去豆瓣的书单看2018年的好书推荐，有一本《巴菲特致股东的信》引起了我的兴趣，想买来看看，却发现书评里很多人说翻译的不好，所以就去找原版书，发现有点小贵，而且只找到了第四版的，出版时间大约是2011年，感觉内容不太新。所以自己就到网上找了找资料，反正这个信本身就是公开的，出版物只是帮你整理好了，自己一年年的看也没什么。自从毕业以后，英语就扔了很多年，就借此机会捡起来，重新学学英语吧。肯定没有人家大佬翻译的好，这里不做比较，只当是翻译练习。
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~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 自以为华丽的分割线 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致 伯克希尔 哈撒韦 有限公司的股东们：
Berkshire’s gain in net worth during 2017 was $65.3 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 23%. Over the last 53 years (that is, since present management took over), per- share book value has grown from $19 to $211,750, a rate of 19.1% compounded annually.
在2017年伯克希尔的净收益是653亿美金，A股和B股的每股净值增长23%。在过去的53年间(指自从现任管理者接手起)，每股净值已经从19美金增长至211，750美金，每年组合增长率为19.1%。
The format of that opening paragraph has been standard for 30 years. But 2017 was far from standard: A large portion of our gain did not come from anything we accomplished at Berkshire.
公开报告的形式已经持续30年了。但是2017年远未达到标准：我们大部分的收益并不是来自于伯克希尔。
The $65 billion gain is nonetheless real – rest assured of that. But only $36 billion came from Berkshire’s operations. The remaining $29 billion was delivered to us in December when Congress rewrote the U.S. Tax Code. (Details of Berkshire’s tax-related gain appear on page K-32 and pages K-89 – K-90.)
650亿美元的收益毫无疑问是真实存在的。但是只有360亿美元来自于伯克希尔的运营。剩下的290亿美元是在12月份国会改写了税法以后给我们的。(伯克希尔税收相关营收将出现在32页和89-90页)
After stating those fiscal facts, I would prefer to turn immediately to discussing Berkshire’s operations. But, in still another interruption, I must first tell you about a new accounting rule – a generally accepted accounting principle (GAAP) – that in future quarterly and annual reports will severely distort Berkshire’s net income figures and very often mislead commentators and investors.
在陈述了这些财政事实以后，我倾向于立即开始讨论伯克希尔的运营问题。但是，仍需先打断一下，我必须先告诉你们一个新的会计核算准则--公认会计原则(GAAP),在未来的季度和年度报告中该原则将严重影响伯克希尔的净收入数据并将会非常严重的误导评论人员和投资者。
The new rule says that the net change in unrealized investment gains and losses in stocks we hold must be included in all net income figures we report to you. That requirement will produce some truly wild and capricious swings in our GAAP bottom-line. Berkshire owns $170 billion of marketable stocks (not including our shares of Kraft Heinz), and the value of these holdings can easily swing by $10 billion or more within a quarterly reporting period. Including gyrations of that magnitude in reported net income will swamp the truly important numbers that describe our operating performance. For analytical purposes, Berkshire’s “bottom-line” will be useless.
新规定要求我们在向您做汇报时，手中持有的未实现的投资营收和股票损益的净变动必须包含全部净收入数据中。这一要求将会在GAAP底线中产生某些真正的波动。伯克希尔拥有1700亿美金的可交易股票(不包含我们的卡夫-海因茨的股票)，这些持有在一个汇报季度周期内将很容易产生100亿甚至更大的波动。在报告净值时包含如此巨大的波动将会掩盖能够说明我们经营业绩的真正数字。为了分析目的，伯克希尔的“底线”将是无用的。
The new rule compounds the communication problems we have long had in dealing with the realized gains (or losses) that accounting rules compel us to include in our net income. In past quarterly and annual press releases, we have regularly warned you not to pay attention to these realized gains, because they – just like our unrealized gains – fluctuate randomly.
新规则使我们在根据会计规则处理已实现的收益(或损失) 时包含净收益这一长期存在的交流问题更严重。在过去的季度和每年的新闻发布会中，我们常警告您们不要关注这些已实现的收益，因为他们--就像我们未实现的收益一样--都是随机波动的。
That’s largely because we sell securities when that seems the intelligent thing to do, not because we are trying to influence earnings in any way. As a result, we sometimes have reported substantial realized gains for a period when our portfolio, overall, performed poorly (or the converse).
这主要是因为我们看起来总是在很明智的时候出售证券，而不是因为我们在尝试以任何方式影响收入。因此，当我们的证券预期表现不佳(或是相反时)，我们会汇报大量的已实现营收。
====== 额，费劲巴拉的翻译了一页纸，但是总感觉自己说的不是人话...请大家还是去买书吧... ======
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~ ~ ~ 昨儿翻译到这里停了 今天翻译的时候发现有部分内容应该接上 续 ~ ~ ~
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With the new rule about unrealized gains exacerbating the distortion caused by the existing rules applying to realized gains, we will take pains every quarter to explain the adjustments you need in order to make sense of our numbers. But televised commentary on earnings releases is often instantaneous with their receipt, and newspaper headlines almost always focus on the year-over-year change in GAAP net income. Consequently, media reports sometimes highlight figures that unnecessarily frighten or encourage many readers or viewers.
由于新的未实现收益规则加重了现有规则关于已实现收益的扭曲，我们在每个季度将花费更多的心思来解释你需要做的调整，来使你们能够更清楚的了解我们的数据。但是在营收发布方面电视评论都是瞬息万变的，并且新闻头条几乎总是关注在年复一年的GAAP净收入变化。因此，媒体报道有时会没必要的夸大惊恐或是鼓励读者和观众。
We will attempt to alleviate this problem by continuing our practice of publishing financial reports late on Friday, well after the markets close, or early on Saturday morning. That will allow you maximum time for analysis and give investment professionals the opportunity to deliver informed commentary before markets open on Monday. Nevertheless, I expect considerable confusion among shareholders for whom accounting is a foreign language.
我们会尝试减轻这个问题通过继续在周五市场关闭后的晚些时候或是周六早上发布财报。这会在周一开市之前，给你足够的分析时间并给投资专业人士机会去发表评论。尽管如此，我依然觉得会给使用非英语做计算的股东造成很大的困惑。
At Berkshire what counts most are increases in our normalized per-share earning power. That metric is what Charlie Munger, my long-time partner, and I focus on – and we hope that you do, too. Our scorecard for 2017 follows.
在伯克希尔，最重要的是提高我们在标准化每股营收的能力。这个指标是查利芒格，我最长久的搭档和我关注并且我们也希望你关注的地方。我们2017的积分卡如下。
