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The Governed Blockchain

受治理的区块链

作者：Ian Grigg

翻译：Lochaiching

Abstract: A blockchain is a platform controlled only by software rules, often termed a permissionless ledger. As the corporate world has entered into this new territory, it has modified the original vision to create permissioned blockchains. This mechanism, deployed to control anarchic and fraudulent behaviour, both, is familiar and effective, but comes with costs - it shuts out the small business, the engine of growth and innovation.

摘要：区块链是一种仅受软件规则控制的平台，通常被称为不需得到许可的分类帐本。随着商业逐渐开始进入这一新的领域寻求自己的一席之地，区块链最初的设想已经开始略有变化了——需要得到许可的区块链逐渐有了需求。这种用于控制无政府主义和欺诈性行为的机制，既熟悉又高效，但也伴随着成本——它将推动增长和创新的小企业拒之门外。
What would a blockchain for small business look like? From 1st principles, business needs a stable and safe environment, one in which its community is for it not against it. The missing element is the trust that a community can work together to resolve a disaster.

区块链中，小型企业会怎样呢？从第一个原则来看，商业需要一个相对稳定和安全的环境，并且在这个环境中，这个社区不反对它的存在。而缺少的因素是整个社区可以协作并共同解决社区危机的那份信任。

As blockchain isn’t that environment, the big money waits on the sidelines. To build trust onto a blockchain, we add a modicum of classical institutions of governance: a set of rules, and mechanisms to keep people within the rules. But, crucially, we do not need to build a wall around to lock small business out.

既然区块链上述的情况，来自外部的大笔资金就只能先在一旁观望，看看先行者会出现什么情况。为了在区块链上建立信任，我们添加了一些传统惯用的治理机构：一套让大家遵纪守法的规则和机制。但最重要的是，我们不需要将小企业拒之门外。

We call the result The Governed Blockchain as a 3rd alternative to permissioned versus permissionless ledgers. It preserves the free entry of open blockchains, but imposes rules of behaviour within the blockchain’s Constitution, and methods to feedback responsibility on bad behaviour.

这样趋势导致的结果称为受治理的区块链，作为许可与非许可分类账簿的第三种选择。它保留了区块链自由进入的开放性，但在区块链的公约（Constitution）中规定了行为规则，以及制定了当事人对不良行为的负责方式。

The Governed Blockchain invites the entrepreneur in to build a business with some basic level of safety and security, that their business will not be destroyed by black swans and other disasters. It invites capital to deploy into blockchain to build business, where before, entrepreneurs were holding back.

这个受治理的区块链邀请企业家共同建立一个具有基本安全水平的商业标的，使他们的企业不会被黑天鹅现象和其他灾难破坏殆尽。同时，它邀请资本到区块链部署并建立业务，而在此之前，企业家们还在犹豫。

Notes.

• The permanent home of this paper is http://iang.org/papers/the_governed_blockchain.html. A working draft is located in [working draft] .

• IanG is a partner and advisor of block.one, the authors of EOS.IO software, however the words and concepts are his and not an official or approved position of block.one.

• Credits. This paper received substantial editorial work by Eva Stöwe. Many others have reviewed and commented: Dan Larimer, Arthur Doohan, Thomas Cox, Ian Panchèvre, Jeff Daub.

· This paper has been presented through late 2017:

◦ 20th Sept 2017 - Hong Kong Bitkan's video（https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qS5a_yS5NXo）;

◦ 16th Oct 2017 - London at Mattereum’s event video （http://internetofagreements.com/2017/12/13/ian-grigg-mattereum/）;

◦ 18th Oct 2017 - London EOS Meetup;

◦ 29th Oct 2017 - Cyprus Decentralized2017 slides（https://www.decentralized.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Ian-Grigg-The-Governed-Blockchain.pdf） & video（https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NTzxu-tLjh4）;

◦ 6th April 2018 - EOS meetup Hong Kong

◦ 22nd May 2018 - Frankfurt School of Finance & Management

备注：

• 本文的永久主页是http://iang.org/papers/the_governed_blockchain.html ，一个正在写的草稿在此http://iang.org/papers/the_governed_blockchain.html#ref_working%20draft

• ianG是block.one的合伙人和顾问，也是EOSIO软件的作者。但是文字和概念是他的，而非block.one正式的或批准的内容。

• 制作人员。本文花费了Eva Stöwe大量的工作来编辑。还有来自很多人的评论:Dan Larimer, Arthur Doohan, Thomas Cox, Ian Panchèvre, Jeff Daub

• 本文已于2017年末发表

First Principles

一、最初的原则

It should be possible to justify a design for a system from first principles. Our mission is to build the EOS blockchain for everybody [Grigg, 2017a （http://iang.org/papers/the_governed_blockchain.html#ref_Grigg,%202017a）] . [Larimer, 2017 （http://iang.org/papers/the_governed_blockchain.html#ref_Larimer,%202017）] . In pursuit of the mission, we should be asking questions such as:

Who is everybody? 

What do they need? 

Can we provide it? 

This paper lays down the logic for a governed blockchain from one starting assumption of need - trade. It is our hope that from this point, everything else follows.

最初的原则应该可以为一个系统的设计辩护。我们的任务是为每个人构建EOS区块链[Grigg, 2017a]、[Larimer, 2017]。为了执行任务，我们应该提出以下问题:

每个人都是谁?

他们需要什么?

我们可以提供吗?

本文从需求交易这一初始假设出发，阐述了受治理的区块链的逻辑。我们希望从这一点开始，其他一切都能跟上。

Ian治理区块链1.png

A governed blockchain is built for business. An example of such a business is the Steem system, a social network or blogging environment built on a custom single purpose blockchain. Another example is Bitshares, a decentralised exchange for trading cryptocurrencies. These two businesses are sisters in model and team, but have completely different missions and customers. The existence of these two, so close but yet so different, and their relative solitude as viable and independent business proposals is significant - it suggests several things:

That, business is possible on the blockchain,

That, there is a wide application space between and around the two use cases, and

That, this application space is currently under-utilised by business.

受治理的区块链是为商业级而构建的。此类业务的一个例子是Steem系统，一个建立在自定义单一用途区块链之上的社交网络或博客环境。另一个例子是Bitshares，一个交易加密货币的去中心化交易所。这两家企业在模式和团队上是姐妹企业，但使命和客户群体完全不同。这两家公司的关系紧密却大有不同，它们作为可行的、相对独立的商业先例是非常重要的——它表明了以下几点:

在区块链上做生意是可能的；

在这两个案例之间和周围有一个广泛的应用空间；

这个应用程序空间目前还没有被企业充分利用。

Why is this? It is our thesis that other blockchains are unsuitable for business. And the very lack that businesses face is that other blockchains are not governed. Let’s build up the case for The Governed Blockchain .

这是为什么呢?我们的论点是，其他区块链不适合商业。企业所面临的问题是，其他区块链没有受到监管。让我们为受治理的区块链构建案例。
[图片上传失败...(image-4b6765-1533524697478)]

To Permission or to UnPermission - was that the question?

允许或不允许，这个问题?

Blockchains have been characterised as unpermissioned and permissioned (Swanson, 2015). This divides the space into (a) open entry, software only blockchains for public access and (b) closed off private blockchains, or ‘walled gardens’ with both software and legal provisions. Let’s consider each in turn.

区块链被分为不被允许的和被允许的(Swanson, 2015)。这将空间划分为(a)开放级入口、仅供公众访问的软件区块链和(b)关闭私人级区块链、或既有软件又有法律规定的“围墙花园（walled gardens）”。让我们依次考虑。

(a)The Unpermissioned Blockchain

(a)未被许可的区块链

The original or classical Bitcoin as an Unpermissioned, public blockchain had the disadvantage that with only software-enforced controls, only the things that can be controlled in software will be controlled. Everything else is left uncontrolled.

原始的或经典的比特币作为一种未经许可的、公开的区块链有一个缺点：只有软件强制控制，软件中才能控制的东西才会被控制。其他一切都不受控制。

In effect, this means that there is a relatively stark line between simple and complex: relatively simple things such as payments can be controlled and are controlled because we can code them up. In contrast, complex things such as relying on your counterparty to deliver a swap in a month cannot be so easily controlled.

实际上，这意味着简单和复杂之间有一个相对明了的界限：相对简单的事情，比如支付可以被控制和控制，因为可以用代码创建它们。相比之下，像依赖你的对手方在一个月内进行互换复杂的事情时是不容易控制的。

Hence the seemingly obsessive fixation by the blockchainers on exotic cryptography: multisig, zkSNARKs, ring signatures, Turing-complete smart contracts and other arcania. We must turn the complex into the simple, and without success, unpermissioned blockchains appear exciting but progress so far does not speak clearly or loudly to viable business use cases. The quest continues, even as it has broken many a venture, lost many a fortune and shows little sign of changing that pattern.

因此，在奇异的密码学上，封锁者们似乎执着于此:multisig, zkSNARKs, ring signatures, Turing-complete smart contract和其他arcania。我们必须把复杂的东西变成简单的东西，如果没有成功，未经许可的区块链就会让一些人感到兴奋。但是目前进展来看，并不能清晰对外用可行的商业用例来作为成功范本。这种追求仍在继续，尽管它穿越了很多冒险，失去了许多财富，而且没有显示出任何改变这种模式的迹象。

(b) The Permissioned Blockchain

(b)受许可的区块链

Then, complex business with a use case turns to Swanson’s permissioned ledgers in the hope that once so controlled, people will behave and complex trade will start to roll [Swanson, 2015 （http://iang.org/papers/the_governed_blockchain.html#ref_Swanson,%202015）] . Trade begets revenues, revenues begets profits, and profits beget living - all is good. An alternate position to Swanson’s is the consortium blockchain which envisages that the consensus is controlled by a group, but otherwise the chain claims to be open entry, free to trade [Buterin, 2015 （http://iang.org/papers/the_governed_blockchain.html#ref_Buterin,%202015）] .

然后，带有用例的复杂商业业务转向Swanson受许可的分类账簿，希望一旦受到这样的控制，人们将会行动起来，让复杂的交易开始滚动[Swanson, 2015]。贸易创造收入，收入创造利润，利润创造生活——这样的一切看起来很好。对Swanson的另一种观点是区块链财团，该财团设想共识由一个组织控制，除此之外，该联盟声称是开放的，可以自由交易[Buterin, 2015]。

But permissioned and consortium ledgers face another problem: the person who provides the permissions inevitably owns or controls the chain.

但是被许可的和财团的分类账簿面临着另一个问题：提供许可的人不可避免地拥有或控制了链。

Ian治理区块链3.png

He who permits, extracts. That person that controls the gate seeks to monetise, and adds rules of discrimination to generate pricing opportunities. The owner is also lobbied by other powerful players, and more rules are added to preserve the benefit for the powerful. A further opportunity is that the owner can capture business from users by raising barriers to entry.

他允许提取物（extract）。那个控制把关的人寻求货币化，并增加了歧视规则以创造定价机会。所有者还受到了其他有权势玩家的游说，并增加了更多的规则来保护权贵们的利益。另一个机会是，所有者可以通过提高进入门槛从用户那里获取商业业务。

Thus the cost rises for all participants, and these chains eventually become dominated by a group of powerful players - cartels following the economic theory if not the political viewpoint. Hence, the term is likely wrong: both permissioned and consortium chains will become private or closed blockchains given enough time and money.

因此，所有参与者的成本都会上升，而这些链上最终会被一群强大的参与者所控制——如果不是出于政治观点，也会遵循经济理论的卡特尔现象（译者注：垄断利益集团）。因此，这一术语很可能是错误的：受许可和联合链会因为给予足够的时间和金钱，成为私人的或封闭的区块链。

The permissioned blockchain is a closed, private chain.

经过许可的区块链是一个封闭的私人链。

Free agents see these blockchains as costly. Costs rise, so much so that Internet entrepreneurs do not like permissioned ledgers. The thesis of inevitable cartelisation suggests that the rational entrepreneur knows that the power of the center will inevitably be turned against them, and they conclude it isn’t worth their time and money. The money and effort they invest in the chain has low ROI (“return on investment”), so low it is expected to be negative returns.

自由代理者认为这些区块链代价高昂。成本上升，以至于互联网企业家不喜欢被许可的分类账簿。不可避免的卡特尔的理论表明，理性的企业家知道，中心化的力量不可避免地会对他们不利，他们认为这是不值得花时间和金钱的，因此在链上投资的资金和努力会有低的投资回报率(“投资回报”)，低到预期的负回报。

Indeed, perhaps, to some, the whole point of the blockchain is that there isn’t an owner, there isn’t a more powerful party, there isn’t a wizard behind the curtain, a central banker behind the coins, a core behind the code. I say, perhaps that is the point, because the design of the blockchain is as it is, the point is as much what we ascribe to it and what we extract from it as any claimed starting position that spawned the first blockchain.

事实上，对一些人来说，区块链的全部意义在于，没有一个是真正意义上的所有者，没有一个更强大的一方，幕后没有巫师，币的背后没有央行行长，代码背后没有核心利益所有者。所以我说，也许这就是重点，因为区块链的设计就是这样的，重点是我们赋予它的和我们从它中提取出来的东西，就像任何声称产生第一个区块链的起始位置一样。

More importantly, what is perhaps becoming clearer is this: everyone can probably agree with the principle that we automate everything that is simple to automate. Whereas, between the two camps either side of the permissioning fence, there is little or no agreement as to what to do with the space of complexity that lies above the line of simplicity.

更重要的是，可能越来越清楚：每个人都可能同意“我们将一切简单自动化”的原则。然而，在两个阵营中，在许可的围栏的两边，几乎没有或没有达成一致的协议，在简单的这条线之上复杂性的空间应该如何处理。

Ian治理区块链4.png

Between Anarchy and The Leviathan

在无政府状态和利维坦之间

As Charles Evans suggests, we are caught between the Anarchy of the unpermissioned chain and The Leviathan of the permissioned alternative [Evans, 2017 （http://iang.org/papers/the_governed_blockchain.html#ref_Evans,%202017）] . This is an uncomfortable choice for the small business owner who is asked to invest substantial capital in what amounts to an unreliable future. To analyse our choices, we must go back to the first principles. We must ask what business is trying to do.

Ian治理区块链5.png

正如Charles Evans所言，我们夹在不受约束的链的无政府状态，和被许可的另类选择——利维坦之间(Evans, 2017)。这对小企业主来说是一个不舒服的选择，他们被要求在一个不可靠的未来投入大量的资金。为了分析我们的选择，我们必须回到最初的原则。我们必须问一下企业在做什么。

II. What does business do?

二、商业业务是做什么的?

Trade is the beginning and the end

贸易是开始，也是结束

If you are a global corporation, finance theory tells us that your best strategy is generally to do what your business already does, until you die. If you are a person with wealth, a high net worth individual, the efficient market hypothesis predicts that your best strategy is to buy the market index, or in today’s lingo, to hodl.

如果你是一家全球性的公司，金融理论告诉我们，你最好的策略通常是做你的公司已经在做的事情，直到你死去才停下来。如果你是一个拥有财富的人，一个高净值个人，有效市场假说预测你的最佳策略是购买市场指数，或者在今天流行的话是hodl。

For the rest of us, for the vast majority of humanity, we need to do business to survive. Trade with real goods and services is the beginning and the end of our life strategy.

对我们其他人来说，对绝大多数人来说，我们需要不断做交易才能生存。我们人生战略的起点和终点都不断在与真正的商品和服务进行贸易。

Ian治理区块链6.jpeg

We put it then as axiomatic that we should build a blockchain not for payments, not for one customer or another, not for banks or bloggers or day traders or gamers or silk roaders or hodlers. Not to please big or small blockers or big or small government.

我们把它作为一个原则，我们应该建立一个区块链，而不是为了支付，不是为一个客户或另一个客户，不是为银行或博客，或日交易者、游戏者、丝绸之路者或持有者（hodler）。不是为了取悦不同的阻碍者，或者取悦不同的政府。

We should build the blockchain for trade, for business, for all of you.

我们应该为贸易、商业和你们每一个人建立区块链。

We live in complexity

我们生活在一个复杂的环境

Business is by its nature complex. As we hinted above, some trade is simple, homogenised, and automated - payments is an exemplary of that in finance. A payment system works at massive scale, is heavily automated and extremely cheap. Such economies at massive scale result in large slow-moving centralised organisations, which also makes them subject to capture and domination by large players. Inevitably: Large banks, large governments, large mining pools.

商业的本质是复杂的。正如我们以上所提及，一些贸易是简单的，同质化的，而自动支付是金融领域的典范。支付系统规模庞大，自动化程度高，成本极低。这样的经济规模巨大，导致了大规模的缓慢移动的中心化组织，这也使得它们受到大型企业的占领和控制。不可避免的是：雄厚的银行、强大的政府、巨大的矿池。

This is the commoditisation argument - the more simple the trade, the more it is automatable, the more subject to scale, and eventual capture. The takeaway here being that such simple, automatable business is not for us - not for the small players, not for the vast majority, not for the diaspora of small traders. We are competed out, we are excluded. We small traders are squeezed out of simple, scalable trade, but what is left is complex trade. We make our livelihood in that messy chaos where our minds & bodies are our capital, and nobody can squeeze us out of our own minds.

这就是商品化的理由——交易越简单，就越容易实现自动化，越容易规模化，最终取得成功。这里的结论是，这种简单的、可自动化的商业业务不适合我们——这不是为了小公司，也不是为绝大多数人，不是为小买卖的商人。我们被淘汰了，我们被排除在外。我们这些小商人被从简单的、可伸缩的贸易中挤出来，剩下的是复杂的贸易。我们在混乱中谋生，而不被排挤在外的，只有我们自己的思想。我们的思想和身体是我们的资本。

We should therefore build the blockchain for the complex trade.

因此，我们应该为复杂的贸易构建区块链。

Things that go bump in the middle of the night

那些在半夜里可能会爆炸的东西

But with complexity comes errors. We make our money on making the complex happen reliably but errors are the continual reminder: that, fundamentally, what we do is both complex and complicated. **If there were no errors, life would be simple. Everything would be automated, the geeks would have won, and we’d be all out of a job! **If our customer perceives no risk of errors, they would not pay us a premium for reliability.

伴随复杂性的是错误。我们赚钱是为了让复杂的事情在预计之中发生，但错误会不断的提醒：从根本上说，我们所做的事情是复杂难懂的。如果没有错误，生活将会变得简单。一切都会自动化，极客们会赢得这场争夺赛，而我们普通人会失业。如果我们的客户接受这样的错误没有风险，他们就不会为我们的可靠性支付额外的费用。

Ian治理区块链7.png

过着复杂、充满错误的生活是小商人的命运。我们和我们的错误常常是阴和阳的两面。反常的是，如果我们的交易充满的风险越高，在这笔交易中就越有赚大钱的可能。竞争迫使我们降低我们错误的发生率，但盈利能力激励我们在交易中保持健康的比率。随着业务变得更加可靠，我们将会在不同的层面上竞争——要么帮更多客户风险来寻求风险解决方案，要么试图通过其他方法让我们的客户保持长期关系[Porter, 1979]。

Error, be gone!

错误不见了!

As errors are, they are mostly predictable in class, but unpredictable in the event. Some of our known blockchain risks are, briefly:

· "Fat fingers,"

· "We don’t need that library...," failure of smart contracts, re-direction of funds

· thefts of capital,

· breaches of contract by individuals

· breakages and lock-outs, lost keys, discarded drives

· loss or theft of customer data, breaches of privacy, GDPR, regulatory exposure

· Collapse of customer faith…

· Imitations, phishing, deceptive masquerading as others, sybils

· forks, splitting of currencies, confusion as to one true chain, doppelganger contracts

· censorship, unacceptable data, harassment, SWATing, extortion

错误经常在理论可以预测，但在实际事件中不可预测的。我们已知的区块链风险有:

·“胖手指”

·“我们不需要那个图书馆……”智能合约的失效，资金的重新流向

·资本盗窃,

·个人在合约中违约

·破损、锁定、丢失私钥，丢弃的驱动硬盘

·丢失或盗窃客户数据、侵犯隐私、GDPR、监管曝光

·客户信心崩溃……

·模仿、钓鱼、伪装成他人的欺骗、 sybils攻击

·分叉、货币分叉、对“真链”的混淆、双重合约

·审查、不可接受的数据、骚扰、背叛、勒索

That’s for the business of blockchain, and ordinary business is no stranger to risk on or off the chain - there are so many threats and attacks that once listed out, it feels as though no business should survive.

这是区块链的业务，普通商业业务在链上或链下的风险并不陌生——有太多的威胁和攻击，一旦列出，就感觉没有任何业务可以继续生存下去。

But we do. How do we survive? To keep our errors under control, businesses do risk analysis, which informs us on how to accept some risks, mitigate others, and change our very business to deal with yet others.

但是我们会继续做。那我们怎么生存？为了控制错误的发生，企业做风险分析，这告诉我们如何去接受一些风险，减少其他风险，并改变我们的业务来处理其他的问题。

There are more clever ways to deal with the future than voodoo - risk management using probability, diversification, mitigation, actuarial science and all that good stuff. Others can get deep into risk analysis, here I shall just claim that while our regular small business person cannot predict the future, she can learn to live with the everyday stress another day in business brings: the tiny chance that today, the unexpected becomes harsh fact. She intuitively prices higher for greater risk, and lower for easy deals. She detects those trades that can break the business, and accepts those that deliver profit worthy of the risk. In short, she trades on the risk of the deal, and she does not risk the business more than any trade merits.

有比巫术更聪明的方法来应对未来——利用概率、多样化、缓解、精算科学和所有这些好东西进行风险管理。其他人可以深入到风险分析中去，在这里我只想说，虽然我们的普通小商人不能预测未来，但她可以学会如何面对商业中另一天所带来的日常压力：今天的微小机会，意想不到的事情变成了残酷的事实。她凭直觉认为，风险越大，价格就越高，而简单交易的价格就越低。她发现那些可以破坏生意的交易，并接受那些值得冒险的利润。简而言之，她是在交易的风险上进行交易的，而且她的风险并不比任何交易价值更大。

The business owner seems to survive - either she can do risk analysis on her individual trades in her head better than we can write it down on paper, and her mitigations against risks are working, or she’s living her life in a never-ending lottery.

这位企业主似乎能够生存下来——要么她能在头脑中对她的个人交易进行风险分析，而不是我们能在纸上写下来；要么她对风险的缓解正在发挥作用，要么她的生活就像一场没完没了的彩票。

Risk Analysis

风险分析

Which tells us what about risk? Let’s look at one of the tools used for formal risk analysis, a risk matrix (Wikipedia “Risk matrix”).[Wikipedia （http://iang.org/papers/the_governed_blockchain.html#ref_Wikipedia）] . This tool measures each risk of error or failure by severity and by probability, and then divides them into three zones - acceptable, as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP), and not acceptable.

这告诉我们什么是风险。让我们来看看一个用于正式风险分析的工具，一个风险矩阵(Wikipedia可查询“风险矩阵（Risk matrix）”)。该工具通过严重程度和概率来度量每一个错误或失败的风险，然后将它们分为三个区域——可接受的、合理可行的最低限度(ALARP)和不可接受的。

Ian治理区块链8.png

In a micro sense the blockchain industry has the right idea - to attack the errors, to reduce the risks. If we can remove or reduce some or all of the errors then surely everyone is better off? But in some high level or strategic sense, the blockchain geeks are missing the big picture of the risks in several fundamental ways:

从微观上讲，区块链行业的想法是正确的——攻击错误，降低风险。如果我们能够消除或减少一些或所有的错误，那么每个人一定会变得更好吗？从某些高层次或战略意义上来看，区块链极客们在几个基本方面忽略了风险的整体情况:

1. Technocrats with no skin in the game are generally biased to elegant system properties. Consequences include overemphasis by computer scientists on pure technical solutions such as exotic cryptography and formal provability, and obsession by bureaucrats on compliance empires. Yet, making systems correct or safe at the expense of the user is not an answer, as security is only of the user, not of the system. Arguably, a focus on the security of the blockchain by the geeks has led to more errors and higher risk for the average user, as compared to say banks and their reliable online systems.

1、没有共担风险（no skin in the game）的技术专家通常偏向于优雅的系统属性。其后果包括:计算机科学家过分强调纯技术解决方案，如奇异的密码学和正式的可验证性；官僚们沉迷于合规帝国的构建。然而，以牺牲用户为代价使系统正确或安全不是我们想要寻找的答案，因为安全性只属于用户，而不属于系统。可以这么说，与银行及其可靠的在线系统相比，极客们对区块链安全性的关注给普通用户带来了更多的错误和更高的风险。

2. On the other side of the same coin, the technocrats are generally biased against users. For example, a frequent complaint in security circles is that a system is unusable by ordinary users yet the designers assert it is secure. This century-old security phenomena, known as Kherckhoffs’ 6th principle, is that if the secure system is bypassed or ignored for unusability, it reduces security by pushing users to weak methods [Kerckhoffs, 1883 （http://iang.org/papers/the_governed_blockchain.html#ref_Kerckhoffs,%201883）]. The same mundane error results in regulatory process: the desire for a secured financial system shuts out average users and pushes them to unsafe systems such as cryptocurrencies. Only a system that is used is capable of securing the user.

2、另一方面，技术专家通常对用户有偏见。例如，在安全领域，常见的抱怨是一个系统不能被普通用户使用，但是设计者声称它是安全的。这个有百年历史的安全现象，被称为Kherckhoffs第六原则，如果安全系统由于不可用性而被忽略，它会用降低用户到“弱方法（weak methods）”来降低安全性[kerckhoff, 1883]。同样常见的错误导致了监管过程的必要性：对安全金融系统的渴望将普通用户拒之门外，而这些人将会走向加密货币不安全系统的路上。只有使用的系统才能保护用户的安全。

3. IT designs will generally attack the errors of highest probability - the ones that happen every day, those to the right of the chart above. This is good tactics because their frequency helps us to know more about them, and their cost over time becomes calculable and consistent. Why waste time chasing our tails on stuff that never happens?

3、它通常会攻击最容易出错的地方——那些每天发生的错误，就像在上面图表右边的错误。这是一个很好的策略——攻击的频率可以让我们对它们有更多的了解，并且随着时间的推移，它们的成本是可以计算和找到相对稳定值的。为什么要把时间浪费在那些从未发生过的事情上呢?

4. But this leaves us vulnerable to the errors on the upper left hand side! Indeed, our focus on correcting the errors we can see, and our propensity to go out and find more risky business results in a rise in risk on the left hand side. Remember, we live for errors! The forces of competition may not make our risks go down, instead, risks typically bounce around a bit until we find a new profitability, a new complexity, a new stability. And a new vulnerability to risk.

4、但这让我们容易受到左上角的错误的影响！实际上，我们专注于纠正我们所能看到的错误，我们倾向于去发现风险更高的业务，这导致了上图左边风险的增加。要记住，我们是为错误而活！竞争可能不会降低我们的风险，相反，风险通常直到发现新的盈利点会反弹一点，新的复杂性，新的稳定性，以及新的风险脆弱性。

The upper left hand side is known as black swan risk - incredibly unlikely in the small, but if we wait long enough it’s guaranteed to happen. And when it does, such as happened to the financial system in 2008, we're doomed. In finance they call it turkey risk - the risk that tomorrow is Christmas Day is very low, so turkeys believe Christmas Day never comes.

左上方被称为黑天鹅风险——在小范围内不太可能发生，但如果我们等待的时间足够长，它一定会发生。当它发生时，就像2008年金融系统发生的那样——注定会失败。在金融领域他们称之为“火鸡风险”——明天是圣诞节的风险很低，而火鸡相信圣诞节永远不会到来。

For responsible business, for users, for our own peace of mind, we need to deal with the unlikely disasters that will wipe us out. We need to deal with our inner black swan.

对于负责任的企业，对于用户，为了我们内心的平静，我们需要处理那些不可能的灾难，这些灾难将会把我们消灭。我们需要处理自己内心的黑天鹅。

Black Swans

黑天鹅

Ian治理区块链9.png

Where do we find the fabled black swan? In three places: in the backwaters of Western Australia, in the risky writings of Nassim Nicholas Taleb, and on the blockchain:

我们在哪里可以找到传说中的黑天鹅？在三个地方:在西澳大利亚的回水里，在纳西姆·尼古拉斯·塔勒布的风险著作中，以及在区块链里:

2011

June 500,000 BTC stolen from Jeb McCaleb’s Mt.Gox auditing account

2013

Bitcoin hard fork from bug in code, rapidly rolled back by core & miners

2013

October 179,342 BTC seized by US agents from ‘SilkRoad’ darknet market

2014

650,000 BTC $323mm stolen from Mt.Gox, handling 80% of BTC trading

2015

April The Collapse of the Bitcoin Foundation

2016

June The DAO - 3.6mm Ether being about $50mm stolen, then fork of Ethereum

2016

August 120,000 = $72mm hacked from Bitfinex exchange

2017

July Bitcoin forked

2017

September China regulates ICOs, orders funds to be reversed

2017

October Ethereum multisig wallets in Parity hit by accidental freeze

2017

November Bitfinex’s Tether dollar unit had $30m reserves stolen

2018

watch this space...

These are just some highlights, but you can see where we are going: disasters on the blockchain are too frequent even to be called black swans.

这些只其中一些大事件，但是你可以看到我们所处的地方：区块链上的灾难太频繁了，甚至不能称之为黑天鹅。

The Conundrum

难题

In the face of the Black Swan, what is the entrepreneur to do? The entrepreneur is very adept at handling small, profitable errors, but the business or market collapsing Black Swan is another matter entirely.

面对“黑天鹅”事件，企业家该怎么办？企业家非常善于处理小型的、有利可图的错误，但商业或市场的崩溃完全是另一回事。
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Ian治理区块链11.png

The Entrepreneur invests heavily into his or her business: Programmers, business development, accounting and legal expertise, web development, and a movie's worth of supporting actors. All of these people cost money; an entrepreneur probably needs to find about a million bucks to get the attention of these supporters. You can pick your own number from your own experience, one that could be higher, or lower. But it is going to be a significant and painful number.

企业家在他或她的业务上投入了大量资金：程序员、业务开发、会计和法律专业知识、web开发，以及电影中值得支持的演员。所有这些人都在花钱；一个企业家可能需要大约一百万美元来吸引这些支持者的注意。你可以从经验中选择这个可高可低的数字，而这将是一个重要而痛苦的数字。

Further - opportunity costs are very fierce in the entrepreneurial world. As an entrepreneur, every one of your people faces a choice: to work at a good job at a good firm and earn steady salary, or take on a speculative, low paid, idealistic path to build what could be a fantastic future, but probably won’t be. Only one of five startups make the big time, and that’s after they’ve made it to Venture Capital money.

在企业家的世界里，机会成本非常高。作为一名企业家都面临着一个选择：在一家好公司里做一份好工作，挣一份稳定的薪水，或者走上一条投机的、低薪的、理想主义的道路，去建设一个可能美好的未来，但也很可能不会。五家创业公司中只有一家能赚到大钱，那是在他们获得风投资金之后。

Whatever number we agree on, the entrepreneur and her team are investing a serious amount of value. The question for blockchain then is,

will the entrepreneur invest their own capital into blockchain?

不管我们同意多少，这位企业家和她的团队都在花费大量有价值的东西。区块链的问题是：

企业家是否会将自己的资金投入到区块链呢?

This question needs to be put against the risks of blockchain. Let’s leave aside the ‘internal’ investor who is already committed to blockchain, can invest in fixing some part of the infrastructure, and can generate internal investment from hodling and ICOs. Let’s consider the external person building a business for users and bringing in external capital. Who, as we’ve suggested above is very adept at recognising risks, and is well able to process the black swan when it swims past.

这个问题需要针对区块链的风险做出提问。让我们暂且不谈那些已经致力于区块链的“内部”投资者，他们可以投资修复部分基础设施，也可以通过和ICO捆绑产生内部投资。让我们考虑外部人员为用户建立商业业务并引入外部资本。正如我们上面所提到的，某些人非常善于识别风险，并且能够妥善处理黑天鹅事件。

What does this external, experienced business person think of unacceptable risks? They are too frequent on the blockchain. I suggest to you:

the sane, rational calculating business person does not invest in such uncertainty.

For the business person to come in, rationally, we need to find another way. Business people won’t accept the black swans, just because. Therefore,

We are building the blockchain to solve the black swan.

这些外部的、有经验的商人会怎么看待不可接受的风险？他们在区块链上太频繁了。我建议你:

理智且理性的商业人士不会投资于这种不确定性。

要让商人理性地进来，我们需要找到另一种方式。商业人士不会接受“黑天鹅”。因此,

我们正在构建区块链来解决黑天鹅问题。
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Figure X. Zero dapps are scaling

III. Trust

三，信任

Trust resolves the hard errors

信任可以解决棘手的难题

Fixing a black swan that devastates your new blockchain-based business, but maybe not that of others, is a big ask of the community. For your counterparty and your community to make themselves vulnerable to your misfortunes, on your say so, requires trust. They will need to trust you are telling the truth while they agree and implement emergency changes that put all at risk. For example, the 2013 Bitcoin hard fork incident was handled because once the emergency was spotted, trust allowed the key stakeholders to come to consensus quickly [Narayanan, 2015] .

修复一个破坏你基于区块链新的业务的黑天鹅，但可能不是其他人，而是社区的一个巨大要求。对于你的对手方和你的社区来说，让他们在你经受灾难之后站在你这边支持你，这需要信任。他们需要相信你说的是真话，同时他们同意实施紧急措施，这将使所有人都处于危险之中。例如，2013年比特币的硬分叉事件被处理，因为一旦发现紧急情况，信任就会让关键利益相关者迅速达成共识[Narayanan, 2015]。

Ian治理区块链13.jpeg

Controversially, it only took a very few miners to switch their software version back and force the chain back to the earlier fork - contrary to how we expected decentralisation to play out. A similar process launched the 2016 Ethereum DAO repair, but with less success - although the trust in the dominant stakeholders was enough to make a decision, it wasn't enough to follow through to implementation. Not all of the community put full trust in the decision, and fought the patch to war cries of “code is law.” The Ethereum forked into two, becoming Etherea.

颇有争议的是，只有少数的几家矿商将他们的软件版本转换过来，并迫使链回到更早的分支状态——这与我们预期中去中心化的结果相反。一个类似的过程让2016年发生了以太坊的DAO事件，但是没有取得太大的成功——尽管对占主导地位的利益相关者的信任足以做出决定，但这还不足以保证能够完全落实下去。并不是社区的所有人都完全信任这一决定，并为“代码即法律”而战。以太坊分叉为二，变成Etherea。

Before we ask how the goal should be met we need to be comfortable with the existence of the goal - to solve for the black swan. The challenge for new business is to understand whether the environment supports the resolution of these serious errors: is your counterparty willing to work quickly and fairly to resolve errors? Is your blockchain resilient to external hacks, both before and after? Will a miner return a fat finger error that would otherwise send you broke? Which event has happened in Bitcoin.

在我们问如何实现目标之前，需要对因为存在目标而感到满意——解决黑天鹅问题。新业务面临的挑战是环境是否支持解决这些严重错误：你的对手方是否愿意快速、公平地解决错误？你的区块链无论是事前还是事后，是否能够抵御外部攻击？一个矿工会不会因为“胖手指”的错误就会破产？比特币到底发生了什么?

Can you repair a broken smart contract? As of the time of writing, the Etherea do not know the answer to that, and worse, they do not know what happens to a real contract after forking [Grigg, 2017b] .

你能修复有问题的智能合同吗？在写这篇文章的时候，他们不知道这个问题的答案，更糟糕的是，他们不知道分叉出一份真正的合同后会发生什么[Grigg, 2017b]。

These are billion dollar questions - but they are also hundred dollar questions. Although we came to the question via the utter disaster known as the black swan, for a business, the question is broader: Can you fix problems? How? And how costly? Which latter admits that there is no guaranteed fix, but this we already know - business conducts analysis of its risks.

这是10亿美元的问题，但也是100美元的问题。尽管我们通过所谓的“黑天鹅”灾难来解决这个问题，但对于一个企业来说，问题会变得更广泛：你能解决问题吗？如何解决？成本怎么样？后者承认没有保证的解决办法，但我们已经知道企业对其风险进行了分析。

And, this question ultimately reduces to another question: are you with me or against me?

这个问题最终归结为另一个问题：你是支持我还是反对我?

To be cooperative or adversarial?

合作还是对抗?

Huch nobHa'bogh verenganpu''e' yIvoqQo'

Don't trust Ferengi who give back money

Klingon proverb

不要相信给钱的人

克林贡谚语

The incidents above, both successful and debacled, suggest that fixing problems is possible, even if controversial. Business wants us to be able to handle several classes of failure, and in principle, we want detailed answers to a greater or lesser degree for the failures listed above (II. "Error, be gone!").

上述事件，无论是成功的还是失败的，都表明解决问题是可能的，即使这些方法还存在着争议。企业希望我们能够处理好不同类型的失败，原则上，我们希望对上面列出的失败给出或多或少更详细的答案(II.“错误,不见了!”)。

The choice is stark: Cooperate or Fight.

选择是显而易见的：要么合作，要么战斗。

We can cooperate to solve problems, if we have trust, as did the core devs in 2013.

如果我们信任彼此，可以一起合作解决问题，就像2013年那时候的核心开发人员一样。

Or, if we expect insufficient trust on the part of the others, we can fight, as we found with the Mt.Gox, the DAO, the "classics", and a thousand other hacks. Without the expectation of cooperation, in an environment of untrust, your capital can be stolen or destroyed by those who are smarter or more adept than you.

或者，如果在与我们设想中一样，其他人的信任不足，我们可以与Mt.Gox、DAO、“classic”以及其他上千个其他的黑客作战。没有合作的基础，加上在不信任的环境下，你的资本容易会被比你更聪明或更熟练的人偷走或摧毁。

Worse, if you can't beat ‘em, you join them: you play it fast, footloose and fancy free, and steal or destroy the capital of others. Either way, the blockchain of adversaries may live on but your own financial future is likely nasty, brutish and short.

更糟糕的是，如果你不能打败他们，你就会被动加入到他们的行列：你自由自在、随心所欲地并且速度很快地窃取或摧毁别人的资本。无论哪种方式，对手的区块链都可能会生存下去，但你自己的金融未来可能是肮脏的、野蛮的和短暂的。

To Win or to Lose?

赢还是输?

There are other ways to look at this divide. Here’s several taken from varied disciplines.

还有其他的方式来看待这种分歧，以下的内容是来自几个不同的学科：

Negotiation Theory 谈判理论

The master negotiator seeks a good trade for both parties in a process called win-win. This goal of sharing the win with your other party assumes that there will be follow on trades in some sense - you want your other party to be happy to come back, and also to spread your reputation for fairness far and wide. She wants the same.

As well as routine business, this theory suggests that cooperative trade with win-win negotiating should be the basis of family and employment negotiations, simply because both of these guarantee that there are new negotiations coming soon.

主谈判者在一个叫做双赢的过程中为双方寻求一个好的交易。与你的对方分享胜利的结果，假设在某种意义上，会有后续的交易——你希望对方会成为回头客，并帮你传播关于公平的名声。而你的对方和你想要的东西是一样的。

这一理论认为，除了日常的商业活动之外，合作共赢的贸易应该是家庭和就业谈判的基础，因为这两者都保证了新的谈判即将到来。

The alternate to win-win is called win-lose. For me to win, you must lose, and vice-versa. This negotiation occurs when there is no apparent follow on trade. The problem with this approach is that, for one side to win, the other side has to lose. If you don’t know which it is, then it’s probably you.

Hence this adversarial approach is reserved for shady business. Especially buying houses, used cars and lawsuits in court are the places where the decision is done on the day, and there is little or no benefit in the future to not fighting for every last crumb.

双赢的另一种选择叫做赢方-输方。也就是我赢的话，你必须输，反之亦然。这种谈判发生在没有明显后续贸易的时候。这种方法的问题在于，一方要想赢，另一方就必须输。如果你不知道是哪一个是谁，很可能就会是你。

因此，这种对抗的方式只适用于不正当的商业。尤其是买房子、买二手车和在法庭上打官司，都是当天做出决定的地方，这种未来不争取每一粒面包的形式几乎没有什么好处。

Economics 经济

When we can both take something positive from our trade, economists call it production, because something extra has been produced by our combined efforts. For example, if one of us has a kitchen, one can provide some ingredients, another has a recipe, and one can cook, we can come together to bake a cake - or cookies, or pie, you pick. The result is that now we have a pie, and that’s better than before. We have produced, and now we can share the fruits of that production.

当我们都能从贸易中得到一些积极的东西时，经济学家称之为生产，因为我们的共同努力产生了一些额外的东西。例如，如果我们其中一个人有厨房，其中一个可以提供一些原料，另一个有食谱，一个可以做饭，你可以选择一起烤蛋糕——或者饼干，或者派。结果是，现在我们有了一个饼，这比以前好多了。我们已经生产了，现在我们可以分享生产的成果。

The alternate is called allocation: when someone (else?) has cooked a pie, and we only get to decide who gets which portion. This pie is made, there is no sensible play where we can make a larger pie out of a smaller one. Assuming that we don't walk out with the same sized slice of pie, then one of us is likely to win a bigger slice, and the other must walk out with a smaller slice!

另一种方法叫做分配:当别人做了一个馅饼，我们只需要决定谁吃这个饼的哪一部分。这个馅饼已经做好了，没有什么更好的做法可以让我们用小馅饼做成大馅饼。假设我们没有拿着同样大小的馅饼走出去，那么我们其中一个可能会赢得更大的一块，而另一个必须拿着更小的一块出去。

Game Theory 博弈理论

If a game results in growth it is called a net-positive game. The players come out with a better situation than that which they entered.

如果一个游戏能带来增长，那它就被称为网络积极游戏。玩家们的表现比他们刚进入的状态还要好。

The alternate to the net-positive is called the zero-sum game in which the value at the beginning is the same as at the end. Who benefitted and who lost?

与净正的交替被称为零和博弈，在这种博弈中，开始时的价值与结束时相同。谁受益了，谁输了?

Political Theory 政治理论

Capitalism [Gupta, 2014]: Nationally enforced rule of law creates skin in the game for everyone that goes beyond the current trade. Dishonest statements or lack of integrity can be brought to complaint, but all are vulnerable to the system.

资本主义[Gupta, 2014]：国家强制的法治为所有超越当前行业的人创造了机会。不诚实的陈述或缺乏诚信会引起投诉，但所有人都容易受到系统的伤害。

Anarchy: Voluntary rules of interaction leaves no skin in the game beyond the present stake, thus allowing the sharp trader to out-compete the dumb trader. All are vulnerable to caveat emptor.

无政府状态：自愿的互动规则在游戏中没有留下任何超越当前赌注的痕迹，从而使精明的交易员比没有那么精明的交易员更有竞争力。所有人都容易受到买者自慎的影响。

For the entrepreneur, all of these views end up on the same side of the fence - she wants to be on the left side so she can get some certainty about the safety of her investment. In particular, she wants to have her damages looked at in the event of disaster, even if the nominal result of “you lost” is all she gets back.

对于这位企业家来说，所有这些观点最终都站在了另一边——她希望站在左边，这样她就能对自己投资的安全性有一定的把握。特别是，她希望在灾难发生时，她的损害赔偿能够得到关注，即使“你输了”这种名义上结果是她所得到的全部。

Taming the Black Swan

驯服的黑天鹅

For Alice the trader to know that Bob the entrepreneur is on her side of the fence when disaster strikes is a question of trust. Building a productive business in complex space, over the long term raises the fear of her capital being raided - can she trust her community to be there when she needs them to help?

对于交易者 Alice来说，当灾难来临时，企业家Bob因为信任会站在她这边。在复杂的空间里建立一个有生产力的企业，从长远来看，会让人担心她的资本会遭到袭击——她能相信她的社区会在她需要帮助的时候出现吗?

Trust then is a desirable property. But where does she find it? Is Trust a place, a service or a religion? Can the entrepreneur buy it at the supermarket like I buy beer?

因此，信任是一种可取的财产。但是她在哪里找到的？信任是一个地址、服务还是宗教呢？企业家能像我买啤酒一样在超市买到吗?

Thinking about when you and I find trust with each other helps to set a framework [Grigg, 2016] . Game theory tells us that to build up the big trust, we need:

◦ Multiple trades, with no expectation of when they might end,

◦ shared profit from this round, and expectations of future shared profits, and

◦ punishments outside the game if we cheat.

考虑一下你和我之间的信任，有助于建立一个框架[Grigg, 2016]。博弈论告诉我们，要建立起巨大的信任，我们需要:

◦多个交易，不确定是什么时候结束时,

◦从这一轮共享的利润，预期未来的利润共享,

◦以及如果我们作弊的话惩罚内容是什么

Ian治理区块链14.png

I won’t trust you much after one beer, one meeting, one argument; I am much more likely to trust you after 100 beers, 100 meetings, 100 debates, by which time we’ll both know I’m untrustworthy about counting the beers.

在喝一杯啤酒，开一次会，吵一架之前，我不会相信你；在喝了100杯啤酒，开了100次会，进行了100场辩论之后，我更有可能相信你，到那时我们都知道，我在数多少杯啤酒的时候是靠不住的。

Ian治理区块链15.png

Each of those 100 events requires a decision, and each adds some information for the next decision. This risk analysis is a cycle: analyse, decide, take on the risk, and enjoy the reward (or not!). We both need to remember the outcomes for the next time, and tag that information with the identity of our partner.

这100个事件中的每一个都需要决策，每个都为下一个决策添加了一些信息。这种风险分析是一个循环：分析、决定、承担风险、享受回报(或者不享受)。我们都需要记住下一次的结果，并把这些信息和我们伙伴的身份联系起来。

Then, trust comes at a high cost, and by its nature, it is too expensive for one trade.

所以信任是要付出很高的代价的，从本质上来讲，和一项交易相比来说，太过昂贵了。

If you require trust with me as your counterparty, the only way to make this workable is if we establish a framework of repeated trades. That is, we spread the cost of trust that fixes the one big snafu over many good trades that each have a little margin devoted to building trust. The building of trust into relationship is made of many small bricks: Introductions, information exchanges, trial transactions, user support, minor teething problems, finding those lost transactions. We hope that enough trust is built in time to capture and tame the black swan when it flies in.

如果作为你的交易对手，你需要信任我，唯一可行的办法是我们建立一个重复交易的框架。也就是说，我们分散了信任成本，在许多好的交易中解决了一个大问题，每个交易都有一点点的利润是用于建立信任的。建立信任关系是由许多小块砖组成的：介绍、信息交换、试用交易、用户支持、小的初期问题、寻找那些丢失的交易。我们希望能够及时建立起足够的信任，在黑天鹅飞来的时候能够抓住并驯服它。

The Blockchain for Tomorrow

未来的Blockchain

Spot the flaw: trust is expensive. We need to 'amortise' or share the cost of all of these small steps. And for that, we need to rely on repeated business, and the expectation of repeated business.

发现缺陷：信任是昂贵的。我们需要“摊销”或分担所有这些小步骤的成本。为此，我们需要依赖重复经营，以及重复经营的预期。

Perversely, trust requires repeated trade and repeated trade requires trust - you are not going to engage in the process of building trust over multiple rounds unless you trust me to at least buy the next round.

有悖常理的是，信任需要重复交易，重复交易需要信任——除非你相信我至少会在下一次买卖，否则你不会参与多轮建立信任的过程。

Which is to say, right now, we may be cooperating on today's trade, but we are expecting every future trade we might also be involved in. We therefore require a blockchain that is cooperative, for all trades, all persons and all tomorrows, rather than adversarial, for the one big win today.

也就是说，现在，我们可能在今天的贸易上进行合作，但我们期待着未来的每一笔贸易，我们也可能参与其中。因此，我们需要一个对所有行业、所有人、所有明天都合作的区块链，而不是对抗性必须有一方赢家一方是输家的区块链，以换取今天的大胜利。

Blockchains have been lauded for their history, their immutable past, their lock on that which has happened, indeed their trustlessness. But this is to look backwards, to history, to archeology, to dead data. People who trade look forward because all trust builds towards a better future.

区块链因其历史、不可改变的过去、对已经发生的事情的锁定、甚至是对他们的不信任而受到称赞。但这是为了回顾历史、考古学、死亡数据。贸易的人期待未来，因为所有的信任都建立在更美好的未来上。

We build the blockchain of the future, in which all our tomorrows are anticipated, in which the long term is the term.

我们构建未来的区块链在其中，我们所有明天的期待在其中，这个期限是长期。

Without the future, trust cannot be.

没有未来，就没有信任。

The Man and her Machine

男人和她的机器

“[Global Thermonuclear War is] A strange game.

The only winning move is not to play.

How about a nice game of chess?”

Wargames 1983

“全球热核战争是一种奇怪的游戏。

唯一的赢家之举就是不去参与。

来一盘好棋怎么样?”

Wargames 1983

We can see something of the answer in the divide between humans and machines. Only humans can engage in net-positive trade, because only humans can value the results. Machines are incapable of production because they cannot value; the best they can do is automate the allocation of value that already exists, and assist in production for their owners.

在人类和机器之间的鸿沟上，我们可以看到一些答案。只有人类才能参与正净值交易，因为只有人类才能珍惜结果。机器不能生产，因为它们不能估价；他们能做的最好的事情是自动分配已经存在的价值，并帮助他们的所有者进行生产。

Value belongs to humans: Pie and cookies are enjoyed only by humans. The appreciation of the results can only be enjoyed by the humans, because humans alone can make the subjective and emotional decision as to what is to be enjoyed. We can employ and own machines to assist in production, in the creation of positive value, but production can only occur because we value it so, because we ascribe a positive value to the results as against the inputs.

价值属于人类：馅饼和饼干只有人类才能享用。只有人类能对结果进行欣赏，因为只有人类才能做出主观和情感上的决定。我们可以使用并拥有机器来帮助生产，帮助创造正向的价值，正因为我们如此重视生产，所以它必然会发生，因为我们将结果与投入相比形成正向的价值。

Ian治理区块链16.png

Machines then are limited to an allocative approach, win-lose, to fight, to extract, to play until death, whereas us humans have choice - we may play at win-lose, or we may also cooperate, or even switch our strategies because we don’t feel good about the other person. We may not play at all.

机器被限制在一种分配的方法，赢输、战斗、提取、进行到死，而我们人类有选择——我们可能会在赢方输方中竞争，或者我们也有可能合作，甚至改变我们的策略，因为一旦我们对别人感觉不好，就可能根本不会开始玩。

Yuval Noah Harari says that what makes humans special is our ability to create fictions or beliefs around which we can choose to cooperate at scale[Harari, 2015] . But none of this works if there is no choice, no risk, and damningly, no reward that can be enjoyed. We can build an AI or robot to engage in (say) high-frequency trading, splice a gene, or predict dating partners. But we cannot build an AI to enjoy early retirement off of a lifetime in the markets, to sip a margarita in bliss, to watch a sunset with a partner or share joy in bringing up a child.

Yuval Noah Harari说，人类之所以与众不同，是因为我们有能力创造虚构或信仰，并据此选择大规模合作[Harari，2015]。但如果没有选择，没有风险，更糟糕的是没有回报，这些都不起作用。我们可以建立一个人工智能或机器人来参与(比如)高频交易、拼接基因或预测约会对象。但我们无法构建一个人工智能，让我们在市场上享受早早退休的时光，在极乐中啜饮一杯玛格丽塔鸡尾酒，与伴侣一起观看日落，或在抚养孩子的过程中分享快乐。

Machines are therefore locked into an allocative game, and absent sophisticated and brittle AI techniques, they find themselves best able to engage in win-lose, in the zero-sum game. Two machines playing any game or protocol can only move existing value back and forth, they cannot create value.

因此，机器被锁在一个分配博弈中，没有复杂而脆弱的人工智能技术，它们发现自己最能在零和博弈中参与赢方输方的角色。两个机器玩任何游戏或协议只能来回移动现有的价值，他们不能创造价值。

This is reflected in the relative strength of the blockchain as an allocative method, below the line, and the relative weakness that the users and their smart contracts have found themselves in, above the line. In principle, this is sane and rational - before, we said that we should automate the simple, as much of the simple as we can. That which is complex, we leave above the line, for the humans. Therefore, correctly, blockchain places the choice above the line with humanity - win-win or win-lose, your choice, your smart contract, your enjoyment.

这反映在区块链作为一种配置方法在线下的相对优势，在线上之上用户和他们的智能合约所发现的相对弱点。原则上讲，这是理智和理性的——之前我们说过，我们应该尽可能多地自动化简单的东西。复杂的东西把它分给给人类。因此，正确地说，区块链将选择置于人性之上——双赢或输赢，你的选择，你的智能合约，你的享受。
[图片上传失败...(image-de2c67-1533524697479)]

The Trap that UnPermissioning Created for Itself

为自己创造了未受允许的陷阱

“How much value is stored in smart contracts that actually do anything interesting?”

Vitalik Buterin, tweet 13 Dec 2017

“有多少价值被存储在智能合约中，而这些合同实际上可以做一些有趣的事情?”

Vitalik Buterin, 2017年12月13日的推特

The unpermissioned blockchain spends most or all of its strength below the line. Whether that user proposition be a payment or a series of simple “script” instructions, a virtual machine or a genetic algorithm trained to respond to questions of import [Sgantzos 2017], it is still automated, and it is left to the user to turn that base tool into valuable trade.

未受允许的区块链将其大部分或全部精力消耗在线下。无论用户主张是支付还是一系列简单的“脚本”指令、虚拟机还是训练有素的用于回答附加问题的演变算法（genetic algorithm）(Sgantzos 2017)，它仍然是自动的，用户可以把基本工具变成有价值的交易。

Satoshi’s design is justifiably seen as a breakthrough. The blockchain can complete simple trades automatically, at the allocative level of the zero-sum game; it defers complex trades of a more win-win, productive form to the complex layer, what might also be called smart contract space. The complexity of trade, as epitomised by the technical promise of smart contracts, is exciting to many.

Satoshi的设计被认为是一个突破。区块链可以在零和博弈的配置水平上自动完成简单交易;它将更为双赢、更高效的复杂交易转移到复杂的层面，也就是所谓的“智能合约空间”。以智能合约的技术承诺为代表的贸易的复杂性，令许多人兴奋不已。

Yet, it is somewhat clear that this latter part did not emerge, or was excruciatingly slow to do so. Why is this?

然而，很明显的是，后半部分并没有出现，或者是极其缓慢的。这是为什么呢?

It may be that Satoshi's design so successfully solved the automation of payment and other simple tasks that the community put the win-lose on a taller pedestal than otherwise deserved. The solution was good at bringing together otherwise adversarial parties to trade, but there is no necessary conclusion that, just because the blockchain can solve an adversarial allocative trade in simple space, that complex space should likewise be adversarial, allocative, win-lose or zero-sum, either individually or in combination.

Satoshi的设计非常成功地解决了支付和其他简单任务的自动化问题，社区把赢方放在了更高的基础上。这个解决方案很擅长将原本对立的各方汇聚到一起进行贸易，但没有必要得出这样的结论：仅仅因为区块链可以在简单的空间中解决对抗性的分配贸易，那么复杂的空间同样应该是对抗性的、分配性的、赢方输方或零和的，无论是单独的还是组合的。

Above, indeed we present the entrepreneur as one potential user who does not want that. And has walked away in frustration. It is not just the absence of attention to this need, nor the weakness of tooling & solutions, nor the blasé attitude to end-user security. Rather, blockchain today has gone far further in its idolatry - the community champions the adversarial, the allocative, win-lose, zero-sum as the space in which to trade. It is as if the blockchainers say, “we've discovered trustlessness is the answer, and now trust is banned!”

在上面，我们不希望把企业家作为一个潜在的用户，企业家沮丧地离开了。这不仅是因为没有注意到这种需求，不是因为工具和解决方案的不足，也不是因为对终端用户安全性的态度过于冷淡。相反，区块链如今在其偶像崇拜上走得更远——社区倡导对抗、分配、赢输、零和的交易空间。就好像是封锁者说:“我们已经发现，毫无信任就是答案，目前的情况就是信任被禁止了!”

And this is the trap that the UnPermissioned blockchain community has fallen into - the outcome of championing an allocative game is the promotion of an incompatible environment for constructive trade.

这就是未受认可的区块链社区陷入的陷阱——倡导分配博弈的结果是促进建设性贸易的不相容环境。

The obsession with the allocative approach has consequences. While a trader is concentrating on today’s big win, she is not concentrating on production. If she does win big, then her customer will lose big - and may not be there tomorrow. If on the other hand she loses big, she may depart the scene, with a bitter taste, big losses and no good word to say about blockchain.

执迷于分配方法是需要承担后果的。当一个交易者沉迷于今天的胜利时，她并没有专注于生产。如果她真的是赢的那方了，那么她的客户就会是大输家——而且明天可能不会出现在交易方的角色中。另一方面，如果她损失惨重，就可能会带着酸苦的和对说区块链不好的话离开。

Multiply the individual poverty across the community, into debates, chatrooms, decisions, divorces and other bankruptcies - the obsession presents a high barrier. It will over time act as a filter: those people who want to produce, have the patience to build, those who see the value in the long term, the trust will be excluded. Either by frightening them away, by chasing them away, or by win-losing away their value.

把整个社会的个人贫困问题放大到辩论、聊天室、决策、离婚和其他破产问题上，这种偏执就会构成了一个巨大的障碍。它会随着时间的推移而成为一个过滤器：那些想要生产的人，有耐心去建立，那些看到长期价值的人，信任将不是需要考虑的范围，他们会坚信地去做事情而不需要信任。所以要么把他们吓跑，要么把他们赶走，要么赢得失去他们的价值。

While, the easy winners are rewarded and encouraged to stay for another easy kill. If the environment promotes zero-sum trading then zero-sum traders are what will make up the community. If we can label that as a community.

然而，容易获胜的人会得到奖励，并被鼓励留下来再做一次简单的杀戮。如果环境促进零和交易，那么零和交易者将会构成整个社区。如果我们把它定义为一个社区。

The War on Trust

信任战争

In Satoshi's view, technology can effectively route around the human "design flaw" in the present money system. Satoshi’s Bitcoin, therefore, is built to be incorruptible by human operators. Bitcoin champions a form of techno-absolutism that insists on properly designed technology as the solution to any social problem. This spirit of techno-absolutism **attracts like-minded people who are fascinated by the mistaken notion that technology can fully "replace" politics or human decision making. **Conjoin Bitcoin's techno-absolutism with an anarchic rejection of institutional authority and a libertarian commitment to property and privacy, and an unique social ideology emerges. It’s an ideology that is espoused by Bitcoin’s technology (i.e., its technology thesis) **and it also permeates the community. **

[Panchèvre, 2015 (my emphasis)]

在Satoshi看来，技术可以有效地绕过现行货币体系中的人类“设计缺陷”。因此，Satoshi的比特币是由人类操作者设计的，不会被腐蚀。比特币是一种科技绝对主义的形式，它坚持把正确设计的技术作为解决任何社会问题的方法。这种技术绝对主义的精神**吸引了志同道合的人，他们被一种错误的观念所吸引，即技术可以完全“取代”政治或人类决策**。将比特币技术的绝对主义与对制度权威的无法无天的拒绝，以及对财产和隐私的自由主义承诺结合在一起，一种独特的社会意识形态应运而生。这是比特币技术所支持的一种意识形态。**它也渗透到整个社会**。

[Panchèvre 2015(我记的重点)]

It gets worse. The win-lose approach to trade (think: real estate, used car selling and financial products) has now moved to center stage. This brings in people talented at the hard sell, the one off, the deceptive offering, the kill.

它变得更糟。这种“赢方输方”的交易方式(想想：房地产、二手车销售和金融产品)现在已经进入了中心舞台。这就带来了擅长硬推销的人才，充斥着某人离开、欺骗性的奉献和杀戮。

But, as the wrong type of trader permeates a community that also champions anonymity and an absence of standards or ethics, the line between aggressive trading and crime dissolves. Anything goes; it becomes rational to do what you can - as long as you don't get caught.

但是，随着错误类型的交易员渗透到一个提倡匿名和缺乏标准或道德的社区，激进交易和犯罪之间的界线就消失了。任何事情都可能发生；只要你不被抓住，做你能做的事情就会变得理性。

By way of rhetorical examples:

⇒ For me to make money on an altCoin pump, you must lose money by for example buying in with your life savings. Hopefully, for me, at the top, as I dump.

⇒ In the casinos, the house always wins.

⇒ If my ICO can convince the herd to move, I collect money, the herd pays. Delivery is optional, so the obvious happens - most ICOs are well dressed scams.

⇒ If I've bought in early on the ICO, and my take shrinks with each additional contributor, why not DDOS the chain so additional contributions can't get in?

Ian治理区块链18.png

通过修辞上的例子:

⇒altCoin为我赚钱，你必须赔钱，例如用你一生的积蓄来买入。希望我能在价格顶部的时候出货。

⇒在赌场，赢家总是庄家。

⇒如果我的ICO能说服一群人向我付费。给不给钱是可以选择的，所以显而易见的是——大多数ICO都是精心打扮的骗局。

⇒如果我在早期投了ICO，我的份额随着不断增加的投资者而减少，那为什么不DDOS这条链然后让投资者不增加而保持我开始的大份额呢？

ToxiChain

ToxiChain

If you look around the blockchain space and can't tell who's getting scammed, it's probably you. 

Jameson Lopp, tweet 23rd September 2016

如果你环顾一下区块链空间，不知道谁被骗了，很可能那个被骗的人就是你。

Jameson Lopp, 2016年9月23日发推

The earliest report of a possible crime is Jeff Garzik's report of an overflow bug being exploited in August of 2010 - some 184 billion were minted through abusing the limit of an integer at 2^64 size [Garzik, 2010] . Many followed. Indeed, many of the above list of black swans were criminally motivated. Which takes us from the early innocent days to the present brutal reality:

最早可能犯罪的是Jeff Garzik报告中溢出被利用的2010年8月的漏洞——通过滥用限制大小的整数2 ^ 64[Garzik,2010] 铸造了另外的1840亿。许多相关的事件在后面也连续发生。事实上，上面列出的许多“黑天鹅”都是出于犯罪动机。它把我们从早期的天真带到现实的残酷中:

Unpermissioned Blockchain is not only win-lose, it is encouraging of crime.

不被允许的区块链不仅是赢方输方，而且是鼓励犯罪的。

Attracting the sorts of people who can work effectively with win-lose and scaring away the rest is a self-fulfilling destiny in toxicity - BTFD, FOMO, and YOLO are rallying cries, anything goes becomes the climate, and crime follows close behind [Güring&Grigg, 2011]. We start with those who understand the haggle, the trade, the pop, the win in the short term. And we invite those who relish the easy money, the pump & dump, taking money from new players, the big kill. Followed by the crims.

吸引那些能够有效地利用赢输和吓跑剩下的人是在毒性方面自我实现的宿命——BTFD、FOMO和YOLO都在呼喊，一切都成了气候，犯罪就会紧随其后[Guring&Grigg, 2011]。我们从那些懂得讨价还价、交易、流行、在短期内取胜的人开始，邀请那些喜欢来钱快的人，那些从新玩家那里拿钱的吸血鬼和找下家的人，进行韭菜大收割。其次是有罪的。

In the final outcome, the unpermissioned blockchain fails to support business. Not because unpermissioning is a bad idea, but because an environment of zero-sum games promotes zero-sum behaviour, and squeezes out net-positive opportunities of productive trade. In a word, unpermissioned blockchain is toxic.

在最终结果中，未被许可的区块链无法支持业务。不是因为不允许贸易是一个坏主意，而是因为零和博弈的环境促进了零和行为，挤压了生产性贸易的正向机会。总之，未经许可的区块链是有毒的。

Of Casinos and Kitties

赌场和小猫

If your goal is money, you'll develop a destructive personality, as the world appears zero-sum, your desire is for others to do things for you. If your goal is liberty, you'll develop a constructive personality, since your world is your own creation. 

Mark Wilcox, tweet 13 April 2018

如果你的目标是金钱，你就会发展出一种破坏性的人格，因为这个世界看起来是零和的，你的愿望是让别人为你做事。如果你的目标是自由，你就会发展出一种建设性的人格，因为你的世界是你自己创造的。

Mark Wilcox，2018年4月13日

We can test the win-lose hypothesis: today's blockchains are where we automate payments, gaming, ICOs and exchange of crypto. The popular successful applications on Bitcoin and Ethereum are almost exclusively zero-sum games:

"if you look at State of the Dapps, the large majority of working applications are either for betting, gaming, or facilitating the movement of ether." 

BlockMason, tweet 2017

我们可以检验赢方输方的假设：今天的区块链是我们自动支付、游戏、ICO和密码交换的地方。在比特币和以太坊上成功的应用几乎都是零和游戏:

“如果你看看Dapps的状态，你会发现绝大多数的工作应用要么是用于赌博、游戏，要么是促进ether运动。”

BlockMason，2017发推

This is the world of day traders, banks, pumpers & dumpers, private dealing, financial engineers, cartels and so forth: the house always wins, cartels are held together by self-interest, currencies such as BTC can only allocate and any 'gains' are because new buyers cash out the old buyers. There is consensus in transactions, but as we know from game theory, any faith you derive from these transactions is not long-lasting.

这是一个由短线交易员、银行、“垃圾处理商”、私人交易、金融工程师、卡特尔（译者注：即垄断利益集团）等组成的世界：庄家永远是赢家，卡特尔们被自身利益维系在一起，BTC等货币只能分配，任何“收益”都是因为新买家从老买家手中买入才得以套现。交易是有共识的，但我们从博弈论中知道，你从这些交易中获得的任何信念都不是持久的。

What are the net-positive businesses? To our knowledge, there are only two distributed applications in the entirety of crypto space that are productive rather than allocative:

☆ Steemit which is a blog posting site in which readers reward blog posters for good writings, and

☆ CryptoKitties, being a new game that 'produces' a cat from 2 others. The combination is a produced digital asset, however trivial, and the entertainment value of the process suggests that this is a productive venture, albeit controversially so.

If anything, CryptoKitties as a productive application highlights how far we haven't come - we've created a $500 billion industry in which the major crimes outnumber the major productive businesses.
[图片上传失败...(image-706f44-1533524697479)]
什么是积极的网络商业？据我们所知，整个密码空间中只有两个分布式应用是有效的，而不是分配式的:

☆Steemit这是一个读者奖励好的输出作品的博客网站

☆CryptoKitties，一个被2人“生产”一只猫的游戏。这种结合是一种生产出来的数字资产，无论它多么微不足道，而这一过程的娱乐价值表明，这是一项富有成效的冒险，尽管存在争议。

如果说有什么不同的话，密码学作为一种富有成效的应用程序，突显出我们才刚刚开始——我们已经创建了一个价值5000亿美元的行业，其中主要犯罪行为的数量超过了主要生产性企业。

Protecting the Environment

保护环境

Who shut down BTC-e?

谁关闭BTC-e?

It wasn't the enterprising efforts of the cryptocurrency community or its verbose opinion-makers on social media or the "new 1%." It was several government law enforcement agencies that coordinated across multiple jurisdictions on limited budgets.6 Yet, like Silk Road, some people in the cryptocurrency community likely knew the operators of the BTC-e and willingly turned a blind eye to serious misconduct which, for so long as it continues, represents a black mark to the entire industry. 

[Swanson, 2017]

这不是加密货币社区的冒险努力，也不是社交媒体上冗长的舆论制造者，也不是那个“新的1%”。几个政府执法机构在多个司法管辖区就有限的预算进行协调。然而，就像丝绸之路一样，加密货币界的一些人可能知道BTC-e的运营商，并且愿意对严重的不当行为睁一只眼闭一只眼，只要这种行为持续下去，就代表着整个行业的一个污点。

[Swanson,2017]

If the opportunity of unpermissioned blockchain in blockchain is winning or losing, then the outcome is destruction or denial. It’s hard for the small enterprise to make profits in a toxic environment. Encouraging the talents of war and appropriation has the effect of discouraging the talents of peace and trade. Which is fine, if we’re actually fighting a war, but what if we’re not? Such an environment does not welcome those who have the patience to build a business, those who see the value in trust.

如果区块链中未被许可的区块链的机会是赢或输，那么结果就是毁灭或否认。在有毒的环境下，小公司很难盈利。鼓励战争和挪用人才，会对和平与贸易的人才产生不利的影响。如果我们真的在打仗这很好，但如果我们没有呢？这样的环境并不欢迎那些有耐心建立企业的人，那些看到信任的价值的人。

Unpermissioned blockchains promote the zero-sum game therefore discourage business with aggressive win-lose, when business is by its nature built on the alternate, win-win. This is the fundamental reason why there have been few stable businesses in blockchain outside the zero-sum game - no rational business person will invest their capital in a toxic environment full of arguments & insults, thefts & hacks, risks of forks and the like.

不受约束的区块链促进了零和游戏，因此，当企业的本质是建立在互补性、双赢的基础上的时候，就会阻碍商业的发展。这就是为什么区块链在零和博弈之外几乎没有稳定的业务的根本原因——没有理性的商人会将他们的资本投资于充斥着争论和羞辱、偷窃和黑客行为、分叉风险之类的有毒环境。

In small business, we look for the trade that is a positive sum, because we want our customer to come back. We both win a little each time, and therefore, a win-win overall. We cannot grow as a society unless we all make profits together.

在小企业中，我们寻找的交易是积极的，因为我们希望回头客多一点。其实这样每次都赢一点，因此，总的来说是双赢的。我们不可能作为一个社会集体来成长，除非我们都能共同获利。

Therefore we must, in order to serve people and business, construct a blockchain that is encouraging to win-win, to net-positive trades. And while not discouraging of the allocative trade, which granted is an essential part of trade because of its simplicity, we do want to discourage the win-lose trader from taking center stage and thereby displacing the win-win trader.

因此，为了服务大家和企业，我们必须构建一个鼓励双赢的区块链。尽管我们不反对由于交易的简单性而被批准为交易的重要组成部分的配置性交易，但我们确实希望避免必须有赢方输方的交易占据主导地位，从而取代双赢的形式。

We want to attract and incentivise the right sort of people, these that want to do good trade and make shareable profit; we want to discourage and filter out the wrong sort people, those that want to take the crumbs off the table, those that beggar their neighbour, and those that steal.

我们想要吸引和激励合适的人，这些人想要做良好的交易并获得可分享的利润；我们想要阻止和过滤那些错误的人，那些想从桌子上把面包屑拿下来的人，那些以邻人为食的人，还有那些偷东西的人。

A blockchain for business is one that promotes win-win, productive trades over win-lose, allocative trades.

商业的区块链是一种促进双赢的、富有成效的交易，而不是赢的、分配的交易。

It is to that more refined goal we turn in the next section.

在下一节中，我们将讨论更精确的目标。

IV. The Governed Blockchain

四、受治理的区块链

The Challenge for Business

商业挑战

Our challenge then is to move the blockchain agenda from supporting the win-lose at the expense of the win-win, to supporting the win-win over the win-lose.

因此，我们的挑战是，将区块链从支持以牺牲其中一方为代价转变为支持共赢。

This is not to say that the zero-sum game, or that win-lose should somehow be forbidden. It's rather to say that our focus is on the win-win because that is where society creates value. Society loses money on the win-lose trade, which is why banks and bankers get richer and people get poorer and those countries that bailed out the banks in 2008 at the expense of the economy are in secular depression. Society - all of us - only create value when we work together and each take a profit out of the trade.

这并不是说应该禁止零和博弈，也不是说应该禁止赢输。而是说我们应该关注的是双赢，因为这是社会创造价值的地方。社会会在只有一方赢家一方输家这样的交易中赔钱，这就是为什么那些在2008年以牺牲经济为代价救助银行的国家处于长期萧条状态，银行和银行家变得越来越有钱，但普通人会变得更穷。社会——我们所有人——只有当我们共同从贸易中努力获利时，才能创造价值。

To encourage win-win we need to provide:

⇒ Open entry & exit

⇒ An environment of repeat transactions, where there is no end in sight,

→ Rules of the game

→ a way to trade (that’s the blockchain thing), and

→ Skin in the game

为了鼓励双赢，我们需要提供:

⇒开放的入口和出口

⇒无穷无尽重复交易的环境

→博弈规则

→一种贸易(区块链事务),和

→风险共担

That latter is a new thing. Skin in the game says that we need a method for Alice to hold Bob to account when he acts up. The method needs teeth, so that the value in play is at risk. We need a structure where our community members can guard themselves against an aggressive party turning a trusting win-win trade into a win-lose by trick, just bad trust or downright crime. There must be repercussions for such actions, there must be skin in the game, so as to hold that aggressor to account.

后者是新事物。风险共担是说我们需要一种Alice的方法来让Bob在他行动的时候考虑到他。这种方法是需要双方唇齿相依的关系，因此其中的价值是处于风险之中的。我们需要一种结构，让我们的社区成员能够防范激进的某一方把原本信任的双赢交易变成了欺骗、信任差或彻头彻尾的犯罪环境。这种行为必然需要承担后果，全员共担其中的风险，以便追究破坏者的责任。

Fixing the Walled Garden

修复整个围墙

Ian治理区块链20.png

A permissioned ledger provides for this, yet the process described above defeats it for the small player.

一个受许可的分类帐本提供了这一点，然而上面描述的过程击败了它的小玩家。

Why is that? A permissioned ledger consists of, let’s say:

◯ A wall around the garden

◓ A gate and a gatekeeper - fees, corruption, exclusion

☆ A set of rules,

☆ A method for applying the rules, aka Dispute Resolution,

☆ Consequences - skin in the game.

这是为什么呢？受许可的分类帐本包括比方说:

◯花园周围有围墙

◓门和看门人——费用、腐败、排斥

☆系列的规则

☆一个方法应用规则，即争议解决

☆后果——风险共担

The problem - the difference between the two above descriptions - is the wall. Let's put them side by side:

问题是——上述两种描述的不同之处在于——围墙。让我们把它们放在一起:

◯ A wall around the garden

◓ A gate and a gatekeeper

⇒ Open entry & exit

⇒ repeat transactions

☆ A set of rules,

☆ A method for applying the rules

☆ Consequences

→ Rules of the game

→ a way to trade

→ Skin in the game

Once there is a wall, we have to have a gate to get into the garden. And once we have a gate, we have to have a gatekeeper. We outlined the barrier to entry costs of the gatekeeper above, but there is another cost we did not mention: Regulation.

一旦有了墙，我们就得有一扇门才能进入花园。一旦我们有了门，我们就需要有一个门卫。我们概述了上述门卫进入成本的障碍是什么，但还有另一个我们没有提到的成本：监管。

Unless someone invents a decentralised wall (!), a decentralised gatekeeper (!!) and a decentralised gate (!!!) then the gatekeeper will be subject to both internal pressures and external pressures. To cut a long story short, our gatekeeper will come under some regulator's control, and will then proceed to place all of the regulator's choice rules in place.

除非有人发明了一堵去中心化的墙(!)，一个去中心化的门卫(!!!)和一个去中心化的门(!!!)，否则门卫将同时要承受到内部压力和外部压力的影响。简单来说就是，我们的看门人将受到监管机构的控制，然后将着手落实监管机构的所有选择规则。

See the problem? Pretty soon we'll be back to centralisation, to being a bank and needing a banking licence. Then everything will clog up and we'll be praying for another 2008 style bailout and a decade of stealth bailout, also known as Quantitative Easing.

看到问题了吗？很快我们就会回到中心化了，成为一家银行，需要一张银行执照。然后，一切都将陷入困境，我们将祈祷另一场2008招式的救助，以及10年的秘密援助，也就是所谓的量化宽松。

A decentralised community cannot be beholden to a gatekeeper. If you're unsure of this, talk to the compliance department of any fiat exchange. Free entry has to be preserved in order for the result to be a community blockchain. Therefore, the decentralised community cannot have a wall nor a gate nor a gatekeeper.

一个去中心化的社区不可能受制于守门人。如果你对此不确定，可以咨询任何fiat交易所的合规部门。为了使结果成为一个社区的区块链，必须保留自由进入。因此，去中心化的社区不能有墙、门、门卫。

Let's tear down the wall.

让我们把墙拆掉。

An Open Park

一个公开的公园

As well as being aligned to the concept of win-win, the rest of the elements above ☆ are not so forceful as centralising influences. In other words, they are not so controllable from outside the environment of your community’s blockchain. It turns out that we can decentralise these elements and create our system of governance with control in the hands of the community.

作为对齐到双赢的概念，其余上面☆的元素不算非常中心化的影响。换句话说，在社区区块链环境之外，它们不是那么可控。事实证明，我们可以将这些要素去中心化，并在社区掌握控制权的情况下创建我们的治理体系。

In brief, opening the Walled Garden into perhaps an Open Park with a posted notice board looks like this:

· The set of rules is a Constitution.

◦ It is offered and accepted on entry,

◦ It applies to every access, every transaction, every contract, every post.

◦ It points to the method of dispute resolution which is agreed in the same way,

◦ And, as a community document, we require:

· A method for the community to change … everything! A decentralised voting mechanism such as Delegated Proof of Stake (Larimer, 2017) does the trick, and can control change to:

◦ the rules! The Constitution can be controlled and voted by the community

◦ Software changes, too 😊

◦ important roles such as Block Producers, Arbitrators

· The forum of Dispute Resolution [Nagy&Shakel, 2008].

◦ Based on the Arbitration Act of all countries, which is to say, it’s legal 😊

◦ Unifies everyone under the same code (the Constitution) which smooths out any local advantages.

◦ Allows Arbitrators to be appointed by the community’s voting mechanism

◦ (And, did we mention, the rules are managed by the community!)

· An enforcement method for actions

◦ Decentralised voting can change the chain and rules.

◦ Rulings can be enforced by block producers.

◦ Rulings can also reach out to external world.

◦ Ultimately, a ruling enforced can take value or eject a person.

简而言之，将带围墙的花园开放成一个开放的公园，上面贴着告示板，看起来是这样的:

·这里的规则是公约（Constitution）。

◦提供和接受的入口,

◦适用于每一个访问、每笔交易、每一个合同、每一个职位。

◦它同意以同样的方式解决指向的争议方法,

◦作为一个社区文档，我们需要:

·一切改变社区的方法！一种去中心化的投票机制，如委托证明股权(Larimer, 2017)就能起到作用，并可以控制改变:

◦规则！公约（Constitution）可以由社区控制和投票产生

◦软件的改变也是一样😊

◦重要的角色比如BP、仲裁员

·争端解决论坛[Nagy&Shakel, 2008]。

◦基于仲裁的所有国家都是合法的😊

◦统一每个人都在相同的代码(公约)来让任何当地的优势趋于平滑。

◦允许指定的仲裁员社区的投票机制

◦(正如我们提到，规则是由社区管理的!)

·行动的执行方法

◦去中心化的投票可以改变链和规则

◦BP可以执行裁决

◦裁决也可以接触到外部世界。

◦最终裁决执行可以让一个人带来价值或者出局。

Why does this work? Firstly, the will of the community. It is not the wall that holds the person to account, it is the community, using the tools found inside. The rules are enforced by the members according to a process that is already agreed.

为什么是这个工作呢？首先，这是社区的意愿。这不是让人解释的墙，而是社区使用内部的工具。这些规则由成员根据已经商定的流程执行。

Secondly, in economics terms, the constitution forms a Schelling point to which everyone agrees on entry. This agreement, this constitution is sticky - when push comes to shove, most will stick to the rules, because they see that most will stick to the rules.

其次，从经济学的角度来看，公约形成了一个人人都同意的切入点。这个协议，也就是这个公约是棘手的——当到了紧要关头，大多数人会遵守规则，因为他们看到大多数人会遵守规则。

Then, the grievances can follow a path agreed by the community. The rules direct their grievances to the Arbitrator, who creates a Ruling, which can then act as a call to action encouraging the community to enforce. As the system starts to work, supporters gather and the process becomes the Community.

然后，不满情绪就会沿着社区同意的道路发展。这些规则将他们的不满传达给了仲裁员，也就是执行了裁决的那些人，然后可以作为号召社区强制执行的号召。当系统开始工作时，支持者聚集在一起，这个过程就形成了社区。

Finally, signalling: those smart criminals who are looking for easy marks will realise there are barriers here that will cost more and raise their risks. The the rules and rulings act as a filtering device. Crooks then analyse whether it is better to go to some other garden.

最后，发出信号：那些想要轻松得分的聪明罪犯会意识到，这里存在着成本更高、风险更高的障碍。这些规则和裁决就像一个过滤装置。然后，骗子们分析是否有更好下手的花园。

Further Research (of course)

更多的搜索

There are three missing elements in this description which we have to leave out of scope.

在这个描述中有三个缺失的元素，我们必须在范围之外省略它们。

One is Identity. As a consequence of the need to build trust over an extended series of trades (Alice’s Trust RADR above), Alice needs to be able to remember Bob and recall how her last decision went, before she relies on him again. Identity is a very deep and interesting topic in itself, but it is too big for this essay; interested readers are referred to the Identity Cycle [Grigg, 2015-2018] .

一个是身份。由于需要在一系列的交易中建立信任(之前的Alice的trust RADR)， Alice需要能够记住Bob并回忆起她最后的决定是如何进行的，然后再依据这些线索进行下一步。身份本身是一个非常深刻和有趣的话题，但是对于这篇文章来说它太大了;有兴趣的读者请参阅身份循环[Grigg, 2015-2018（http://iang.org/papers/the_governed_blockchain.html#ref_Grigg,%202015-2018）]。

Second, the technical security model. Multisig arrangements, recovery partners, time-delay transactions, staking and hardware wallets are all useful components (Larimer, 2017) that when deployed in concert with a strong Constitution and Arbitration framework will make the job of the criminal much harder.

二是技术安全模型。 Multisig安排、恢复伙伴、交易延迟、质押和硬件钱包都是有用的组件(Larimer, 2017)，如果与强大的公约和仲裁框架一起部署，将使罪犯的工作变得更加困难。

Thirdly, how to impose the Constitution on entry? This can be handled with a mix of two elements. (1) Technically by making the Constitution into a Ricardian Contract - one which is both machine and human readable, and critically has its hash placed into any relevant communications with users[Grigg, 2004]. Then, (2) legally, by having the Constitution include a clause that describes how third party operators and developers take on the responsibility for fairly presenting the Constitution to users. Their software can then ensure that users enter into the agreement, as signalled by the presence of the hash, to which all recipients may rely. Interested readers are referred to NortonRoseFulbright's "Legal Analysis of the Governed Blockchain" [NortonRoseFulbright, 2018].

第三，如何在进入时就能实施公约？这可以通过两个元素的混合来处理(1)。从技术上讲，通过公约变成一份李嘉图合约——一份机器可读的、人类可读的合约，并严格地将其哈希置于与用户的任何相关通信中[Grigg, 2004]。然后，(2)法律上，通过公约包含一项条款，描述第三方经营者和开发商如何承担向用户公平地展示公约的责任。接着，他们的软件可以确保用户签署协议，如哈希的存在所示，所有接收方都可以依赖哈希。感兴趣的读者可以参考NortonRoseFulbright对“被统治的区块链”[NortonRoseFulbright, 2018（http://iang.org/papers/the_governed_blockchain.html#ref_NortonRoseFulbright,%202018）]的“法律分析”。

Conclusion

结论

"The principle of open entry is important for blockchain robustness, yet open entry can also occur within a range of actors that does not include the whole humanity, but only those that accept some rules and satisfy some requirements."

[Morini, 2017] .

“开放进入的原则对区块链的健壮性很重要，但开放进入也可能发生在不包括整个人类的范围内，而只发生在那些接受某些规则并满足某些需求的参与者之中。”

[Morini,2017)。

A governed blockchain is one which has free entry, but conditions apply on entry (Morini 2017). Primarily those conditions are rules of behaviour, encoded in a Constitution, and include two critical elements: a forum for dispute resolution and a method for changing the rules.
[图片上传失败...(image-1a4369-1533524697479)]
一个受治理的区块链是一个有自由进入，但此处的进入是有条件的(Morini 2017)。这些条件主要是构成公约的行为规则，包括两个关键要素：解决争端的论坛和改变规则的方法。

We present it as a third alternative to the permissioned and unpermissioned blockchains (Swanson, 2015).

我们将其作为许可和不许可的区块链的第三种替代方案(Swanson, 2015)。

Up until recently, blockchains had been characterised as unpermissioned or permissioned, and this was thought to be the only choice. More limiting, to a large extent it was believed the two are incompatible, the choice is exclusive.

直到最近，区块链一直被认为是未经许可或许可的，这被认为是唯一的选择。更有限的是，在很大程度上，人们认为两者是不相容的，被认为这个选择是排他性只能存在其一的。

We offer a third choice, the Governed Blockchain. By identifying the components that differ, we find that one component - free entry versus the wall - is key, and it can be modified to create a third, safer alternative suitable for business.

我们提供第三种选择——治理区块链。通过识别不同的组件，发现一个组件的自由进入和此处的围墙是最为关键的，并且可以修改它以创建第三种更安全的适合于商业的替代选择。

A community of enforceable rules creates an open garden. A community in an open garden can cultivate win-win trade for the people. A community of win-win traders can build an economy for their mutually beneficial future. And finally, a mutually protective community can finally invite in the mass market.

Ian治理区块链22.png

一个具有可执行规则的社区创造了一个开放的花园。一个开放的花园社区可以为人民创造双赢的贸易。一个双赢的交易者社区可以为他们的互利未来建立一个经济体。最终，一个相互保护的社区可以邀请大众市场。

The working draft of the paper was at: "The Governed Blockchain" - google docs https://docs.google.com/document/d/1TKegYdH5ASqGlEWiVDYFMubE7651hsZIuZb8FKO8KNk/edit#. ...

这是一份草稿版本的文件《受治理的区块链》。

References

[working draft] "The Governed Blockchain" - google docs https://docs.google.com/document/d/1TKegYdH5ASqGlEWiVDYFMubE7651hsZIuZb8FKO8KNk/edit#.

[Grigg, 2017a] Ian Grigg, 2017a; "EOS: An Introduction," iang.org/papers/EOS_An_Introduction.pdf

[Larimer, 2017] Dan Larimer, 2017; "EOS Technical White Paper," github.com/EOSIO/Documentation

[Swanson, 2015] Tim Swanson, 2015; "Consensus-as-a-Service," http://www.ofnumbers.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Permissioned-distributed-ledgers.pdf

[Buterin, 2015] Vitalik Buterin, 2015; "On Public and Private Blockchains," https://blog.ethereum.org/2015/08/07/on-public-and-private-blockchains/

[Evans, 2017] Charles Evans, 2017 "Delegated Proof of Stake: Between Anarchy and Leviathan," working paper forthcoming.

[Porter, 1979] Michael E. Porter, 1979; "How Competitive Forces Shape Strategy," Harvard Business Review Vol 59, No 2.

[Wikipedia] Wikipedia, "Risk Matrix," wikipedia.org/wiki/Risk_matrix

[Kerckhoffs, 1883] Auguste Kerckhoffs; "La cryptographie militaire ('Military cryptography')," Journal des sciences militaires, vol. IX, pp. 5-38, Jan. 1883, pp. 161-191, Feb. 1883. http://www.petitcolas.net/kerckhoffs/la_cryptographie_militaire_i.htm Kerckhoffs' 6th Principle is, "Finally, it is necessary, given the circumstances that command its application, that the system be easy to use, requiring neither mental strain nor the knowledge of a long series of rules to observe."

[Narayanan, 2015] Arvind Narayanan, 2015; "Analyzing the 2013 Bitcoin fork: centralized decision-making saved the day," Freedom to Tinker blog https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2015/07/28/analyzing-the-2013-bitcoin-fork-centralized-decision-making-saved-the-day/

[Grigg, 2017b] Ian Grigg, 2017b; “Life is a Cabaret… Or how to split and merge a blockchain,” Financial Cryptography steemit.com/eos/@iang/life-is-a-cabaret-or-how-to-split-and-merge-a-blockchain

[Gupta, 2014] Vinary Gupta, 2014; "[Bitcoin] Cannot be divorced from pre-existing political theory," IAmSatoshi Interview, youtube.com/watch?v=FHFSvttMg6E

[Grigg, 2016] Ian Grigg, 2016; "On Trust," working paper, Part II of Identity Cycle.

[Harari, 2015] Yuval Noah Harari, 2015; “What explains the rise of humans?” TEDGlobalLondon https://www.ted.com/talks/yuval_noah_harari_what_explains_the_rise_of_humans

[Sgantzos 2017] Konstantinos Sgantzos "Implementing A Church-Turing-Deutsch Principle Machine on a Blockchain," forthcoming, HSCBB 2017

[Panchèvre, 2015 (my emphasis)] Ian Maya Panchèvre, 2015; "Immaterial World:The Virtual Politics of Bitcoin."

[Garzik, 2010] Jeff Garzik, 2010; "Strange block 74638," Bitcointalk

[Güring&Grigg, 2011] Phillip Güring & Ian Grigg, 2011; "Bitcoin & Gresham’s Law - the economic inevitability of Collapse," working paper

[Swanson, 2017] Tim Swanson, 2017; "Eight Things Cryptocurrency Enthusiasts Probably Won't Tell You," working paper

[Nagy&Shakel, 2008] Daniel Nagy, Nadzeya Shakel, 2008; "OpenPGP-based Financial Instruments and Dispute Arbitration,” Financial Cryptography 2008,

[Grigg, 2015-2018] Ian Grigg, 2015-2018; Identity Cycle, working cycle of papers, at https://drive.google.com/drive/u/0/folders/0B9aJ9_ZDMOjMbVRIMUNZdUJLakU

[Grigg, 2004] Ian Grigg, 2004, "The Ricardian Contract," First IEEE International Workshop on Electronic Contracting, iang.org/papers/ricardian_contract.html

[NortonRoseFulbright, 2018] Adam Sanitt & Ian Grigg, 2018; "Legal Analysis of the Governed Blockchain," NortonRoseFulbright, forthcoming

[Morini, 2017] Massimo Morini, 2017; "2018: The Year We Make Cont(r)act," Coindesk

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