乏的。我们认为，这些生物肯定有感觉，因为它们以适当的方式对有害的刺激作出反应，它们有感觉器官，通过它们获得关于周围事物的信息，并据此调整和修正它们的行为。但是他们有思想吗?他们有意识吗?那究竟是什么让你有思想，或者是心灵。

In coping with the myriad things and events that come our way at every mo-ment of our waking life, we try to organize them into manageable chunks.

We do this by sorting things into groups—categorizing them as “rocks,” “trees,” “fish,” “birds,” “bricks,” “fires,” “rains,” and countless other kinds—and describ-ing them in terms of their properties and features as “large” or “small,” “tall” or “short,” “red” or “yellow,” “slow” or “swift,” and so on. A distinction that we al-most instinctively apply to just about everything is whether it is alivingthing. (It might be a dead bird, but still we know it is thekindof thing that lives, un-like a rock or a celadon vase, which couldn’t be “dead.”) There are exceptions, of course, but it is unusual for us to know what something is without at the same time knowing, or having some ideas about, whether it is a living thing. Another example: When we know a person, we almost always know whether the person is male or female.

The same is true of the distinction between things, or creatures, with a “mind” and those without a mind. This, too, is one of the most basic contrasts we use in our thoughts about things in the world. Our attitudes toward crea-tures that are conscious and capable of experiencing sensations like pain and pleasure are importantly different from our attitudes toward things lacking such capacities, mere chunks of matter or insentient plants, as witness the controversies about vegetarianism and scientific experiments involving live animals. And we are apt to regard ourselves as occupying a special and distinctive place in the natural world on account of our particularly highly developed mental capacities and functions, such as the capacity for abstract thoughts, self-consciousness, artistic sensibilities, complex emotions, and a capacity for rational deliberation and action. Much as we admire the miracle of the flora and fauna, we do not think that every living thing has a mind or that we need a psychological theory to understand the life cycles of elms and birches or the behavior and reproductive patterns of amoebas. Except those few of us with certain mystical inclinations, we do not think that members of the plant world are endowed with mentality, and we would exclude many members of the ani-mal kingdom from the mental realm as well. We would not think that planarians and gnats have a mental life that is fit for serious psychological inquiry.

When we come to higher forms of animal life, such as cats, dogs, and chimpanzees, we find it entirely natural to grant them a fairly rich mental life. They are surelyconsciousin that they experiencesensations, like pain, itch, and pleasure; theyperceivetheir surroundings more or less the way we do and use the information so gained to guide their behavior. They alsorememberthings—that is, store and use information about their surroundings—andlearnfrom experience, and they certainly appear to havefeelingsandemo-tions, such as fear, frustration, and anxiety. We describe their psychologicallife using the expressions we normally use for fellow human beings: “Phoebe is feeling cramped inside the pet carrier and all that traffic noise has made her nervous. The poor thing is dying to be let out.”

But are the animals, even the more intelligent ones like horses and dolphins, capable of complex social emotions like embarrassment and shame? Are they capable of forming intentions, engaging in deliberation and making decisions, or performing logical reasoning? When we go down the ladder of animal life to, say, oysters, crabs, and earthworms, we would think that their mental life is considerably impoverished in comparison with that of, say, a do-mestic cat. Surely these creatures have sensations, we think, for they react in appropriate ways to noxious stimuli, and they have sense organs through which they gain information about what goes on around them and adjust and modify their behavior accordingly. But do they have minds? Are they conscious? Do they have mentality? What is it to have a mind, or mentality?

未完待更……