Introduction
引⾔
My dad was also my hero, just like the case with you. Dick clearly was a terrific guy and a sound thinker. You were lucky to have him as a father, teacher, and inspiration.
—WARREN E. BUFFETT
(written on the back of a Pecaut & Company newsletter)
我的⽗亲也是我⼼⽬中的英雄，就像你的⽗亲是你的英雄⼀样。迪克显然是个了不起的家伙，他还善于思考。你⾮常幸运，能够成为他的⼉⼦和学⽣，能够从他那⾥获得灵感。
——沃伦·巴菲特 （写在佩科公司企业资讯的背⾯）
After my dad, Dick Pecaut, passed away in 2009, I wrote a loving tribute to him in my investment firm’s monthly newsletter. Days later, I received one of the newsletters back. Handwritten, on the back of that newsletter, was a note from the Oracle of Omaha, Warren Buffett. The man whose mindset, strategies, and investing insights my business partner, Corey, and I have studied for three decades. The man whose wisdom we are honored to share with you in the coming pages.
2009年，我的⽗亲迪克·佩科去世后，我在⾃⼰的投资公司的每⽉企业资讯中悼念了他。⼏天后，我收到⼀份回复，有⼈在企业资讯背⾯写了⼏⾏字，竟然是“奥⻢哈的先知”沃伦·巴菲特的⼿笔。我和我的商业伙伴科⾥花了30年的时间研究巴菲特的思想、策略和投资洞察⼒，我们很荣幸能在这本书接下来的内容中和你分享他的智慧。
Buffett’s short note served as a heartwarming footnote to my father’s life work as an investment advisor. It also served as validation of both the newsletters that make up this book and our work as investment advisors.
我⽗亲做了⼀辈⼦的投资顾问，巴菲特写下的⼏⾏字总结了他的⼀⽣，令⼈动容。这⼏⾏字是对我们投资顾问⼯作的肯定，也是我们撰写这本书的初衷。
We have been longtime Berkshire Hathaway commentators. Our analyses of its chairman, Warren Buffett, and vice chairman, Charlie Munger, have been featured in the New York Times, Money Magazine, Schiff’s Insurance Observer, and a host of other leading investment publications. One of our newsletters was referenced in James O’Loughlin’s book, The Real Warren Buffett: Managing Capital, Leading People.1
作为伯克希尔·哈撒⻙公司的资深评论员，我们对公司主席沃伦·巴菲特以及副主席查理·芒格的研究，曾是《纽约时报》《⾦钱》《希夫保险观察家》以及其他⼀些主要的投资杂志的头条⽂章。詹姆斯·奥洛克林撰写的《沃伦·巴菲特传：管理资⾦，领导⺠众》[1] 中还曾引⽤过我们的⼀份企业资讯。
For years, we sent our newsletter, unsolicited, to Berkshire Hathaway’s headquarters. But until this thoughtful reply, we never knew if anyone actually opened the envelopes.2
⼏年来，我们主动将企业资讯发送到伯克希尔·哈撒⻙公司总部。直到收到了这份暖⼼的回复，我们才知道的确有⼈看过它们。[2]
Corey and I were electrified. Buffett read our newsletter! It was an acknowledgment that our writings and insights on value investing are of interest to the master himself. On a personal level, mourning my father, it was one of the warmest and most affirming notes I have ever received. For that, I am eternally grateful.
我和科⾥激动不已。巴菲特读了我们的企业资讯！这⾜以说明⼤师对我们在价值投资⽅⾯的⻅解感兴趣。就个⼈⽽⾔，这⼏句话是我收到的最温暖的悼词，它肯定了我⽗亲的成就。为此，我会永远感激他。
But it wasn’t always like this. We didn’t always receive personal notes from the world’s greatest investor.
How Did We Get Here?
我们是如何开始的
I graduated from Harvard in 1979 with a philosophy degree. While there, I took only one economics course. I found it too theoretical, not anything like the investing I saw happening in my family’s business.
1979年，我从哈佛⼤学毕业，获得哲学学位。在哈佛，我只选修过⼀门经济学课程。我发现那门经济学课程过于理论化，和我家的公司所做的投资完全是两回事。
My grandfather, father, and uncle had founded Pecaut & Company, a stockbrokerage firm, in 1960. My grandfather, Russell, often marveled that they made money from day one and never looked back. My involvement in the family business began in the late 1970s, when I was working summers in the back office. I did the grunt work, including updating the S&P 500 tear sheets.
我的祖⽗、⽗亲和叔叔在1960年创办了⼀家证券经纪公司——佩科公司。我的祖⽗罗素总是感叹，他们从公司成⽴那天起就稳赚不赔，从未出过岔⼦。 我是20世纪70年代到公司帮忙的。我每年夏天都在交易清算室⾥忙活，⼯作很烦琐，其中就包括从标准普尔500指数中撕下旧单，换上新单。
Back then, the S&P sent its clients color-coded binders that were alphabetized like a set of encyclopedias. Every month, a packet would arrive in the mail with colored sheets that matched the binders. Green sheets were large-company stocks. Yellow sheets were small-company stocks. Blue sheets were for bonds. Someone needed to manually update the binders by replacing old sheets with the new. That was my job. I learned a lot by reading those sheets.
那时，标准普尔500指数发给客⼾的彩⾊编码活⻚夹是按字⺟顺序排列的，看上去就像套百科全书。每个⽉，我们的邮件⾥都夹着⼀沓与活⻚夹相配的彩纸。绿纸是⼤公司的股票，⻩纸是⼩公司的股票，蓝纸是购买股票需要填写的单⼦。这时便需要有⼈将活⻚夹中的单⼦换成新的，这便是我的⼯作。读了这些单⼦，我学到了不少知识。
After graduating, I entered the firm as a full-time employee. I felt inadequate and clueless. Our small, family-run operation had no formal training program or structure. My dad rarely sat me down to discuss how things were going. I tortured myself with my own self-judgment about how poorly I thought I was doing. I learned by trial and error.
毕业后，我正式进⼊公司，成为⼀名全职员⼯。我觉得⾃⼰能⼒不⾜，⽆从下⼿。我家公司的规模不⼤，没有什么正规的培训，也谈不上组织架构。⽗亲很少有时间坐下来和我讨论讨论事情的进展。我以为⾃⼰⼀⽆是处，痛苦不已。我不断尝试，不断犯错，倒也学会了不少东⻄。
One error was option trading. It was quick and exciting. You could theoretically triple your money in a short time. Do that a few times, and you’d have a good year. I spent a year trying to develop a successful option trading strategy. And at the end of the year? I had made about a hundred bucks. Calculating that into the amount of time spent, I had made about 10 cents an hour. Clearly, that wasn’t worth it. Trading in the short-term may work for some people, but it wasn’t for me. I needed a better approach.
我犯的错误之⼀便是期权交易。期权交易速度快，⼗分刺激。理论上讲，你可以在短时间内将⼿⾥的资⾦翻上3倍，多交易⼏次，你⼀年都会⾐⾷⽆忧。我花了⼀年的时间来研究期权交易的成功策略。到了年底，我⼤概赚了100美元。考虑到时间成本，我每个⼩时只赚了⼤约10美分。 这么做显然没有任何意义。短期交易也许对别⼈有⽤，在我这⼉却⾏不通，我需要找到更好的⽅法。
Then, in 1982, I read the book The Money Masters by John Train, in which he profiles nine brilliant investors, including John Templeton and Warren Buffett. A light bulb came on when I finished the book. I said, “I’m going back to school. These investors are my professors. My curriculum is everything they say and write.” I was excited. I would study the most brilliant investors in the world like they were my professors at Harvard. I was on fire to learn everything I could about them and to figure out how to invest like them.
1982年，我读了约翰·特雷恩撰写的《⾦钱的主⼈》，书中介绍了包括约翰·坦普尔顿和沃伦·巴菲特等在内的9位杰出的投资⼈。读完这本书，我突然有了主意，说道：“我打算回学校深造。这些投资⼈就是我的教授，我要学的知识就是他们所说、所写的⼀切。”我激动不已。我把世界上最杰出的投资⼈当作我在哈佛的教授，渴望了解他们的⼀切，希望能够像他们⼀样成为投资⽅⾯的⾏家。
From that point forward, I saw my role in the firm primarily as a learning organism. My thought was that the more I learned, the better my decisionmaking would be, and the better I would serve our clients. Over time, my favorite professors would include Sir John Templeton (of the Templeton Growth Fund),3 George Michaelis of Source Capital (a topperforming closed-end fund), Jean-Marie Eveillard (who ran what is now the First Eagle Global Fund), Bob Rodriguez (of First Pacific Advisors), and Marty Whitman (of Third Avenue Value Investors). These experts would all offer tremendous insight and direction.
从那时起，我在公司的主要任务就是学习。我想着只要多学习，就能做出更加英明的投资决策，就能更好地为客⼾服务。 久⽽久之，我喜欢的教授囊括了约翰·坦普尔顿爵⼠（坦普尔顿成⻓基⾦）、乔治·⽶凯利斯（最佳封闭式基⾦原始资本公司）、让-⻢⾥·埃⻙亚尔（第⼀⽼鹰全球基⾦）、鲍勃·罗德⾥格斯（第⼀太平洋顾问公司），以及⻢丁·惠特曼（第三⼤道价值基⾦）。这些专家为我们献计献策，为我们指引⽅向。[1]
But of all the brilliant “professors,” none of them has been more instructive than Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger of Berkshire Hathaway.
然⽽在所有杰出的教授当中，没有谁的建议能⽐伯克希尔·哈撒⻙公司的沃伦·巴菲特和查理·芒格给出的建议更中肯了。
After realizing that Buffett was one of the guys to learn from, I devoured all his annual letters to shareholders from Berkshire. When I met a friend who had Buffett’s letters from his partnership prior to taking over Berkshire, I devoured those, too. I loved reading them.
当意识到该向巴菲特学习后，我便津津有味地读遍了巴菲特每年写给伯克希尔股东的信。巴菲特在接⼿伯克希尔前，曾给他的合伙⼈写过不少信，我遇到的⼀个朋友刚好有这些信，我便兴致勃勃地读完了。我喜欢读这些信。
From where I lived, it was only a 90-minute drive to Omaha and Berkshire’s annual meetings. But to attend, you had to be a shareholder.
从我住的地⽅出发，只要开⻋90分钟就能赶到奥⻢哈参加伯克希尔的年会。可要想参加年会，就必须成为伯克希尔的股东。
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University of Berkshire Hathaway”
伯克希尔·哈撒⻙⼤学
I distinctly remember that first meeting in 1984. It was an electric yet cozy affair at Omaha’s Joslyn Art Museum.
我清楚地记得1984年我第⼀次参加的年会。年会在奥⻢哈乔斯林艺术博物馆举⾏，令⼈既兴奋⼜惬意。
A local CPA I knew, Corey Wrenn, was taking tickets at the door.4 He was a relatively new employee, hired by Berkshire’s audit department in 1983.
科⾥·雷恩和我是⽼相识，他这个注册会计师正在门⼝验票。[1] 他1983年才被伯克希尔审计部门录⽤，算起来还是公司的新员⼯。
After graduating college and working two years in public accounting in Sioux City, Iowa, Corey decided that wasn’t what he wanted to do his whole life. While looking for another job, he received a call from a headhunter in Omaha who told him that Berkshire Hathaway was looking for an internal auditor. Corey asked, “Berkshire what?” The headhunter said, “It’s run by Warren Buffett.” And Corey responded, “Warren who?” He had no idea who or what they were. Nonetheless, he took the job and began working alongside the six or seven other employees in the audit department, auditing Berkshire’s subsidiary companies and preparing schedules used for quarterly financial statements and for Buffett’s use.
⼤学毕业后，科⾥在艾奥⽡的苏城做了两年的公共会计⼯作，但他觉得那并不是⾃⼰想奋⽃⼀辈⼦的事业。找⼯作时，他接到奥⻢哈⼀个猎头打来的电话，猎头告诉他伯克希尔·哈撒⻙公司正在招聘⼀名内部审计员。科⾥问道：“伯克希尔什么？”猎头答道：“是沃伦·巴菲特的公司。”科⾥答道：“沃伦什么？”他丈⼆和尚摸不着头脑。尽管如此，他还是做了那份⼯作，和其他六七个⼈⼀起在审计部门审计伯克希尔⼦公司的账⽬，为巴菲特准备季度财务报表。
I had felt a pang of jealousy when I found out he had been hired there. I envied how he would be learning firsthand from Buffett.5
当发现科⾥居然在伯克希尔⼯作时，我羡慕不已。我多么羡慕他能从巴菲特那⾥学到第⼀⼿的知识呀。[2]
But I wasn’t focused on Corey at the time. My eyes were on the stage.
但那时我并没有把注意⼒放在科⾥⾝上，我的眼睛⼀直盯着主席台不放。
Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger sat on the auditorium’s stage in front of an audience of 300 shareholders (which at the time I felt was large).
沃伦·巴菲特和查理·芒格⾯对着300名股东，坐在礼堂的主席台上（我当时觉得那个主席台可真够⼤的）。
I realized that if I were going to learn, I would have to get up and ask what I was wondering about. I wrote pages and pages of detailed questions with the goal of getting to the microphone.
我知道，要是想学知识，就必须站起来提出⾃⼰的疑问。所以，我详详细细地写下⼀⻚⼜⼀⻚的问题，就等着拿到⻨克⻛了。
I nervously asked my one question. Their clarity of mind and high intellect was clear from their answer. I thought, Wow. That was a fantastic answer. They took my dumb question and turned it into a masterpiece.
我紧张地提出了第⼀个问题。从他们的回答中就能看出他们清晰的头脑和⾮凡的才智。我⼼想：“哇，回答得太棒了！他们把我愚蠢的问题变成了杰作。”
I kept thinking, What took me so long to get here? Why haven’t I been here before?
我接着想：“我怎么现在才来，以前怎么就没想到要过来呢？”
At that meeting, I learned that Berkshire owned 80% of Wesco Financial, where Charlie Munger served as the chairman. So I flew out to Pasadena to attend the Wesco meeting. It was a much smaller affair.
那次年会上，我得知伯克希尔持有⻙斯科⾦融公司80%的股份，⽽查理·芒格正是⻙斯科⾦融公司的主席。所以，我⼜⻜往帕萨迪纳参加了⻙斯科的年会。⻙斯科年会的规模可要⼩得多。
The first Wesco meeting I attended had only 15 people, and half worked for the company. Once again, I had prepared questions. After asking three questions, it was clear I would be asking a lot more.
我第⼀次参加⻙斯科年会时，只有15⼈出席会议，其中半数都是公司的员⼯。我⼜准备了许多问题。
I felt nervous. Munger has an imposing presence behind his thick Cokebottle lenses. He seemed like an old professor who doesn’t tolerate fools. I got up and stammered, “I’m sorry, I’ve got a lot of questions. It looks like I’m asking all the questions. I didn’t mean to take over the meeting.”
我很紧张。芒格戴着厚厚的眼镜，⼗分威严。他就像位受不了傻⼦的⽼教授。我站起来，结结巴巴地说：“不好意思，我有⼀⼤堆的问题，好像就我在问问题，我不是有意霸占整场会议的。”
He was gracious, saying, “That’s what we’re here for. I’ll answer your questions as long as you’ve got them. If people want to leave, they can leave. But I’ll be here.”6
他和蔼地说：“我们就是为了问题才聚集在这⾥的。只要你有问题，我就会⼀⼀作答。谁要是想⾛，可以随时离开，不过我不会⾛的。”
I thought, Wow. All right, then. Here we go. I don’t know how long it went, but I was in heaven. There’s no doubt that having that level of expertise delivered directly to me accelerated my learning.
我⼼想：“哇，太好了，那就开始吧！”我不知道我们⼀问⼀答了多久，但我⾼兴坏了。毫⽆疑问，顶级专家⼿把⼿的教导让我前进了⼀⼤步。
The “University of Berkshire Hathaway” is what I nicknamed the accumulated wisdom dispensed by Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger.
“伯克希尔·哈撒⻙⼤学”就是我给沃伦·巴菲特和查理·芒格所积累的智慧起的昵称。
Each year’s curriculum consists of Berkshire Hathaway’s annual reports and the lectures at its annual meetings. That course of study, now accessible in these pages, has taught Corey and me far more about investing than any other source.
每⼀年，我们都研读伯克希尔·哈撒⻙公司的年度报告，聆听年会上的讲座。如今，所有的智慧都汇集在了这本书⾥，我和科⾥也从中学到了从其他任何地⽅都学不到的投资学知识。
Pouring over Berkshire’s reports, reading Buffett’s annual letter, and listening to Buffett and Munger at the annual meeting have all been central to our growth as value investors. It is the core curriculum of our business education—one that easily rivals most MBA programs.7 It is the cornerstone of our continuing education.
阅读伯克希尔的报告及巴菲特每年写给股东的信，聆听巴菲特和芒格在年会上的发⾔，对我们这些价值投资⼈来说⾄关重要。这些才是商业教育的核⼼，它轻松碾压⼯商管理学硕⼠（MBA）课程，是我们接受继续教育的基⽯。
It is, without a shadow of doubt, the best investment either of us has ever made.
毫⽆疑问，这是我们两个做过的最好的投资项⽬。
Once a year, you have arguably the greatest investment team of all time on hand to answer your questions. It is a fantastic annual tutorial on the world of business. Buffett admitted in the beginning that he was terrified of public speaking. (He used to get physically ill at just the thought of it.)
每⼀年，有史以来最杰出的投资团队都会为你答疑解惑，编撰优秀的商业世界年度教程。巴菲特坦⾔，他⼀开始害怕当众讲话（他曾经只要⼀想到要当着这么多⼈说话，就会感到⾝体不适）。
Thankfully, over the years, Buffett and Munger have grown ever-more comfortable as educators. Today, they are excellent teachers. Their wisdom and willingness to share make each annual meeting an invaluable installment in a sublime lecture series.
谢天谢地，这些年来，巴菲特和芒格越来越习惯于当众讲话了。如今，他们成了优秀的教师。他们的智慧以及乐于分享的精神，使得每场年会都成了宝贵的系列讲座。
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A Short History
公司简史
Buffett was educated at the University of Nebraska. Afterward, he enrolled at Columbia Business School. He went there to learn from the father of value investing, Benjamin Graham. Buffett became Graham’s star student. Afterward, Graham took him on at his investment partnership, Graham Newman.
巴菲特曾就读于内布拉斯加州⽴⼤学，之后在哥伦⽐亚⼤学商学院深造。在那⾥，他师从于价值投资之⽗——本杰明·格雷厄姆。巴菲特成了格雷厄姆最得意的门⽣。那之后，格雷厄姆让巴菲特去了他合伙投资的公司——格雷厄姆·纽曼公司上班。
Buffett used what he learned from that experience to start his own partnership back in Omaha. He did phenomenally well from the very beginning. A $10,000 investment in his partnership in 1956 grew to $200,000 by 1969. That’s a 25.9% compounded annualized return. Incredibly, the partnership never had a down year, even though the market had six down years during that period.
巴菲特利⽤那段经历在奥⻢哈启动了⾃⼰的合伙⼈⽣涯，他从⼀开始就表现得出类拔萃。1956年合伙⼈投资的10000美元到了1969年已经涨到了200000美元，年复合收益率达到25.9%。不可思议的是，尽管这期间曾遭遇过六年的市场低迷，但合伙⼈的收益却从未下降过。
In 1959, Buffett met Charlie Munger, who was also from Omaha, at a dinner party. Each man instantly recognized the intelligence of the other. Munger had worked in law, but Buffett convinced him that he should be in the investment business if he wanted to make real money.8 Munger started his own investment partnership, Wheeler, Munger & Co., in 1962. From then on, he and Buffett worked on a number of investment ideas together, both formally and informally.
1959年，巴菲特在晚宴上遇到了同样来⾃奥⻢哈的查理·芒格，他们⽴刻觉察到了对⽅的睿智。芒格当时从事法律⼯作。巴菲特规劝他，如果想赚⼤钱，就得改⾏做投资。[1] 芒格于1962年成⽴了⾃⼰的投资合伙⼈公司——惠勒·芒格公司。从那时起，他就和巴菲特以正式或⾮正式的形式经常交换投资意⻅。
Berkshire Hathaway was originally a New England textile company. It was a deeply discounted stock, with a book value of $19. Its net working capital was over $11 a share. Buffett bought shares at around $7–$8 per share. Buffett was buying shares at a discount to net cash and near-cash items.
伯克希尔·哈撒⻙公司起初是⼀家新英格兰纺织公司，它的股价当时打了很⼤折扣，账⾯价值为每股19美元，⽽净营运资本每股超过11美元。巴菲特以每股7—8美元的价格收购伯克希尔的股票，享受到低于净现⾦及类似现⾦的价格折扣。
The decline of the textile industry was underway. Berkshire Hathaway was consolidating and selling assets. Then, with the cash, it was buying in its stock—which was intelligent because the stock was so cheap. In 1963, Berkshire did a massive buy-in of almost a third of its shares. The owners of Berkshire Hathaway saw Buffett’s position and didn’t want him in their little fiefdom. They called Buffett, offering to pay him $11.50 a share. He agreed. He’d make about a 40% profit in a short period.
纺织⾏业渐渐衰落，伯克希尔公司忙着整合售卖资产。当时，巴菲特的合伙⼈公司使⽤现⾦也购买了伯克希尔的股票——此举⼗分明智，因为那时股票相当便宜。 1964年，伯克希尔公司⼤规模回购将近1/3的公司股票——公司的⽼板们不想让巴菲特“坐享其成”，想把他赶出公司。他们给巴菲特打电话，承诺⽀付给他每股11.5美元。他同意了，这意味着他能在短时间内获得⼤约50%的利润。
When the letter came for the offer, however, it was less than the agreed-on amount—but only by pennies. Nevertheless, their dishonesty upset Buffett. They were trying to chisel him out of 12.5 cents per share. So Buffett went the other way and started buying increasingly more shares of Berkshire until he took control. He then booted out the guy who had tried to chisel him out. In 1964, Warren Buffett took control of that small New England textile firm, and it became his new base for making investments.
然⽽合同送到时，价格却⽐商定的少了⼀些。他们想从巴菲特的每股股票⾥骗上12.5美分。如此奸诈的⾏径惹恼了巴菲特。于是巴菲特反其道⽽⾏之，开始⼤量购进伯克希尔的股票，并最终收购了这家公司。他接着解雇了试图诓骗他的家伙。1965年，沃伦·巴菲特接管了这家⼩型新英格兰纺织公司，把它变成了⾃⼰新的投资基地。
At the time, the move made no sense. Buffett had bought a business in decline that he didn’t know how to run. He later joked that he should have taken the money. That would have been the smarter thing to do.
当时，巴菲特此举毫⽆意义。他收购了⼀家⽣意萧条的公司，况且还不懂经营。巴菲特后来开玩笑说，他本该拿钱⾛⼈才对，那样做才更明智。
As it turned out, this textile company was an ideal vehicle for making investments. With Berkshire Hathaway’s stock, Buffett had a publicly traded corporation with captive capital. The benefits of this corporate structure for managing money are significant.
事实证明，这家纺织公司成了理想的投资媒介。这得益于伯克希尔·哈撒⻙的股票，巴菲特得到了⼀家拥有受限资⾦的上市公司，这种企业架构在资⾦管理⽅⾯优势明显。
In his previous partnership, if shareholders redeemed their shares, the money would come right out of the till. Now, when shareholders sell their shares in Berkshire Hathaway, that doesn’t affect its available capital. Capital doesn’t leave the corporate shell unless Buffett pays a dividend. He could use this captive permanent capital to invest long-term by buying businesses, in part or in whole. Berkshire’s structure also allows for making opportunistic investments in special situations.
在曾经的合伙⼈公司中，⼀旦股东赎回股票，公司就必须兑现，进⽽遭受损失。如今，即便股东出售伯克希尔·哈撒⻙的股票，也不会影响公司的可⽤资本。只要巴菲特不⽀付股息，资本就依然归公司所有。他可以利⽤这些稳定的受限资⾦来进⾏⻓期投资：全资收购或部分收购企业的股份。伯克希尔的企业架构使得特殊情况下的机会主义投资成为可能。
Over time, Buffett phased out the textile portion of the business. He sold off assets to create more cash. With the cash, he began to build his wealthcompounding machine.
巴菲特逐步取消了公司的纺织业务。他变卖资产，获得了更多现⾦。正是借助这些现⾦，他开始打造起⾃⼰的财富机器。
In 1967, Buffett bought an insurance company, National Indemnity. Insurance has been a core operation at Berkshire Hathaway ever since. He loves the insurance business. With its float characteristics, it creates a powerful platform for compounding wealth.
1967年，巴菲特收购了⼀家保险公司——国⺠保险公司。⾃那以后，保险就成了伯克希尔·哈撒⻙公司的核⼼业务。巴菲特热爱保险。保险浮存⾦的特征为公司创造巨额财富提供了强有⼒的平台。
Insurance companies collect premiums, of which a significant portion goes into reserves to pay future claims. This reserve (the “float”) earns money for Berkshire, leveraging the company’s return on capital. If you can operate in a way where that float is generated at a low cost and you can grow it over time, you have built a wealth-compounding machine. As Munger once put it, “Basically, we’re a hedgehog that knows one big thing. If you generate float at 3% per annum and buy businesses that earn 13% per annum with the proceeds of that float, we have figured out that’s a pretty good position to be in.” Few investors understand that float is one of the secrets to Berkshire’s success.
保险公司收取的保费⼤都成为⽤以⽀付索赔⾦的准备⾦。这些准备⾦（浮存⾦）为伯克希尔赚到了钱，提⾼了公司的资本回报率。你要是能依靠低成本浮存⾦慢慢“敛财”，就能打造出⼀台财富机器。正如芒格曾经所说的那样：“其实，我们就是只知道⼀件⼤事的刺猬。[2] 如果每年能获得3%的浮存⾦，并靠着这些浮存⾦收购年利润⾼达13%的公司，我们的形势就⾮常好。”投资⼈⼤都还不知道，浮存⾦就是伯克希尔成功的秘密之⼀。
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“Woodstock for Capitalists”
“资本家的伍德斯托克⾳乐节”
As Buffett’s and Munger’s fame and wealth have grown, so has the frenzy around Berkshire’s once humble annual meetings.
随着巴菲特和芒格名声⼤噪，以及他们的财富越聚越多，伯克希尔曾经⽆⼈问津的年会也变得异常热闹。
As noted, my first meeting in 1984 was a cozy, 300-attendee affair. Since then, the meeting has changed many times. First it was an event, then a spectacle, and now it is a full-fledged, three-day party. But in 1984, 300 attendees was considered large, since only 13 people attended just six years before. Fast-forward to 2015, when 45,000 people were in attendance.11
正如之前提到的那样，我1984年第⼀次参加的年会是⼀场只有300⼈出席的会议。从那时起，年会接⼆连三地有了变化。⼀开始，年会只是公司的⼤事，之后成了浩荡的聚会，到现在已经演变成了为期3天的⼤型派对。但在1984年，300⼈来参加年会就被认为规模不⼩了——要知道在此6年前的年会可只有13⼈出席⽽已。快进到2015年看看，⼀共有40000⼈参加了年会。[1]
In a short period, Berkshire’s annual meetings morphed from a small private lecture series into a chamber of commerce’s dream event. It may be a sign of the times that so many people now flock to Omaha to hear Buffett and Munger speak. It’s often called “Woodstock for capitalists.” This testifies to the world’s rising interest in the realm of investment.
没⽤多⻓时间，伯克希尔的年会就从⼩型私⼈系列讲座演变成了商会梦寐以求的⼤事件，成群结队的⼈聚集在奥⻢哈聆听巴菲特和芒格的讲话似乎成了时代的象征。年会常常被戏称为“资本家的伍德斯托克⾳乐节”。这⽆不证明了世界对投资领域愈发浓厚的兴趣。
Buffett and Munger are happy to accommodate the hordes of fans, friends, students, and shoppers who flock to Omaha each year. In fact, they have managed to stretch out the whole affair for an action-packed, three-day weekend.
巴菲特和芒格很⾼兴每年能有这么多粉丝、朋友、学⽣和商家赶来奥⻢哈。事实上，正是他们两个⼈让年会成了为期3天的激动⼈⼼的假期。
It’s a weekend vacation package where shareholder discounts abound. Stores such as Borsheim’s (jewelry) and Nebraska Furniture Mart have exclusive openings and parties for shareholders. Around town, Omaha routinely features events, such as an Omaha Storm Chasers baseball game, where Buffett has signed autographs and thrown out the first pitch.
伯克希尔的“度假套餐”是为股东提供的各式各样的折扣商品。波仙珠宝店、内布拉斯加家具卖场为股东独家开放，派对随处可⻅。在⼩镇周围，奥⻢哈定期举办活动，巴菲特就为奥⻢追⻛者棒球赛签过名，并投出了第⼀球。
Over the weekend, shareholders are encouraged to patronize everything in which Berkshire has an economic interest—which brings us to “The Berkshire Mall,” a target-marketing retail bonanza for Berkshire subsidiaries.
整个周末，公司⿎励股东光顾“伯克希尔购物中⼼”，为伯克希尔创收。这⾥可是伯克希尔⼦公司的零售天堂。
The ground floor of the CenturyLink Center turns into a mini-mall for Berkshire’s shareholders. Dozens of subsidiaries form a midway of booths hawking their wares.12
世纪电信中⼼的⼀楼成了伯克希尔股东的⼩型购物中⼼，⼗⼏家⼦公司摆出摊位兜售他们的商品。[2]
And then there’s the meeting itself, which kicks off with an original short film. Over the years, these films feature skits that have featured every kind of celebrity, including soap opera legend Susan Lucci, boxer Floyd Mayweather, and actor Bryan Cranston (appearing in his role as Walter White from Breaking Bad).
年会以原创短⽚开场。多年来，这些搞笑短⽚由各⾏各业的名⼈出演，包括肥皂剧传奇⼈物苏珊·卢琪、拳击⼿弗洛伊德·梅威瑟以及演员布赖恩·克兰斯顿（扮演过《绝命毒师》中的沃尔特·怀特）。
The Meeting Itself
年会
With all the furor around the Q&A, you might be forgiven for thinking it was of lesser importance. But you couldn’t be farther from the truth. These two men are always the main attraction.
尽管年会上问答环节热⽕朝天，但你要是觉得它并不重要也⽆可厚⾮，虽然事实远⾮如此。巴菲特和芒格永远是⼤家关注的焦点。
People care deeply about what they have to say and will wait for hours just to ask a single question. In 1984, the Q&A session went on for 2.5 hours. Now, it’s considered short if it wraps up in under six hours. Such is the value attendees place on the combined wisdom of these two modern-day sages.
⼤家特别关⼼他们会说些什么，宁愿等上⼏个⼩时也要问上⼀个问题。1984年，问答环节持续了两个半⼩时。如今，这个环节要是到不了6个⼩时都显得意犹未尽。⼈们赶来参加年会就是为了吸取两位“现代圣贤”的共同智慧。
Admittedly, adjusting to the larger numbers of attendees has been, well, an adjustment. With so many people vying to get a question in, the quality of the questions appeared—to Corey and me—to drop off. But perhaps we are being unfair. Having been longtime attendees,13 we miss the quieter, more intimate meetings of the past. Fortunately, in 2013, the quality of questions significantly improved by adding a panel of three journalists and three analysts, who now ask a majority of the questions.
诚然，出席⼈数越来越多，年会也需要做出调整。争相提问的⼈变多了，但我和科⾥却发现所提问题的质量有所下降。也许是我们有失公允。参加了这么多次年会，我们开始怀念曾经那些安静亲切的年会了。[1]幸运的是，3名记者和3名分析师代替⼤家在年会上发问，这⼤幅提升了2013年年会上问题的质量。
Regardless of size, though, the meetings are always informative and full of Buffett and Munger’s wit and insight.
然⽽⽆论规模⼤⼩，年会都充满了巴菲特和芒格的智慧与远⻅，总能让我们学到很多东⻄。
A Conversation Across Time
穿越时间的对话
Corey and/or I have taken copious notes during every single Berkshire meeting since that first one in 1984. In 1986, I decided I shouldn’t keep them to myself and started sending them out as a newsletter to clients and friends.
⾃1984年起，我和科⾥每⼀次参加伯克希尔的年会都会做⼤量的笔记。1986年，我觉得不该把它们据为⼰有，便将它们撰写成资讯发送给客⼾和朋友们。
While working for Berkshire, Corey was still on my newsletter’s mailing list. He remembers reading and enjoying my newsletters while there. He found them to be informative and down-to-earth and thought they captured the essence of the meetings. We talked on the phone from time to time, and I would ask him questions. He said I understood Berkshire’s business, from the outside looking in, as well as anyone.
尽管科⾥当时还在伯克希尔⼯作，但我还是会给他发⼀份资讯。他还记得在伯克希尔读到我发来的资讯时喜悦的⼼情。他发现资讯信息量⼤、务实，还提炼出了会议的精华。我们不时在电话中交谈，我还会问他⼀些问题。他说我和其他⼈⼀样，以旁观者的⾓度审视伯克希尔的业务。
While at Berkshire, Corey had often thought about chronicling what he learned there in a diary, but part of him thought that would be disloyal to the corporation, so he opted against it.
在伯克希尔的时候，科⾥总是琢磨着怎样才能把学到的知识写在⽇记⾥。但他转念⼀想，这么做也许会泄露公司机密，便就此作罢。
While he didn’t formally sit down to take notes, Corey still picked up gems of wisdom as he talked to his coworkers and the executives of the subsidiaries and watched how these exceptional people thought. As a necessity of his job, Corey was always focused on learning. The subsidiaries he worked with varied greatly in their business models. Nebraska Furniture Mart’s business, after all, is a lot different from National Indemnity, See’s Candies, and Buffalo News.
尽管没有坐下来好好记笔记，但科⾥在和同事交流的过程中，在和⼦公司⾼管的谈话中，在观察这些成功⼈⼠的思维⽅式的过程中，学到了很多智慧。科⾥的⼯作⽆时⽆刻不需要学习，因为他审计的⼦公司的经营模式存在很⼤差异——内布拉斯加家具卖场的经营模式⾃然和国⺠保险公司、时思糖果以及《⽔⽜城新闻报》⼤相径庭。
While working there, Corey also went to graduate school for his MBA and studied organizational theory as part of that. So during his workdays, he observed how effectively Berkshire’s decentralized organization functioned through the lens of what he was studying.
在伯克希尔⼯作时，科⾥攻读了⼯商管理学硕⼠学位并学习了管理组织理论。因此，在⼯作中，他将所学知识应⽤于伯克希尔分散式管理组织的研究上，搞清了伯克希尔⾼效的经营⽅式。
Corey became my business partner in 1992. While not disclosing any of the proprietary information he had been privy to, Corey and I discussed Berkshire all the time. He brought a deep understanding of the culture, the values, and of the players involved.
1992年，科⾥成了我的商业伙伴。尽管科⾥没有向我透露伯克希尔任何的机密信息，我们还是会经常聊起这家公司。他⾮常了解伯克希尔的⽂化、企业价值以及曾经的同事。
At that time, he personally knew a lot of the people involved and intimately understood the businesses that Berkshire owned. He had spent a lot of time traveling to meet with the subsidiaries.14 Ajit Jain, who is often talked about as being Buffett’s replacement now, invited Corey for dinner after he spent the day working at his office in New York. Corey even had brief interactions with Buffett, talking to him briefly two or three times.15
当时，科⾥认识伯克希尔公司⾥的很多⼈，也⾮常了解伯克希尔的各项业务，并经常和⼦公司的领导们⻅⾯。[1]如今阿吉特·贾殷常被看作巴菲特的接班⼈，科⾥曾在他纽约的办公室忙活了⼀天，他还请科⾥吃了晚饭。科⾥甚⾄还和巴菲特简单地说过两三次话。
Corey had seen firsthand Berkshire’s high ethical standards. Corey saw how Buffett, from the top, set the tone that Berkshire employees would monitor and respect all laws and rules. When Corey started in internal audit, computers could be purchased online without paying sales tax. But, at Berkshire, if anything like that was purchased, it had to be reported to corporate, so they could file the use tax returns. Buffett wanted to make sure that Nebraska got their sales tax. He was adamant about making sure that Berkshire paid—not more taxes than it had to, but the taxes that it was responsible for.
科⾥亲眼⻅证了伯克希尔的“⾼道德标准”。他看到巴菲特从公司⾼层开始，如何定下员⼯们相互监督，并遵守国家所有法律法规的基调。科⾥做内部审计时，可以直接从⽹上订购电脑，不需要缴纳任何销售税。然⽽在伯克希尔，⽆论购买什么东⻄，都需要向公司汇报，这样⼀来，他们就能提交纳税申请表。巴菲特要确保公司正确缴纳了各项税费。
Taking everything he understood from that experience, Corey has contributed to the notes every year since he came to work at Pecaut & Company in 1992. In the years he attended alone, I based the newsletter on his notes and insights. While I wrote each newsletter, Corey rigorously edited each one.16
科⾥吸取了过往的所有经验，⾃1992年来到佩科公司⼯作，他每年都会参加伯克希尔的年会，并做好笔记。有时他⼀个⼈参加年会，我便根据他的笔记和⻅解来撰写资讯。我负责撰写资讯，科⾥则认认真真地校对。[2]
Writing feverishly at each meeting, Corey and I jot down what we feel are the most significant of Buffett and Munger’s comments and insights. Our rigorous note-taking enables us to highlight, reflect on, and pass along the golden nuggets of what we learned.
每次参加年会，我和科⾥都奋笔疾书，记录下我们认为巴菲特和芒格的最有价值的评论与⻅解。我们的笔记⼗分严谨，只有这样我们才能够找出会议的重点，反思会议的精华，并将学到的宝贵知识传递出去。
Once home, we do a condensed but detailed write-up of each meeting’s notes for our clients. Those write-ups are what make up this book.
⼀到家，我们就为客⼾撰写出详细的会议纪要。那些会议纪要便是本书内容的基础。
In addition to their words, we often address what was unsaid, inferred, or implied. Our own expertise as value investors adds a depth of insight that goes beyond a dry, static, verbatim reporting of events.
除了他们直⾔的内容，我们还常常需要处理那些虽然并未明说，却能够推断和感知的东⻄。我们两个价值投资⼈的专业知识能够提升本书的洞察⼒，避免枯燥乏味的照本宣科。
Much of the mainstream news reporting on Buffett is done without deep insight into the working world of investing.17 In these pages, you will benefit from our own critical assessment of the meetings.
不少主流媒体在报道巴菲特时，并没有深⼊了解投资的学问。[3]⽽在这本书中，我们对年会进⾏了专业的、批判性的评价，你可以从中学到不少知识。
We have taken hundreds of hours of lectures and distilled them to their most concentrated form. You’ve been saved the painstaking task of digging through the archives to bring the gold to the surface.
我们选取了⼏百个⼩时的演讲内容中最精华的部分，你⽤不着费⼒挖掘，就能看到满地的⻩⾦。
You’ll quickly be swept up by the highlight reel of what has been a fascinating, informative, and often hilarious ride through 30 years of the
巴菲特和芒格30年来精彩幽默的“表演”蕴藏了丰富的知识，你很快就会被其中的⽚段深深吸引。
Warren and Charlie show.
This isn’t a book about dusty old “investment theory.” This is a curated collection of the best advice and insights Buffett and Munger have shared over the last three decades. Shocking revelations. Funny moments. Devilishly insightful strategies.
这不是⼀本尘封已久的“投资理论”，这是巴菲特和芒格在过去30年间分享的最精彩的意⻅与⻅解的精选集，⾥⾯有令⼈警醒的启⽰，有欢乐的时光，有巧妙的策略。
These newsletters form a conversation with Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger spanning three decades. We have no doubt that any serious investor will be fascinated and informed, in equal measure, by these letters. (And we challenge you not to laugh out loud at Munger and Buffett’s sibling-like haranguing.)
这不是⼀本尘封已久的“投资理论”，这是巴菲特和芒格在过去30年间分享的最精彩的意⻅与⻅解的精选集，⾥⾯有令⼈警醒的启⽰，有欢乐的时光，有巧妙的策略。
We believe these notes (excluding the annual reports) are the best substitute for attending Berkshire’s annual meetings in person over the last 30 years. Of course, if you were at the meetings, then this book is the perfect refresher. The pages to follow will add color and definition to your own memories of events.
这些内容能够弥补你30年来没能参加伯克希尔年会的遗憾。当然，如果你参加过年会，这本书就能帮你好好回忆会议的内容。接下来的内容将为你的记忆增光添彩。
The layout of the book is simple. It’s designed to put you in the room with Buffett and Munger, every year for the past 30 years (1986–2015).18 You will see how Buffett and Munger responded to their own mistakes and faced challenges as the world changed around them. The book unfolds as a journey.
这本书结构简单，它能够带你进⼊过去30年（1986—2015年）的伯克希尔年会，让你同巴菲特和芒格待在⼀起。你将看到巴菲特和芒格如何纠正⾃⼰的错误，如何在世界的动荡中应对挑战。总之，这本书将带你进⼊⼀段旅程。
If you decide to jump on board, you will see the remarkable rise of Berkshire Hathaway as it happens. You’ll come to understand the genius behind it. You have in your hands fly-on-the-wall analyses of 30 years of annual meetings.
如果你决定加⼊我们，[4]你将看到伯克希尔·哈撒⻙公司的崛起，你将了解它背后的天才，还将拿到伯克希尔30年间每场年会真实的分析结果。
Admittedly, for most companies, that would be like watching paint dry. But Berkshire Hathaway is a different kind of beast.19 The company’s unique success, and the strategies that made it possible, are legendary.
诚然，对⼤多数公司来说，陈年的会议纪要就像慢慢变⼲的油漆，但伯克希尔·哈撒⻙公司却是另⼀番情景。[5]它⽆可⽐拟的成功及其背后切实可⾏的战略都堪称传奇。
How To Use These Letters
如何使⽤本书
This book isn’t for the first-time investor. It’s for the informed investor who sees the value of being able to get deep into the mindsets of Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger. If you want to walk around in their shoes for the past three decades, absorb what works, and then apply it to your own investments, then this book is for you.
这本书不适合初次投资的⼈。它是为⻅多识⼴的投资⼈准备的，他们看到了深⼊了解沃伦·巴菲特和查理·芒格思维模式的价值。如果你希望能像他们⼀样投资得游刃有余，想找到有效的投资⽅法，并将其运⽤到⾃⼰的投资项⽬当中，那么这本书就是你的不⼆之选。
Also, one significant personal benefit of value investing is peace of mind. Many investors tough it out in the markets for years, living a life filled with anxiety and stress. They constantly fear that their investments will disappear overnight. On the other hand, great value investors, like Buffett and Munger, sleep like a baby—provided they follow simple timeless principles.
价值投资还能让你获得内⼼的平静。不少投资⼈在市场上苦苦挣扎，过着焦虑不安的⽣活。他们总是担⼼⾃⼰的投资项⽬会在⼀夜之间化为乌有。⽽像巴菲特和芒格这样优秀的价值投资⼈，却能如孩⼦般安然⼊睡——他们不过是遵循了⼀些亘古不变的简单的投资原则罢了。
We hope that by the time you’ve finished this book, these principles will be engrained in your consciousness. We hope that your investment decisions will take on a quality and depth that give you a serious competitive edge.
希望你看完这本书后，有些原则能够在你的意识中⽣根发芽。希望你能够做出⾼质量的、有深度的投资决策，为⾃⼰赢得强有⼒的竞争优势。
This is not a “how-to” book. This book wrestles with the question, “Why do two of the world’s greatest investors do what they do?” The answer is contained in these pages. If you understand it, you will become a better investor. If you can think and behave like they do, particularly under pressure, you will become a great and wealthy investor.
这不是⼀本告诉你“该如何去做”的书。这本书⼀直在思考⼀个问题：两位最伟⼤的投资⼈为什么要这么做？答案就在接下来的内容当中。你如果能够把握其中的真谛，就能成为更好的投资⼈。如果你能像他们⼀样思考和投资，特别是能够顶着压⼒做事，你就能成为伟⼤⽽富有的投资⼈。
This book will provide you with a deeper insight into how two of the world’s greatest investors deal with investment problems as they arise. You’ll witness, in real time, their reactions to events like the sovereign debt crisis, the subprime crisis, and nuclear terrorism. Through it all, you get an honest and frank account of mistakes made and obstacles overcome. You’ll see firsthand Buffett’s rock-solid reasoning for investing in Coke and See’s Candy.
这本书将使你拥有更加深刻的洞察⼒，了解两位伟⼤的投资⼈是如何应对投资难题的。你将实时⻅证他们处理主权债务危机、次贷危机以及核恐怖主义事件的能⼒。这样⼀来，你就能坦然⾯对⾃⼰犯下的错误和眼下的难题。你将亲⾝体会巴菲特投资可⼝可乐公司与时思糖果时的可靠推断。
You’ll also take a long look into the morbidly funny yet jaw-droppingly astute mind of Munger on a range of issues. From the futility of growing corn for fuel to the annual whipping of the modern portfolio theory, Munger never misses a beat.
你还能在⼀系列问题上仔细观察芒格既滑稽⼜令⼈错愕的思想——从挖苦种⽟⽶做燃料的徒劳⽆益到对现代投资组合⼀年⼀度的抨击，芒格⼀个都没落下过。
Had this been just a collection of anecdotes drawn from the last 5–10 years, it would have been too short of a time period to be meaningful. Instead, this is a three-decade, year-by-year analysis of history unfolding. You will be able to view Buffett and Munger’s decision-making process from a unique vantage point. You have a collection of insights about what went on beneath the surface of those decisions over time. You see how the same timeless principles are applied to vastly changing landscapes and circumstances (i.e., the internet, the demise of newspapers, booms and busts, and so on).
如果只搜集了过去5到10年的资料，则时间太短，分析起来没有太⼤意义。⽽这本书呈现了30年间伯克希尔每⼀年的年会分析，你将能够从独有的优势视⾓来审视巴菲特和芒格的决策过程。随着时间的推移，你还能洞悉这些决策背后的故事。你将看到同样的亘古不变的原则如何在千差万别的⾏业中⼤显⾝⼿（如互联⽹的兴起，报业的衰落，以及经济的繁荣与萧条，等等）。
While reading, you may wonder, If Berkshire got out of the market, shouldn’t I do the same? or If Berkshire bought it, should I buy it too? Buffett and Munger are clear in their advice—people should learn from them and model their advice rather than copy their behavior. The main reason is this: Unless you find yourself in the enviable position that Berkshire operates in, you would do well not to copy its moves.
读书时，你可能在想，如果伯克希尔从股市抽⾝，我难道也要退出来？或者说，要是伯克希尔收购了哪家公司，我也要跟着买进？巴菲特和芒格的建议⾮常清晰：⼤家应该向他们学习，接受他们的忠告，⽽不是完全照搬他们的做法。主要原因是，除⾮你的处境和伯克希尔⼀样令⼈羡慕，否则最好不要跟⻛⾏动。
Berkshire Hathaway now represents half a trillion dollars of assets. It makes direct purchases and deals of its own design. Berkshire sometimes buys whole companies. Buffett and Munger play the game at a scale that most investors cannot match. So instead of copying, understand why they made the decisions they did. Then apply those insights to your own decisions and your own position.
伯克希尔·哈撒⻙公司⽬前拥有1万亿美元的资产，它可以“随⼼所欲”地购⼊股票、达成交易，有时甚⾄全资收购某公司。巴菲特和芒格投资的规模是我们多数投资⼈⽆法⽐拟的。所以与其照搬，倒不如想想他们为什么会做出这些决策，然后把这些⻅解应⽤到⾃⼰的决策和处境当中去。
In more than one annual meeting, Buffett suggests that the best investment you can make is in yourself. After a lifetime of following his teachings and seeing the success in our own business, we wholeheartedly agree with him.
巴菲特不⽌⼀次地在年会上表⽰，最好的投资项⽬是⾃⼰。我花了⼀辈⼦的时间向他学习，也⻅证了⾃⼰公司的成功，我真⼼认同他的观点。
These letters are a valuable resource of learning and analysis that you can model for your own investing decisions. But before you dive in, understand that you are about to reap the rewards of the best investment we ever made, as a student at the University of Berkshire Hathaway.
本书中的会议纪要是⽤于学习和研究的宝贵资源，你可以将此作为⾃⼰投资决策的参考。开始阅读前，切记你即将收获我们在“伯克希尔·哈撒⻙⼤学”学到的最宝贵的投资知识。
So we invite you to turn the page and step into the fascinating world of the world’s greatest investment team . . .
所以，我们邀请你翻开这本书，踏⼊世界顶级投资团队的迷⼈世界……
All the best,
Daniel S. Pecaut
Pecaut & Company
April 2016
祝好！
丹尼尔·佩科
佩科公司
2016年4⽉
